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Agency  theory  provides  an  explanation  for  the  demand  for  financial 
statement  audits.  Jensen  and  Meckling  (1976)  show  that  capital  markets 
incorporate expectations of self-interested behavior by managers and their 
effect  on  firm  value  in  the  security  prices.  This  creates  incentives  for 
companies to hire external auditors to enhance the credibility of the financial 
statements. Hence, financial statement audits are used by companies as a 
monitoring  mechanism  to  reduce  the  costs  that  arise  from  conflicts  of 
interests between managers and shareholders, thereby increasing company 
value. 
The  value  of  the  audit  in  reducing  a  manager‟s  divergent  actions  is 
nevertheless contingent on the quality of the audit (Watts and Zimmerman 
1981).  Audit  quality  is  a  function  of  auditor  competence  and  auditor 
independence  (DeAngelo  1981b).  Auditor  competence  is  positively 
associated with the probability that misstatements in the financial statements 
are detected by the auditor. The probability that detected misstatements are 
reported depends on the independence of the auditor. 
Auditors have incentives to provide high quality audits due to possible 
reputation  and  litigation  costs  associated  with  audit  failures.  DeAngelo 
(1981b) argues that failure by an auditor to report material misstatements 
could harm his reputation, resulting in the loss of future quasi-rents due to 
client  loss.  A  comparison  of  auditor  reporting  behavior  in  high  and  low 
litigious environments by Farmer et al. (1987) shows that litigation concerns 
also  make  auditors  more  likely  to  report  material  misstatements.  Hence, 
litigation risk and reputation concerns create incentives for auditors to not 
compromise audit quality for a single client. 
Despite incentives for auditors to deliver high quality audits, a number of 
major auditing scandals occurred at the beginning of the twenty-first century. 
These auditing scandals raised concerns about the value and role of audits. 
In response to the scandals, regulation was put in place to ensure auditor 
competence and auditor independence. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, enacted in 
2002, and the revised 8
th EU Directive, which came into force in 2006, deal 
with issues such as auditor rotation, the provision of non-audit services and 
licensing requirements. These requirements depict a move away from audit-
market self-regulation to increased public oversight.  
The recent global financial crisis and the lack of qualified audit opinions 
issued by auditors preceding the crisis have once again resulted in concerns 
about  auditor  competence  and  auditor  independence  (Sikka  2009). 
Regulators currently consider the need for more regulation to maintain audit 
quality and to enhance confidence of investors in the auditing profession. For 
example,  the  Financial  Stability  Forum  (2008)  and  the  Basel  Committee Chapter 1 
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(2008) suggest the need for further guidance on audit quality. In addition, the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) currently studies the 
need  for  further  regulation  regarding  the  assignment  of  supervision 
responsibilities within audit firms (PCAOB 2010). The European Commission 
seeks to answer whether the auditing profession could have done a better 
job of signaling risks of financial institutions (European Commission 2010). 
Furthermore,  the  commission  attempts  to further  the  understanding  about 
the  effects  of  audit  market  structure,  audit  firm  governance  and  auditor 
independence on audit quality. 
This  dissertation  consists  of  three  empirical  studies  which  examine 
factors  influencing  audit  quality.  Figure  1.1  displays  the  relationships 
between  the  individual  studies.  The  three  studies  are  related  to  the  two 
components  of  audit  quality:  competence  and  independence.  These  are 
displayed in the middle of the figure. Displayed at the top of figure 1.1, the 
first empirical study examines whether audit firms use audit partner expertise 
as a risk management strategy. The second empirical study, displayed in the 
bottom right corner, tests the effect of auditor-client economic bonding on 
audit  quality  and  examines  whether  the  effect  of  auditor-client  economic 
bonding on audit quality depends on the extent of public oversight. The third 
and last empirical study, displayed in the middle of figure 1.1., examines the 
relationship between competition on the market for audit services and audit 
quality. 
 
Figure 1.1: The determinants of audit quality 
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This dissertation consists of three empirical studies. The first empirical study 
investigates  the  use  of  audit  partner  expertise  as  a  risk  management 
strategy. Risk management strategies are aimed at reducing the negative 
impact that audit failures may have on the profitability and reputation of an 
audit firm. This study focuses on one specific risk management strategy: the 
use  of  audit  partner  expertise.  Specifically,  the  study  examines  two 
components  of  expertise:  general  partner  experience  and  industry 
experience.  Auditing  standards  require  audit  partners  to  have  sufficient 
general experience and industry experience to audit clients (e.g. ISA 220.14; 
AU.  312.02).  Furthermore,  more  experienced  auditors  are  found  by  prior 
research to be better at detecting material misstatements (e.g. Libby  and 
Frederick  1990).  Hence,  the  allocation  of  audit  partners  with  greater 
expertise  can  be  used  to  manage  client  risks.  Besides  this,  more 
experienced  partners  are  shown  to  use  more  cost  effective  approaches 
when taking action in response to detected material misstatements than less 
experienced  partners  (Biggs  et  al.  1988).  Hence,  it  is  important  for  audit 
firms to allocate the most experienced audit partners to the most risky audit 
clients  to  minimize  audit  production  costs  and  to  manage  potential  client 
risks. 
Despite  the  importance  of  using  audit  partner  expertise  as  a  risk 
management strategy, it is not clear from a theoretical perspective if audit 
firms actually use partner expertise to manage client risks for two reasons. 
First,  the  allocation  of  audit  partners  to  clients  is  a  complex  task  due  to 
differences  in  partner  expertise  and  client  characteristics  (Dopuch  et  al. 
2003). This may cause audit firms to not optimally allocate audit partner to 
clients.  Second,  due  to  incentives  at  the  audit  partner  level,  such  as  risk 
aversion and career development incentives, the allocation of audit partners 
to audit clients may not be effective, and audit firms may face risks that are 
insufficiently managed. Therefore, the study examines whether audit firms 
allocate audit partners to clients based on client risk characteristics. 
The second empirical study analyzes the relationship between auditor-
client economic bonding and audit quality. The value of the audit depends 
directly  on  the  independence  of  the  auditor.  An  audit  conducted  by  an 
auditor who is not independent from the client has little to no value for the 
users of financial statement information. Audit regulation is therefore aimed 
at ensuring auditor independence, for example by limiting the types of audit 
and  non-audit  services  that  auditors  are  allowed  to  provide.  Despite  the 
prohibition of many types of non-audit services, the fact that auditors obtain 
audit  fees  from  the  clients  they  audit  may  still  create  an  economic  bond 
between the auditor and the client. The economic bond generated by audit 
fees may cause auditors to never be entirely independent from their clients 
(Mautz and Sharaf 1961; AICPA 1978; Wallman 1996). While this is unlikely 
to be an issue for small audit clients, economic dependence on large clients 
may  cause  auditors  to  acquiesce  to  client  pressures  to  allow  earnings 
management, hence lowering audit quality. However, potential costs due to Chapter 1 
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reputation losses and litigation in case of an audit failure create incentives 
for auditors to remain independent from clients. This study tests whether the 
negative effect of auditor-client economic bonding on audit quality is offset 
by litigation and reputation concerns. 
The negative impact of auditor-client economic bonding on audit quality is 
more likely to manifest itself at the audit partner level and the local office 
level  than  at  the  audit  firm  level  because  the  audit  fees  obtained  from  a 
single client are unlikely to represent a significant part of the total audit fee 
revenues of an audit firm, while they may represent a substantial part of the 
revenues of a local office or an audit partner (Wallman 1996; Francis et al., 
1999). This study therefore examines the effect of auditor-client economic 
bonding on audit quality at three levels: the audit firm level, the local office 
level,  and  the  audit  partner  level.  Furthermore,  the  study  separately 
examines the effect of auditor-client economic bonding on audit quality for 
clients that engage in upward earnings management and clients that engage 
in  downward  earnings  management.  Financial  statements  of  clients  that 
engage in downward, hence tax reducing, earnings management are more 
likely to be inspected by the tax authorities than the financial statements of 
client that engage in upward earnings management (Vander Bauwhede et al. 
2003). Hence, material misstatements are more likely to be detected when 
clients  engage  in  income  reducing  than  income  increasing  earnings 
management.  This  may  induce  auditors  to  be  stricter  in  preventing 
downward earnings management than upward earnings management. The 
use of separate analyses based on the direction of earnings management 
facilitates testing the effect of public oversight on audit quality. 
The final empirical study tests the association between competition on 
the market for audit services and audit quality. Concerns have been voiced 
about  the  lack  of  competition  on  the  market  for  audit  services  (e.g. 
Government Accountability Office 2003). Following standard economic the-
ory, a lack of competition is expected to result in lower quality. Most of the 
criticism on the audit industry is vested in the structure-conduct-performance 
framework (S-C-P). High market concentration is generally argued to lead to 
collusive behavior between the largest suppliers on a market, harming the 
competitiveness of the market and lowering the provided quality (Yardley et 
al. 1992). Prior literature has however questioned the suggested association 
between high concentration levels and a lack of competitiveness on the audit 
market (Buijink et al. 1998). Furthermore, while economic theory generally 
argues a positive association between competition and quality, it is unclear 
whether  this  holds  for  the  highly  regulated  market  for  audit  services. 
Competition may put pressure on audit fees, thereby reducing the incentives 
for audit firms to invest in quality (Leland 1979; Kranton 2003). Furthermore, 
competition  may  impair  audit  independence,  as  reduced  audit  fees  may 
cause auditors to become more dependent upon future quasi rents to offset 
initial losses (DeAngelo 1981a). Reduced auditor competence and auditor 
independence  could  therefore  result  in  reduced  audit  quality  (DeAngelo 
1981a).  Since  the  effect  of  competition  on  audit  quality  is  unclear,  it  is 
important  for  regulators  to  obtain  insight  into  the  relationship  between 




audit quality  is maintained at a high level. The study  uses the Herfindahl 
index, which is adopted from the area of industrial organization, to analyze 
whether  high  market  concentration  levels  reflect  reduced  quality. 
Furthermore,  two  measures  of  competition  are  used  to  analyze  if  audit 
quality is affected by competition on the audit market. The first measure of 
competition  is  based  on  the  market  share  mobility  measure  adopted  by 
Buijink et al. (1998). The study develops a second measure of competition to 
enhance the measurement of local competition. 
This dissertation is relevant for both audit practice and audit regulators as 
it enhances the understanding of factors that influence audit quality. The first 
study provides further insight into the partner allocation process within audit 
firms and the extent to which client risks are managed by audit firms. The 
allocation  of  audit  partners  influences  auditor  competence  because  audit 
partner  expertise  is  positively  related  to  the  likelihood  that  material 
misstatements are detected. The second study provides more insight  into 
the effect of auditor-client economic bonding on audit quality. Furthermore, 
the second study adds to the current debate on the need for public oversight 
by analyzing the effect of auditor-client economic bonding on quality using 
two settings that are characterized by different levels of public oversight. The 
third  study  helps  to  understand  the  relationships  between  market 
concentration,  competition  and  audit  quality.  Furthermore,  it  adds  to  the 
literature through the development of a new local measure of competition 
which better takes into account the geographical dispersion of auditors and 
clients  within  local  audit  markets.  Together  these  three  studies  provide 
further  insight  into  the  main  factors  that  influence  audit  quality.  The 
contributions of the studies are further discussed in section 1.4. 
 
 
1.3 Research setting and data 
 
Decisions by auditors regarding individual clients are not taken in isolation, 
but based on the characteristics of the other clients within the auditor‟s client 
portfolio (Simunic and Stein 1990). It is therefore important to use a setting in 
which data is available for the complete set of clients, and not for subsets of 
clients. Analyses based on complete client portfolios better reflect the actual 
decision making process within audit firms, thereby providing more insightful 
results. Therefore, the empirical studies in this dissertation require a setting 
in which data for a complete market are available. The studies also require 
the audit firm, the local office and the audit partner to be identifiable for each 
audit to facilitate the construction of client portfolios at the audit firm level, 
the  local  office  level  and  the  audit  partner  level.  The  first  empirical  study 
requires  the  construction  of  client  portfolios  at  the  audit  firm  level  for  the 
examination  of  relative  client  riskiness.  Furthermore,  it  is  necessary  that 
proxies for audit partner expertise and client riskiness can be constructed to 
test whether audit firms allocate audit partners to clients based on client risk 
factors and audit partner expertise. The second study requires client portfolio 
data to measure the extent of auditor-client economic bonding. In addition, Chapter 1 
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the study relies on the availability of financial client data for the construction 
of the proxy for audit quality. The third study needs client portfolio data as 
well as geographic locations of all auditors and clients for the measurement 
of local competition. Similar to the second study it requires financial client 
data to measure audit quality. 
The Belgian audit market provides an appropriate setting for the studies 
in  this  dissertation  since  it  meets  all  the  requirements  specified  above. 
Complete  portfolios  can  be  constructed  because  Belgian  corporate  law 
requires  all  companies  above  a  certain  size  limit  to  have  their  financial 
statements  audited  by  a  statutory  auditor.  These  audited  financial 
statements have to be deposited at the National Bank of Belgium (NBB) and 
are publicly available. Furthermore, all audit reports in Belgium are required 
to  be  signed  by  the  name  of  the  audit  firm,  as  well  as  the  name  of  the 
engagement partner. This enables the construction of client portfolios at the 
audit firm level and the audit partner level. Finally, all Belgian auditors are 
required to be registered at „het Instituut van de Bedrijfsrevisoren‟ (IBR, the 
Belgian Institute of Auditors). This facilitates the collection of audit partner 
specific data. 
The necessary data are obtained from three different sources. Financial 
client data are obtained from the Bel-First database. This database also lists 
the  audit  firm  and  audit  partner  for  each  audited  client  company.  This 
enables the construction of client portfolios at the audit firm level and the 
audit partner level. The second dataset consists of annual membership lists 
of the IBR. These membership lists contain audit partner information, such 
as the location of the local office at which the audit partner is employed. This 
facilitates the construction of client portfolios at the office level. Additionally, 
the  IBR  membership  lists  enable  the  construction  of  a  measure  of  audit 
partner expertise. Finally, geographical locations obtained for all audit clients 
and all local audit offices are obtained from Google Earth. The geographical 





This dissertation contributes to the auditing literature in several ways. First of 
all, the dissertation examines the determinants of audit quality in a market-
wide  setting.  Whereas  prior  studies  have  focused  only  on  publicly  listed 
companies, the studies in this dissertation use data on both publicly listed 
and privately held companies. The examination of audit processes based on 
the  complete  range  of  clients  is  important  because  decisions  regarding 
individual  clients  are  not  taken  in  isolation,  but  are  a  function  of  the 
characteristics of the other clients within an auditor‟s client portfolio. More 
specifically, this implies for the first study that auditor allocation decisions are 
based on the risk characteristics of all clients within the client portfolio of the 
audit firm. For the second study this implies that the extent of pressure to 
allow  earnings  management  depends  on  a  client‟s  importance  relative  to 




to individual clients are not a result of just the level of competition faced by 
the auditor for that particular individual client, but of the level of competition 
faced for each of the auditor‟s clients. Hence, each of the three empirical 
studies will provide more insightful results than studies based on samples of 
publicly listed clients only. 
Second, although listed companies are generally larger than non-listed 
companies, it is important to analyze the private client segment since non-
listed companies are predominant in the market and constitute the largest 
part of an auditor‟s portfolio. An analysis of the private client segment of the 
audit market is furthermore of interest because this segment of the market is 
likely to be less concentrated and more competitive than the public client 
segment (Simunic 1980). It is  important to examine  auditor  behavior  in  a 
more competitive environment because auditor behavior may differ based on 
the degree of competition in a market. 
Third, the first study of this dissertation examines the actual allocation of 
audit partners to clients. Prior research has examined the nature and mix of 
labor resources used within a single audit firm, as well as the effect of risk on 
the  planned  use  of  experts.  However,  no  study  has  examined  the  actual 
allocation of audit partners as a risk management strategy in a market-wide 
setting. An examination of actual partner allocation is valuable because the 
allocation of audit partners is a complex process due to the large variation in 
client  and  audit  partner  characteristics.  Hence,  the  possibility  exists  that 
audit partners with greater expertise are not allocated to risky clients even 
though  audit  firms  recognize  that  audits  of  risky  clients  may  benefit  from 
such an allocation. 
Fourth,  the  examination  of  auditor-client  economic  bonding  on  audit 
quality in a low litigious environment, while taking into account the likelihood 
that the financial statements will be inspected by tax authorities based on the 
direction  of  client  earnings  management,  provides  an  opportunity  to 
contribute to the literature by providing further insight into the need for public 
oversight.  Specifically,  this  enables  testing  whether  reputation  concerns 
provide  sufficient  incentives  for  auditors  to  resist  client  pressure  to  allow 
earnings management or whether additional public oversight is needed to 
prevent auditors from acquiescing to client pressure. 
Fifth, the second study of this dissertation uses a relatively new approach 
by constructing client portfolios not only at the audit firm level, but also at the 
local office level and the audit partner level. This enables testing the effect of 
auditor-client  economic  bonding  on  audit  quality  at  those  levels  at  which 
financial dependence on a single client is most likely to result in impaired 
auditor independence. 
Finally, the use of geographical coordinates enables the construction of a 
new  measure  of  local  competition.  This  measure  takes  into  account  the 
geographical dispersion of auditors and clients  within local  audit markets, 
facilitating a more accurate measure of local competition. 
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1.5 Structure of the dissertation 
 
The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows. The first empirical 
study,  which  analyzes  the  use  of  audit  partner  expertise  as  a  risk 
management  strategy,  is  presented  in  chapter  2.  The  second  empirical 
study, which examines the effect of auditor-client economic bonding on audit 
quality, forms chapter 3. Chapter 4 presents the third empirical study, which 
investigates  the  association  between  competition  on  the  market  for  audit 
services and audit quality. Finally, chapter 5 concludes by summarizing the 





The Use of Audit Partner Expertise 
as a Risk Management Strategy 
 
 
ABSTRACT: This study examines the use of audit partner ex-
pertise as a risk management strategy. Risk management strat-
egies are important, because client risks can result in losses on 
audit engagements due to litigation, loss of reputation or regula-
tory penalties. Although there is some prior research that has 
examined the planned use of experts, to date no study has ex-
amined the actual use of experts. This study attempts to ad-
dress this issue. 
The study makes use of Belgian data which facilitates the con-
struction  of  partner  expertise  measures.  The  study  examines 
whether audit firms use audit partner expertise as a risk man-
agement  strategy  for  three  different  types  of  risk:  audit  risk, 
client business risk and auditor business risk. 
Results show that audit partner expertise is used as a risk man-
agement strategy for clients that pose a higher audit risk or a 
higher auditor business risk. No evidence is found in support of 
the hypothesis that audit partners with higher expertise are allo-
cated to engagements with a higher client business risk. 
Key Words: Risk Management Strategies, Audit Partner Exper-





Audit firms use risk management strategies to manage the impact of client 
risks. There are various risk management strategies which audit firms can 
use. This study examines whether audit firms use partner expertise as a risk 
management strategy. Auditors with more expertise can be expected to bet-
ter detect material misstatements and subsequently better act upon detected 
material misstatements (Biggs et al. 1988; Bedard and Biggs 1991). 
The allocation of partners to clients is a complex task due to differences 
in  partner  expertise  and  client  characteristics  (Dopuch  et  al.  2003).  From 
both a risk management and cost minimization perspective it can be rea-
soned that it is optimal for an audit firm to allocate partners with the greatest 
expertise to the most risky clients. However, due to possible risk aversion of 
audit partners and practice development pressure faced by audit partners it 
is unclear whether the partner allocation in fact occurs in a manner that is 
optimal for the audit firm. On the one hand, experienced audit partners may 
be unwilling to audit risky clients due to liability concerns and may use their 
position in the audit firm to avoid being allocated to such clients. On the oth-




order to expand their client portfolio. This can result in risks being insuffi-
ciently or not cost effectively managed. 
Because of the regulatory requirement to effectively manage client risks 
(e.g. ISA 220.14; AU. 312.02) and the impact of risk management on audit 
firm profitability and risk exposure, it is important to test whether audit firms 
actually  allocate  audit  partners  with  the  greatest  expertise  to  clients  that 
pose increased risk. Therefore, the main research question of this study is: 
Do audit firms use audit partner expertise as a risk management strategy by 
allocating partners with more expertise to clients with a higher risk? 
Whereas prior literature has tested whether expertise enhances the effec-
tiveness and efficiency of audit decisions (e.g. Libby and Frederick 1990; 
Biggs et al. 1988; Bedard and Biggs 1991), examined the nature and mix of 
labor resources used within a single firm (e.g. O‟Keefe et al. 1994; Hacken-
brack and Knechel 1997) and investigated the effect of risk on the planned 
allocation of expert personnel (e.g. Johnstone and Bedard 2003; Bedard and 
Johnstone 2004), no study has tested whether audit firms take client risks 
into account in actual partner allocation decisions. The current study contri-
butes  to  the  audit  literature  in  at  least  two  respects.  First,  this  study  ex-
amines the actual allocation of audit partners across clients, as opposed to 
prior research which investigated  the planned allocation  of audit partners. 
Since the auditor allocation process is complex due to a large variety in audit 
partner and client characteristics, it is important not only to examine if a need 
for  partners  with  greater  expertise  was  indicated,  but  also  whether  such 
partners were actually allocated to clients that pose greater risks. Second, 
this study examines the actual allocation of audit partners across clients in a 
market wide setting. Prior research relied on data from listed clients only. 
However, auditors consider client risk in a portfolio setting, taking not only 
risk characteristics of individual clients into account, but also risk characteris-
tics  of  the  other  clients  in  the  client  portfolio  (Simunic  and  Stein  1990). 
Hence, it is important for an analysis of client risks to incorporate both listed 
and non-listed clients in the construction of client portfolios to better reflect 
the processes that take place within audit firms. Furthermore, audits of both 
listed and  non-listed companies enhance auditor expertise. A measure of 
auditor expertise based on both listed and non-listed clients will therefore be 
more accurate than a measure of partner expertise based on listed clients 
only. 
This study is conducted in the Belgian audit market, a setting in which it is 
possible to construct complete client portfolios for each audit firm, including 
both listed and non-listed client companies. Furthermore, for each audit firm 
it is possible to construct expertise measures for all audit partners. To re-
duce the confounding impact of other potential risk management strategies, 
this study makes use of a sample of companies for which a new partner was 
assigned,  while  still  audited  by  the  same  audit  firm.  This  setting  enables 
testing whether clients that pose greater risks are audited by audit partners 
with a greater level of expertise. 
The current study tests the use of audit partner expertise as a risk man-
agement strategy for three types of risks that are commonly distinguished in 




risk (Huss and Jacobs 1991). Furthermore, two components of partner ex-
pertise  are  distinguished:  general  partner  experience  and  industry  expe-
rience. The results support the expectation that audit firms use partner ex-
pertise as a risk management strategy. Partners of both Big N and non-Big N 
audit  firms  with  greater  general  experience  are  allocated  to  clients  with 
greater auditor business risk. Industry experience of partners is found to be 
used to manage audit risk. Furthermore, there is some evidence that non-Big 
N audit firms allocate partners with greater general experience to clients with 
greater audit risk. No support is found for the use of partner expertise as a 
risk management strategy for client business risk. 
The  remainder  of  this  study  is  structured  as  follows.  Section  2.2  dis-
cusses  relevant  prior  literature  and  hypotheses  development.  Section  2.3 
describes the data required to conduct the current study and outlines the 
research  methodology.  Section  2.4  presents  the  results  of  the  analyses. 
Finally, section 2.5 provides the conclusion and limitations. 
 
 
2.2 Prior literature and hypotheses development 
 
This section provides an overview of relevant prior literature. First, the vari-
ous types of client risks are described. This is followed by a discussion of the 
importance  of  risk  management  strategies.  Subsequently,  possible  risk 
management strategies are described, along with an overview of prior re-
search on these risk management strategies. Finally, based on this discus-
sion, the hypotheses for this study are outlined. 
 
2.2.1 Client risks and risk management strategies 
Because a single client can cause significant costs to an audit firm in case of 
bankruptcy or audit failure, it is important for an audit firm to manage client 
risks, while taking into  account the  audit fee (e.g. Johnstone  and Bedard 
2003) and the risk characteristics of other clients (Simunic and Stein 1990). 
Prior literature has identified various types of risks which clients can pose 
to auditors, using different risk classifications. The current study relies on the 
commonly  used  risk  classification  provided  by  Huss  and  Jacobs  (1991). 
They distinguish three types of risk that are relevant for audit firms in client 
acceptance decisions and for the audit process in general: client business 
risk, audit risk, and auditor business risk. The first type of risk, client busi-
ness risk, is related to client profitability and continuity. Client business risk is 
defined as “the risk that an entity’s business objectives will not be attained” 
(Bell et al. 1997, p.15). The second type of risk, audit risk, refers to “the risk 
that the auditor may unknowingly fail to appropriately modify his or her opi-
nion on financial statements that are materially misstated” (AICPA 2006, AU. 
312.02). The last considered type of risk, auditor business risk, relates to the 
risk that an auditor incurs “loss or injury to his or her professional practice 
from litigation, adverse publicity, or other events arising in connection with 
financial  statements  audited  and  reported  on”  (AICPA  2006,  AU  312.02, 




Auditing standards require audit firms to appoint audit teams to engage-
ments in such a way that an audit team has a sufficient amount of expe-
rience to manage these types of risk. The International Standards on Audit-
ing (ISA 220.14) require that “[t]he engagement partner shall be satisfied that 
the engagement  team, and any auditor’s experts who are  not  part of the 
engagement team, collectively have the appropriate competence and capa-
bilities  to  perform  the  audit  engagement  in  accordance  with  professional 
standards and applicable legal and regulatory requirements, and enable an 
auditor’s report that is appropriate in the circumstances to be issued”. ISA 
220.A11  draws  further  attention  to  the  experience  component  of  an  en-
gagement team, requiring that an engagement team has an: “understanding 
of, and practical experience with, audit engagements of a similar nature and 
complexity through appropriate training and participation”. 
The need to manage client risks also follows from the audit risk model 
(AICPA 2006, AU. 312.02). According to the audit risk model, audit risk is a 
function of the risk of material misstatements and the detection risk, where 
the risk of material misstatements is the product of inherent risk and control 
risk. Inherent risk refers to the probability that the financial statements con-
tain a material misstatement, assuming that there are no related controls. 
Control risk refers to the risk that material misstatements are not detected by 
the client‟s internal control system. Detection risk refers to the probability that 
the auditor fails to detect a material misstatement that has not been detected 
by the client‟s internal control system. From this it follows that in cases of 
increased inherent risk and increased control risk (weaker internal control 
system) an auditor will have to lower the detection risk to maintain audit risk 
at an acceptable level (e.g. Simunic 1980). Detection risk is lowered by in-
creasing audit effort. Given a desired audit risk level, a higher detection risk 
(less audit effort) is acceptable when inherent risk and control risk are low. 
Hence, from the audit risk model it follows that an audit firm has to appro-
priately adjust its audit effort based on the degree of audit risk. 
Apart from merely managing these three types of client risk, it is also im-
portant for the audit firm to manage these in a cost effective manner. Assum-
ing audit firms participate in a competitive market and given a scarcity of 
expert staff, audit firms will face a cost minimization problem not only at the 
individual engagement level (e.g. O‟Keefe et al. 1994), but also at the overall 
firm level. Even though clients at all risk levels might benefit from having an 
experienced engagement partner, it is optimal for audit firms to assign part-
ners with the highest expertise to clients with the greatest risks, since audits 
of such clients benefit most from more partner expertise (Biggs et al. 1988; 
Libby  and  Frederick  1990;  Bedard  and  Biggs  1991).  The  assessment  of 
client risk factors will therefore not only influence the assignment of labor 
within, but also across engagements (Bell et al. 1997). The diversity in know-
ledge of audit partners, and the fact that client characteristics show a lot of 
variation, make the allocation of audit partners to clients a complex, but im-
portant task (Dopuch et al. 2003).  
The audit partner allocation process is further complicated by the degree 
of risk aversion of the engagement partner. The engagement partner is the 




case of an audit failure. Because audit partners are personally accountable 
for any liabilities arising from engagements for which they are the engage-
ment partner, they are likely to be reluctant to audit risky clients. Partners 
with the greatest experience may therefore use their power within the firm to 
influence the client allocation process, in order to avoid being allocated to 
risky clients.
1 Besides that, less experienced audit partners, faced by career 
concerns, may have incentives to accept risky clients, as practice develop-
ment is an important factor in promotion and compensation decisions (Hooks 
et al. 1994). This may result in a sub-optimal use of expertise as a risk man-
agement strategy, which may leave audit firms with risks that are insufficient-
ly, or not cost effectively managed. 
 
2.2.2 The use of risk management strategies 
Audit firms can use a number of strategies to manage client risks, such as 
increasing audit effort (Schelleman and Knechel 2010), screening out clients 
with a high litigation risk (Francis and Reynolds 2001; Shu 2000; Choi et al. 
2004) or poor management integrity (Johnstone and Bedard 2004; Asare et 
al. 2005), charging a risk premium (e.g. Pratt and Stice 1994; Houston et al. 
1999; Seetharaman et al. 2002; Johnstone and Bedard 2003; Asare et al. 
2005), negotiating adjustments of the financial statements with clients (Fran-
cis and Krishnan 1999), reporting more conservatively (i.e. lowering the thre-
shold  for  issuing  a  modified  audit  report)  (Thoman  1996;  Willekens  and 
Vander  Bauwhede  2004),  changing  the  nature  and  timing  of  audit  proce-
dures  (Bell  et  al.  2002),  and  using  expert  personnel  (e.g.,  O‟Keefe  et 
al.1994;  Hackenbrack  and  Knechel  1997;  Johnstone  and  Bedard  2001; 
Johnstone and Bedard 2003; and Asare et al. 2005). Since the latter strategy 
is most closely related to that examined in the current study, research on this 
strategy is discussed more elaborately below.  
A number of studies use an experimental approach to test the effect of 
expertise on the effectiveness of the audit (e.g. Libby and Frederick 1990; 
Biggs et al. 1988; Bedard and Biggs 1991; Owhoso et al. 2002). Libby and 
Frederick  (1990)  find  evidence  suggesting  that  experienced  auditors  are 
more accurate and more efficient in explaining audit findings and that they 
are able to provide more plausible reasons for audit findings compared to 
less experienced auditors (measured in years of auditing experience). Using 
the  verbal  protocol  technique,  Biggs  et  al.  (1988)  and  Bedard  and  Biggs 
(1991)  report  similar  findings  using  an  experience  classification  based  on 
rank (seniors relative to managers). Biggs et al. (1988) further report that 
while inexperienced auditors respond to finding a potential problem by in-
creasing the audit effort in all stages of the audit, experienced auditors seem 
to  be  more selective,  suggesting  a  more cost  effective  approach  towards 
handling  audit  problems.  An  experimental  study  by  Owhoso  et  al.  (2002) 
shows that partners with industry expertise are more likely to detect errors 
than partners without industry expertise. These studies help to understand 
the benefit of allocating personnel to clients based on the client risk profile 




In addition to the experimental studies discussed in the previous para-
graph,  there  are  a  number  of  studies  that  use  archival  data  to  examine 
whether  auditors  plan  to  assign  more  experienced  personnel  to  riskier 
clients. The first insights on how audit firms alter actual audit plans based on 
client characteristics are provided by Bedard (1989). Through a survey of 
workpapers,  her  archival  study  shows  that  audit  plans  are  relatively  un-
changed from year to year.
2 Mock and Wright (1993) confirm these results, 
and additionally find limited evidence that the extent of planned testing is 
positively related to inherent risk. Quadackers et al. (1996) show that the 
planned extent of substantive testing is only adjusted for clients that exhibit 
large changes in risk. Mock and Wright (1999) report a moderately positive 
association between changes in client risk factors and the nature of planned 
tests, but find no association between changes in client risks and the amount 
of testing. Davidson and Gist (1996) find that the total number of planned 
audit hours is positively related to inherent risk, control risk, client business 
risk, client size, and client complexity. Overall, these studies show that audit 
plans are influenced by client risk factors, but that audit firms are slow in 
revising audit plans to reflect changes in client risks.  
A number of studies add to the literature by disaggregating the number of 
hours  spent  across  different  levels  of  expertise.  These  studies  examine 
whether client risks are reflected in the planned allocation of expert staff. 
O‟Keefe et al. (1994) find that more hours of expert staff are assigned to 
clients with a higher client business risk, but find no support for the hypothe-
sis that the level of inherent risk has an effect on the number of hours spent 
on  an  engagement  by  managers  or  partners.  Hackenbrack  and  Knechel 
(1997) add to this by showing that audit firms plan to use relatively more 
hours of high grades of labor to clients with a higher auditor business risk. 
Johnstone and Bedard (2001) report that audit firms plan to allocate person-
nel with a greater level of expertise to clients with a higher audit risk. John-
stone and Bedard (2003) find further evidence that audit firms manage audit 
risk by planning to assign expert personnel, but find no evidence supporting 
the argument that audit firms plan to use expert personnel to manage client 
business risk and auditor business risk. Results from an experimental study 
by Asare et al. (2005) show that audit firms allocate relatively more expe-
rienced staff to clients with a high inherent risk. Ettredge et al. (2009) show 
that economies of scale allow bank specialist auditors to charge lower audit 
fees,  on  average,  to  bank  clients.  Furthermore,  their  results  suggest  that 
compared to non-specialist auditors, bank specialist auditors spend relatively 
more time auditing less verifiable fair value accounts, which require more 
auditor judgment. Hence, audits appear to benefit from the allocation of spe-
cialist auditors. 
Overall, prior literature has found a weak association between client risk 
factors and the number of audit hours planned to an engagement. Stronger 
results are found when taking the level of staff expertise into account, al-
though it still remains unclear for which types of risk the use of partner ex-
pertise is an appropriate risk management strategy. Building on prior litera-
ture, the current study examines the use of audit partner expertise as a risk 




2.2.3 Hypotheses development 
The prior discussion shows that audit firms are required by auditing stan-
dards to sufficiently manage client risks. Furthermore, there are economic 
reasons for audit firms to manage the potential impact of client risks. How-
ever, due to the complexity of the partner allocation process, as well as risk 
aversion of audit partners, it remains an empirical question  whether audit 
firms use partner expertise as a risk management strategy. Since the viabili-
ty of the use of expert personnel as a risk management strategy is likely to 
depend on the type of risk (as suggested by Johnstone and Bedard 2003), 
and because of the mixed evidence so far, separate hypotheses are formu-
lated for the three risk categories as identified by Huss and Jacobs (1991): 
audit risk, auditor business risk, and client business risk. Each hypothesis 
follows the  argumentation  that  audit firms use partner expertise as  a risk 
management strategy. 
 
The first hypothesis tests whether audit firms use partner expertise as a 
risk management strategy for audit risk. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, audit firms are more likely to allocate a 
partner with more expertise to a client with a higher audit risk than to a 
client with a lower audit risk. 
 
The second hypothesis examines whether audit firms use partner exper-
tise as a risk management strategy to manage client business risk. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, audit firms are more likely to allocate a 
partner with more expertise to a client with a higher client business risk 
than to a client with a lower client business risk. 
 
The final hypothesis examines the use of audit partner expertise as a risk 
management strategy for clients with a higher auditor business risk: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Ceteris paribus, audit firms are more likely to allocate a 
partner with more expertise to a client with a higher auditor business risk 
than to a client with a lower auditor business risk. 
 










This section describes the methodology used to test the hypotheses stated 
in the previous section. First, the data requirements for testing the research 
question are described. Subsequently, it is explained why the Belgian audit 
market is chosen as a setting for this research. This is followed by a descrip-
tion of characteristics specific to this audit market. Next, the sample selection 
is discussed. This section concludes by providing an overview of variables 
which are used to measure audit partner expertise and client characteristics. 
 
2.3.1 Data 
To be able to test the hypotheses as stated in the previous section, there 
are a number of data requirements. First of all, client financial information is 
required  to  construct  proxies  for  the  client  risk factors.  Second,  for  every 
client  company  in  the  sample  the  audit  firm  should  be  known  because 
relevant client portfolios per firm have to be constructed. This is necessary to 
compare  the  risk  profile  of  one  client  to  that  of  the  risk  profiles  of  the 
remaining clients of the same audit firm to test whether audit firms allocate 
partners with (relatively) more expertise to (relatively) riskier clients. Third, 
for every engagement the name of the audit partner should be identifiable. 
Finally, a measure of audit partner expertise should be available for each 
auditor in the market. The last two requirements are necessary to be able to 
relate a client‟s risk profile to the expertise of an audit partner. 
The Belgian audit market provides an appropriate setting for this research 
for a number of reasons. First of all, in Belgium audit reports have to be 
signed with both the name of the audit firm and the name of the responsible 
audit partner. This makes it possible to construct client portfolios at both the 
firm and the partner level. Second, all auditors in Belgium are required to be 
registered  at  the  Belgian  Institute  of  Auditors  (IBR,  „Instituut  van  de  Be-
drijfsrevisoren‟).  The  Belgian  Institute  of  Auditors  has  published  annual 
membership lists from 1961 onwards, which allow computing the number of 
years of experience of each auditor in Belgium. Appendix A gives a more 
extensive overview of the IBR membership lists and steps taken to match 
audit partners to the appropriate audit firm. In addition, the possibility to con-
struct client portfolios at the partner level provides the opportunity to con-
struct  an  alternative  measure  of  expertise,  which  is  industry  experience. 
Finally, it is possible to collect the required financial information for all Bel-
gian companies using the Bel-First database. With this financial data it is 
possible to construct proxies for audit risk, client business risk and auditor 
business risk for each audited company. 
The possibility to construct relevant portfolios per firm and per partner, to 
measure expertise, and to construct risk proxies for every audited company 
make the Belgian audit market a unique and appropriate setting to examine 
the use of partner expertise as a risk management strategy. 




2.3.2 The Belgian audit market 
In many ways the Belgian market for audit services is different from the US 
market.  Belgium  has  a  code-law  tradition,  a  French  legal  origin,  a  strong 
legal enforcement, a high ownership concentration, but low outside investor 
rights and a stock market which is of limited importance (LaPorta et al. 1997; 
LaPorta  et  al.  1998;  Leuz  et  al.  2003;  Vander  Bauwhede  and  Willekens 
2004).
3  Most  companies  in  Belgium  are  privately  held  and  family-owned. 
Further, Belgium is a country with a low litigious environment, in which hardly 
any litigation exists against inappropriate audit reporting (Gaeremynck and 
Willekens 2003). 
Although Belgium has a low litigious environment, there are still sufficient 
other mechanisms to ensure that audit quality remains at a sufficiently high 
level, e.g. three year mandates
4, disciplinary actions against auditors, inves-
tigations in audit firms, and peer reviews (Gaeremynck and Willekens 2003). 
In addition, even though the risk of litigation is low, auditors still face the risk 
of loss of reputation (Klein and Leffler 1981) and loss of quasi rents (DeAn-
gelo 1981b). 
Figure  2.1  gives  an  overview  of  the  development  of  the  Belgian  audit 
market. It shows a steady increase in the number of auditors, which stabi-
lized around 1998 at just below 1,000 auditors. The major increase in the 
number of auditors around 1984 was due to a change in regulation, requiring 
all auditors to be registered with the national institute of auditors (IBR). 
 
2.3.3 Sample selection 
As discussed, data for this study are collected from two separate sources. 
Financial data are collected using the Bel-First database, and partner infor-
mation is collected using the IBR membership lists. Financial data and audi-
































complete  audit  market  are  available  in  the  Bel-First  database  from  1998 
onwards. The most recent year for which financial data was available at the 
start of the study is 2006. Partner experience is measured using the mem-
bership lists of the Belgian institute of auditors, which are published annually 
from 1961 onwards. Therefore the sample is limited to company observa-
tions for the years 1998-2006. This section discusses the sample selection. 
More information about the steps taken to prepare the data for this research 
can be found in the appendices. 
As mentioned, audit firms can adopt various risk management strategies, 
which could act as substitutes. In order to reduce the likelihood that alterna-
tive risk management strategies could confound the results, a setting is used 
in which the use of other risk management strategies is minimized, and in 
which  therefore  the  use  of  audit  partner  expertise  as  a  risk management 
strategy is most likely to occur. Therefore a subsample of client companies is 
used for which the audit partner changed, but the audit firm did not. While 
the reason for the change in partner could vary, this setting creates an op-
portunity to test whether a partner with more (less) expertise is allocated to 
clients with higher (lower) risk.
5 
In total, 28,735 unique companies are available for 1998-2006, resulting 
in  167,379  company-year  observations.  From  this  initial  sample,  observa-
tions are removed for the following reasons (see also Panel A of Table 2.1): 
  Due to their specific audit requirements and circumstances, utilities 
(four digit NACE industry codes between 4000 and 4,100) and fi-
nancial  institutions  (four  digit  NACE-codes  between  6500  and 
6720) are excluded from the sample (n=11,675). 
Table 2.1 – Panel A: Sample selection (company-year observations) 
A) Initial Sample    167,379 
Less: Utilities and Financial Institutions  -11,675   
Less: Subsidiaries  -18,004   
Less: Missing values  -56,490   
Less: More than one audit partner  -6,480   
B) Full Sample    74,730 
Less: Sole Proprietorships  -13,343   
Less: Lack of prior year auditor information  -15,845   
Less: No change in audit partner  -40,036   
Less: Switch to another audit firm  -2,758   
Less: Audit firms with only one partner accepting new clients  -194   
C) Sample for analyses (change sample)    2,554 
     
Table 2.1 – Panel B: Number of observations per year 
 
Year  Full Sample  Change Sample 
1998  7,862  -- 
1999  8,014  311 
2000  8,171  290 
2001  8,358  281 
2002  8,298  227 
2003  8,348  417 
2004  8,498  359 
2005  8,643  366 
2006  8,538  303 
Total  74,730  2,554 




  Subsidiaries are removed from the sample because audit partner 
allocation may be driven by decisions of the parent company, and 
not by characteristics of the subsidiary (n=18,004).  
  Observations with missing values were removed (n=56,490). Most 
of these are removed because of missing financial information for 
the current or prior fiscal year (n=53,602). The other 2,888 observa-
tions were removed because the audit partner was not identified in 
the Bel-First database. 
  Observations  with  more  than  one  audit  partner  are  removed 
(n=6,480) because the assignment of multiple partners may already 
be considered to be a risk management strategy.
6 
7 
  Observations for which the audit firm is a sole proprietorship (i.e. a 
firm with only one auditor partner) are removed (n=13,343) because 
these firms cannot allocate auditors to clients based on client risk. 
  Observations are removed for which no auditor information is avail-
able for the prior fiscal year, either because the company was not 
included in the database before, or because of omission for one or 
more years (n=15,845). In these cases it is impossible to determine 
if or when a partner change occurred. 
   Company observations that continued to be audited by the same 
partner were removed (n=40,036) because in these cases no allo-
cation decision takes place.  
   Companies that switched to another audit firm were also removed 
(n=2,758) because it is possible that the partner who attracted the 
new client becomes the engagement partner, without a formal allo-
cation decision taking place. 
   Finally, 194 observations were removed from the sample because 
for these observations there was only one partner in the audit firm 
accepting re-allocated from within the same firm, making it imposs-
ible to measure relative partner expertise.
8 
 
The  final  sample  consists  of  2,554  company-year  observations  (2,222 
unique companies). An overview of the remaining observations, per fiscal 
year, is given in Panel B of Table 2.1, which shows that the number of ob-
servations is quite evenly distributed across the sample years. 
 
2.3.4 Variables 
 This section discusses the measurement of the dependent and independent 
variables. 
2.3.4.1 Dependent variables 
Experience  is  commonly  assumed  to  be  a  primary  determinant  of  im-
proved expertise (e.g. Hamilton and Wright 1982; Bonner and Lewis 1990; 
Marchant 1990). However, Bonner and Lewis (1990) argue that even though 
it is common to measure expertise based on experience, it is an incomplete 
measure of expertise.
9 Therefore two measures of expertise are used. The 




ure  of  expertise,  suggested  by  Bonner  and  Lewis  (1990)  and  commonly 
used in auditing research, is industry experience. 
The first dependent variable, GENERAL_EXPERIENCE, is defined as the 
number of years since the auditor has obtained his or her certification as 
certified public accountant.
10 
The  second  dependent  variable  is  INDUSTRY_EXPERIENCEi.  While 
prior studies commonly measure industry experience at the level of the audit 
firm, Francis et al. (2005) argue that industry experience partly resides in 
individuals. The audited assets of a client is a commonly used proxy for the 
revenues  derived  by  an  audit  firm  from  a  client,  and  are  an  appropriate 
measure, because auditing is an inherently balance sheet oriented activity 
(Caplan and Raedy 2005). Prior studies report a non-linear relationship be-
tween client size and audit fees derived from a client (e.g. Simunic 1980). 
Therefore, partner industry experience is measured as the ratio of the sum of 
the natural logarithms of total assets from clients within industry (i), divided 
by to the sum of the natural logarithms of total assets from all clients in all 
industries which were audited by the partner in the last year.
11 An overview 
of the number of observations per industry is provided in Appendix C. 
2.3.4.2 Independent variables 
Prior research has used a number of different variables to proxy for audit 
risk, client business risk and auditor business risk (e.g. Simunic and Stein 
1996; Krishnan and Krishnan 1997; Shu 2000; Francis and Reynolds 2001; 
Choi et al. 2004; Hay and Jeter 2008). This section describes the variables 
that are relevant to the current setting. 
A number of variables are used in prior literature to proxy for audit risk.
12 
Receivables and inventory are typically accounts that are difficult to audit, 
and where financial statement misstatements occur often (Feroz et al. 1991), 
hence requiring subjective judgments by auditors (Simunic 1980). Therefore, 
a first risk measure that is used to proxy for audit risk is the sum of inventory 
plus receivables, scaled by total assets (IRTA) (see Simunic 1980; Krishnan 
and Krishnan 1997; Francis and Reynolds 2001; Gaeremynck and Willekens 
2003).  A  positive  association  between  IRTA  and  partner  expertise  is  ex-
pected. 
Another comparable measure that is commonly used in previous studies 
to proxy for audit risk is the ratio of current assets over total assets (CATA), 
where  a  higher  ratio  indicates  a  higher  audit  risk (Ferguson,  Francis  and 
Stokes 2003; Francis, Reichelt and Wang 2005; Ferguson et al. 2006; Hay 
and Jeter 2008). A higher value for CATA is expected to be associated with 
greater partner expertise. 
Asset Turnover (TURN) is measured as the ratio of sales to total assets. 
A higher turnover indicates a lower client business risk (Francis and Rey-
nolds 2001), but also a higher transaction complexity and is associated with 
more audit effort (Chaney et al. 2004). This variable could therefore be as-
sociated with either client business risk or audit risk. The effect of this varia-
ble on partner expertise is therefore not directly obvious.
13 
Client business risk is influenced by the profitability, liquidity and solvabili-




Reynolds 2001). This study uses two measures of profitability, a measure of 
liquidity and a measure of solvability to proxy for client business risk. The 
Return on Assets (ROA) and the Net Profit Margin (NPM) are both measures 
of client profitability. ROA is calculated as net income divided by total assets. 
NPM is calculated as net income divided by sales. Higher values for these 
variables are associated with lower client business risk and can therefore be 
expected to be negatively associated with partner expertise. 
Client financial distress is a common reason for litigation against the audi-
tor (St. Pierre and Anderson 1984; Palmrose 1987). Companies with a low 
liquidity face a higher risk of short term insolvency and therefore a higher risk 
of financial distress (Francis and Reynolds 2001). The quick ratio (QUICK) is 
a measure of liquidity and is computed as the ratio of current assets (minus 
inventory) to current liabilities. A quick ratio lower than 1 is usually perceived 
as an indicator of increased client business risk. A negative association be-
tween QUICK and partner expertise is expected because a lower quick ratio 
indicates a higher client business risk. 
Leverage  (LEV)  is  an  objective  measure  of  solvability  and  bankruptcy 
risk, and has been commonly used in auditing research (e.g. Simunic and 
Stein 1996). LEV is computed as the ratio of total debt to total assets. Com-
panies that  have a  higher leverage pose higher client business risk. This 
variable is therefore expected to be positively associated with partner exper-
tise. 
Audit firms consider a public listing to be an important driver of auditor 
business risk (Bell et al. 2002; Johnstone and Bedard 2003). Companies that 
are listed on a stock exchange receive more media attention, and therefore 
present a greater possible reputation loss in case of material misstatements 
that were not detected by the auditor. The risk of litigation and the damage 
awards are also greater for clients with a stock listing (St. Pierre and Ander-
son 1984; Lys and Watts 1994). The variable LISTED is set to equal 1 if the 
company is listed on the Belgian stock exchange, 0 otherwise. A positive 
relationship between auditor business risk and partner expertise is expected. 
2.3.4.3 Control variables 
A  number  of  control  variables  are  included  based  on  prior  literature  (e.g. 
Simunic 1984; Reynolds  and Francis 2001;  Vander  Bauwhede  and Wille-
kens 2004).
14 
The first control variable, WORKS_COUNCIL, indicates whether a compa-
ny is required to have a works council. Belgian companies that have more 
than 100 employees are required to submit economic and financial informa-
tion to a works council, and auditors are obliged to explain this information to 
the works council. According to Lefevbre et al. (1995) employees are impor-
tant users of the financial statements in companies with a work council. Re-
lations with banks, trade creditors and employees can create incentives for 
management  to  manage  earnings  upwards,  but  they  may  also  constrain 
earnings  management  (Sercu  et  al.  2002).  The  relationship  between  the 
presence of a works council and the level of expertise of the allocated part-




focus on the auditor‟s work, whereas on the other hand it serves as an addi-
tional monitoring mechanism on which the auditor can rely. 
Next,  a  number  of  proxies  for  complexity  are  included.  More  complex 
clients are likely to benefit more from a partner with a higher level of exper-
tise. Two common measures used to proxy for complexity are the number of 
subsidiaries, and the number of industries in which the client operates (Si-
munic 1984). NUM_SUBS is the number of subsidiaries in which the compa-
ny  has  a  more  than  50  percent  interest.  NUM_INDS  is  measured  as  the 
number of two-digit NACE industry groups in which the company operates. A 
positive relationship between these variables and the expertise of the allo-
cated audit partner is expected. 
Furthermore, two measures of client size, the natural log of total assets 
(TOTAL_ASSETS)  and  the  natural  log  of  revenues  (REVENUES)  are  in-
cluded. Client size is positively related to the amount of audit fees (e.g. Si-
munic 1980), making larger clients potentially more interesting for audit part-
ners. Hence, a positive effect of the size related measures on the general 
experience of the allocated partner is expected. 
The final control variable, BIGN, indicates whether a company is audited 
by a Big N audit firm (1), or a non-Big N audit firm (0). Big N audit firms differ 
from non-Big N audit firms in various aspects. A main difference is that Big N 
audit firms are larger, which allows their audit partners to specialize more 
than auditors working for non-Big N audit firms. It is therefore more likely that 





This section presents some descriptive statistics, followed by a factor analy-
sis aimed at reducing the large number of variables that are used as proxies 
for risk. Subsequently, the regression models are presented, and finally the 
results of the regressions. 
 
2.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
For reasons explained in section 2.3, the sample of 2,554 observations is 
used for the analyses. This section first provides some general descriptive 
statistics for the Belgian market for audit services. These descriptive statis-
tics are based on the more complete sample of 74,730 observations to give 
a more accurate overview of the Belgian market for audit services. Appendix 
C provides an overview of the number of observations per two-digit NACE 
industry group. 
The 74,730 observations (14,592 unique companies) are audited by 483 
different audit firms and 900 different partners. Panels A and B of Table 2.2 
provide some insight into the market shares of the Belgian audit firms for the 
sample examined in the current study. The market share of the Big N audit 
firms adds up to 48 percent when measured based on the number of con-
ducted audits.
15 The portion of assets audited by Big N audit firms equals 





79 percent, however this percentage is likely to be overstated because prior 
literature found that there is a non-linear relationship between client size and 
audit fees (Simunic 1980). The market shares based on the natural loga-
rithms of client assets are more in line with those of Panel A of Table 2.2, 
indicating a market share of 49 percent for the Big N audit firms. The percen-
tage of clients audited by Big N audit firms is lower than what is usually re-
ported in studies that examine only listed companies, where the Big N audit 
firms have a more dominant market share. 
Table 2.3 provides both the number of clients per audit firm and the num-
ber of clients per audit partner. The average number of clients per audit 
partner for the Big N firms ranges from 17.28 to 19.06, while it ranges from 
10.22 to 12.27 clients per partner per year for the non-Big N firms. The aver-
age number of clients for sole proprietorships is even smaller, ranging from 
6.69 to 7.49. The average number of clients per audit firm is also greater for 
Big N audit firms than for non-Big N audit firms. All differences are significant 
at the 1 percent level. Apart from confirming that Big N audit firms are in 
general larger than non-Big N audit firms, Table 2.3 also shows that partners 
working for Big N audit firms audit more clients than partners working for  
 
Table 2.2 – Panel A: Audit firm market shares based on the number of clients for the largest 10 
audit firms (n=74,730) 
Audit firm name Number  of  clients  Percentage Market 
1. Ernst & Young  10,226  13.68% 
2. PricewaterhouseCoopers 8,858  11.85% 
3. Deloitte & Touche  7,865  10.52% 
4. Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler  7,073  9.46% 
5. BDO Atrio  2,128  2.85% 
6. Arthur Andersen  1,619  2.17% 
7. Grant Thornton, Lippens, Rabaey & Co  1,292  1.73% 
8. TCLM – Toelen, Cats  1,051  1.41% 
9. Van Passel, Mazars & Guerard  1,014  1.36% 
10. Hermant, Dodemont & Co  957  1.28% 
Full Sample (483 audit firms)  74,730  100.00% 
   
   
Table 2.2 – Panel B: Audit firm market shares based on audited assets (in billions of euros) for 
the largest 10 audit firms (n=74,730) 
Audit firm name Audited  assets 
Percentage market 
share based on 
assets 
Percentage market 
share based on the 
natural log of assets 
PricewaterhouseCoopers  667.24 22.88% 13.66% 
Ernst & Young  542.02  18.58%  12.16% 
Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler  531.86  18.24%  10.71% 
Deloitte & Touche  486.25  16.67%  9.69% 
Arthur  Andersen  88.65 3.04% 2.80% 
Van Passel, Mazars & Guerard  33.47  1.15%  2.22% 
BDO  Atrio  33.09 1.13% 1.75% 
Grant Thorton, Lippens, Rabaey & Co  26.22  0.90%  1.39% 
TCLM – Toelen, Cats  24.45  0.84%  1.30% 
Callens, Guevar, Van Impe & Co  22.26  0.76%  1.22% 
      
Full Sample (483 audit firms)  2,916.69  100.00%   100.00% 




non-Big N audit firms. A possible explanation is that Big N audit firms have 
more support staff available than non-Big N audit firms, allowing partners of 
Big N audit firms to audit more clients than partners of non-Big N audit firms. 
Table 2.4 displays the general experience, measured as the number of 
years of experience as an auditor, for all of the partners included in the sam-
ple of 74,730 observations. The general experience per partner for Big N 
firms is on average lower than for sole proprietorships and other non-Big N 
audit firms. Differences are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
The remaining analyses use the sample of 2,554 observations for which 
the audit partner changed while the client remained to be audited by the 
same audit firm. Table 2.5 provides the descriptive statistics for this reduced 
sample for the variables that were discussed in the previous section.
16 As 
auditor allocation takes place at the beginning of the fiscal year, the alloca-
tion decision can be expected to be based on the audited financial state-
ments for the previous year.
17 For this reason, financial information from the 
previous year is used to explain partner allocation in the year under exami-
nation. 
Table 2.3: Average number of clients per firm and per partner for Big N firms, non-Big N firms 
and sole proprietorships (n=74,730) 
 
  BIG N  Non-BIG N  Sole proprietorships 
Year 
Avg. number of 
clients per 
partner 
Avg. number of 
clients per firm 




of clients per 
firm 
Avg. number of clients 
per firm
* 
1998  17.53  694.40  11.91  37.36  7.18 
1999  18.24  744.20  12.27  40.50  6.98 
2000  18.52  785.40  10.85  36.93  7.44 
2001  17.95  836.60  10.91  36.68  7.10 
2002  17.28  1,045.25  10.22  34.16  7.49 
2003  17.71  1,027.25  10.24  34.59  7.24 
2004  19.06  1,019.50  10.62  36.33  6.69 
2005  18.51  1,013.50  10.92  37.12  6.96 
2006  18.21  979.00  10.87  38.58  7.42 
* Sole proprietorships are audit firms with only one audit partner. Therefore no separate column 
for the number of partners is shown for sole proprietorships, since the number of audit firms 
equals the number of audit partners for these firms. 
 
 
Table 2.4: Number of audit firms and partners per year and their average experience in years 
for Big N firms, non-Big N firms and Sole proprietorships (n=74,730) 
 

























1998  198  5  13.22  254  81  13.49  190  13.67 
1999  204  5  13.65  231  70  13.65  209  14.06 
2000  212  5  13.65  245  72  14.36  213  14.74 
2001  233  5  13.87  242  72  15.10  216  14.93 
2002  242  4  14.78  254  76  15.85  203  15.70 
2003  232  4  14.96  267  79  16.47  208  16.46 
2004  214  4  15.57  284  83  16.92  210  16.90 
2005  219  4  15.52  289  85  17.46  206  17.31 
2006  215  4  15.87  284  80  17.94  207  17.88 
 
* 
Sole proprietorships are audit firms with only one audit partner. Therefore no separate column for the number of partners is 
shown for sole proprietorships, since the number of audit firms equals the number of audit partners for these firms. 





Less than 1 percent of the observations included in the sample have a 
stock exchange listing. The general partner experience for the Big N sample 
is higher than for the non-Big N sample (difference significant at the 5 per-
cent  level).  These  results  differ  from  those  reported  in  Table  2.4  which 
showed that audit partners of Big N audit firms have less experience than 
audit partners of non-Big N audit firms. Further analysis shows that partners 
of Big N firms with more years of experience audit more clients than partners 
with less experience, suggesting that partners start with a small portfolio of 
clients, which increases as they get more years of experience. Partners of 
Big N audit firms also have a higher industry experience than partners of 
non-Big N audit firms (difference significant at the 1 percent level). This is 
consistent with the expectation stated in section 2.3.4.3 that audit partners 
working for Big N audit firms are more likely to be able to specialize into spe-
cific industries than audit partners working for non-Big N audit firms. 
 
   
Table 2.5 - Descriptive statistics for the estimation samples for Big N clients, Non-Big N clients 
and all clients 
 
Variables  Big N clients 
n=2,242 
Non-Big N clients 
n=312 
All clients 
n=2,554  IRTAt-1  .542(0.287)  .516(0.267)  .539(0.285) 
CATAt-1  .698(0.291)  .672(0.277)  .695(0.290) 
TURNt-1  1.735(1.456)  1.821(1.544)  1.745(1.467) 
QUICKt-1  2.028(3.719)  1.785(3.301)  1.998(3.670) 
LEVt-1  .655(0.260)  .644(0.247)  .654(0.259) 
NPMt-1  .060(0.462)  .048(0.379)  .059(0.452) 
ROAt-1  .024(0.124)  .027(0.095)  .024(0.121) 
TAt-1  39.209(100.642)  14.932(48.326)  36.244(96.118) 
REVt-1  36.052(79.242)  17.074(37.950)  33.733(75.671) 
WORKS_COUNCILt-1  .216(.412)  .119(.324)  .204(.403) 
LISTEDt-1  .007(.082)  .003(.057)  .006(.079) 
NUM_INDS t-1  1.707(0.929)  1.625(0.902)  1.697(0.926) 
NUM_SUBSt-1  .750(1.818)  .728(1.612)  .747(1.794) 
GENERAL_EXPERIENCEt  11.444(6.065)  10.715(6.560)  11.355(6.131) 
INDUSTRY_EXPERIENCEi,t  .141(0.184)  .111(0.171)  .138(0.183) 
 
-The numbers before the brackets denotes the mean. The numbers between brackets denote the standard deviation. 
-All variables have been winsorized at the top and bottom 1 percent. 
-Variable definitions: 
IRTAt-1  Receivables in year t-1 plus inventory in year t-1 scaled by total assets in year t-1. 
CATAt-1  Current assets in year t-1 scaled by total assets in year t-1. 
TURNt-1  Asset turnover in year t-1, defined as the ratio of sales to total assets. 
QUICKt-1  Quick ratio in year t-1, defined as the ratio of current assets minus inventory to current 
liabilities. 
LEVt-1  Leverage in year t-1, defined as the ratio total debt to total assets. 
NPMt-1  Net profit margin for year t-1, calculated as net income divided by sales. 
ROAt-1  Return on assets for year t-1, calculated as profit divided by total assets. 
TOTAL_ASSETSt-1  Total assets in year t-1 stated in thousands of Euros. 
REVENUESt-1  Revenues in year t-1 stated in thousands of Euros 
WORKS_COUNCILt-1  Dummy variable indicating 1 if the company had more than 100 employees in year t-1, 0 
otherwise. 
LISTEDt-1  Dummy variable, indicating 1 if the company is listed on the Belgian stock exchange in 
year t-1, 0 otherwise. 
NUM_INDSt-1  Number  of  industries  in  which  the  company  operates  in  year  t-1,  measured  as  the 
number of 2-digit NACE industry codes. 
NUM_SUBSt-1  Number of subsidiaries in which the company holds a greater than 50 percent interest in 
year t-1. 
GENERAL_EXPERIENCEt  Number of years since the auditor obtained his CPA title in year t. 
INDUSTRY_EXPERIENCEi,t  Measure of partner industry experience in year t, computed as the sum of the natural log 
of total assets from clients audited by a partner within industry i in year t-1, scaled by the 
sum of the natural log of total assets from all clients audited by that partner in year t-1. 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.4.2 Factor analysis 
Many  of  the  independent  variables  are  significantly  correlated  (see  Table 
2.6). Factor analysis is used to reduce the number of variables by summariz-
ing them into a smaller set of factors. Factor analysis is applied to the 11 
continuous variables, also shown in Table 2.7.
18 The selected variables are 
similar to those described in Table 2.5, with the exception that the natural 
logarithms of the following variables are used to control for heteroscedastici-
ty  between  the  dependent  variable  and  the  independent  variables:  TO-
TAL_ASSETSt-1, REVENUESt-1, NUM_SUBSt-1, and NUM_INDSt-1. The va-
riables TOTAL_ASSETSt-1 and REVENUESt-1 are from this point onwards 
corrected for inflation using the GDP price deflator to improve comparability 
across the years. 
Because the goal of this factor analysis is to identify the latent constructs 
by  creating  a  small  number  of  factors  to  account  for  the  intercorrelations 
among the observed variables, this study uses common factor analysis in-
stead of component factor analysis.
19 Common factor analysis takes only the 
common variance of the variables into account, whereas component factor 
analysis takes both the common and the unique variance of variables into 
account. Common factor analysis is more appropriate since it does not re-
quire the error and specific variance to represent a small portion of the total 
variance (Hair et al. 2006). 
Table 2.7 – Summary of common factor analysis (n=2,554) 
  Factor Loadings 
 
  Factor 1  Factor 2  Factor 3 
Cronbach‟s Alpha  .794  .799  .622 
IRTAt-1  .828  -.056  .046 
CATAt-1  .849  -.116  .184 
TURNt-1  .635  .026  -.191 
QUICKt-1  -.022  -.147  .587 
LEVt-1  .069  .061  -.581 
NPMt-1  .037  .124  .570 
ROAt-1  .162  .150  .443 
LN(TOTAL_ASSETSt-1)  -.252  .867  .175 
LN(REVENUESt-1)  .295  .856  -.084 
LN(NUM_SUBSt-1)  -.186  .369  -.004 
LN(NUM_INDSt-1)  .000  .032  .049 
-Factors loadings above .400 are displayed in bold. 
-FACTOR 1 is labeled AUDIT_RISKt-1 
-FACTOR 2 is labeled SIZE
t-1 
-FACTOR 3 is labeled CLIENT_BUSINESS_RISK
t-1 
-Variable definitions:   
IRTAt-1  Receivables in year t-1 plus inventory in year t-1 scaled by total assets in year t-1. 
CATAt-1  Current assets in year t-1 scaled by total assets in year t-1. 
TURNt-1  Asset turnover in year t-1, defined as the ratio of sales to total assets. 
QUICKt-1  Quick  ratio  in  year  t-1,  defined  as  the  ratio  of  current  assets  minus  inventory  to  current 
liabilities. 
LEVt-1  Leverage in year t-1, defined as the ratio total debt to total assets. 
NPMt-1  Net profit margin for year t-1, calculated as net income divided by sales. 
ROAt-1  Return on assets for year t-1, calculated profit divided by total assets. 
LN(TOTAL_ASSETSt-1)  Natural log of total assets in year t-1 stated in thousands of Euros, corrected for inflation using 
the GDP price deflator. 
LN(REVENUESt-1)  Natural log of revenues in year t-1 stated in thousands of Euros, corrected for inflation using 
the GDP price deflator. 
LN(NUM_INDSt-1)  Natural log of the number of industries in which the company operates in year t-1, measured 
as the number of 2-digit NACE industry codes. 
LN(NUM_SUBSt-1)  Natural log of the number of subsidiaries in which the company holds a more than 50 percent 
interest in year t-1. 




A three factor solution is used, which follows from the root criterion,
20 the 
proportion criterion, and the scree plot. After applying an oblique factor rota-
tion on the standardized variables, the factor loadings as shown in table 2.7 
are obtained.
 21,22 
Factor 1 loads on two audit risk related factors IRTAt-1 and CATAt-1, and 
on TURNt-1 and will therefore be labeled AUDIT_RISKt-1. Factor 2 loads on 
two size variables (the natural log of TOTAL_ASSETSt-1, and the natural log 
of REVENUESt-1), and will therefore be labeled SIZEt-1. Factor 3 loads on 
two  profitability  measures  (ROAt-1  and  NPMt-1),  and  two  debt  variables 
(QUICKt-1 and LEVt-1). These variables are all measures of client financial 
health,  and  therefore  this  variable  will  be  labeled  CLIENT_BUSINESS_ 




Ordinary  least  squares  regressions  are  used  to  test  the  hypotheses.  The 
measures AUDIT_RISKt-1 and CLIENT_BUSINESS_RISKt-1 follow from the 
factor analysis discussed in the previous paragraph.
23 Both these variables 
are  measured  in  such  a  way  that  a  higher  value  indicates  a  higher  risk. 
Therefore,  in  line  with  the  hypotheses,  a  negative  relation  between  AU-
DIT_RISKt-1 and CLIENT_BUSINESS_RISKt-1 and the expertise measures is 
expected. A stock exchange listing is used to proxy for auditor business risk, 
AUDITOR_BUSINESS_RISKt-1,  for  which  a  positive  relationship  with  the 
expertise  measures  is  expected.  In  addition,  as  discussed  in  section  2.3, 
WORKS_COUNCILt-1, SIZEt-1, and BIGNt are included as control variables. 
Furthermore, dummy variables are included to control for possible fiscal year 
effects. 
For each fiscal year, the dependent variable and the continuous indepen-
dent variables are group mean centered, with audit firms as the grouping 
variable. This way it is possible to examine whether an audit firm allocates a 
partner with relatively higher (lower) expertise to a client that poses relatively 
higher (lower) risk. Mean centering per audit firm is required for the regres-
sion analysis to reflect that audit firms can only allocate their own audit part-
ners, and not audit partners working for other audit firms. The definitions for 
the restated variables are provided in Table 2.8, as well as in subsequent 
tables. 
To test whether more experienced auditors are allocated to clients with 
respectively a higher audit risk, a higher client business risk and a higher 
audit business risk, a regression is estimated in which the relative general 
experience of the audit partner is tested as a function of the aforementioned 
risk and control variables, as described in the following model: 
 
                                                    
                               
                                             
                                   
  
                    
(2.1) 





t  =  year; 
REL_GENERAL_EXPERIENCEt   =  GENERAL_EXPERIENCEt  of  the  engagement 
partner  –  the  average  GENERAL_ 
EXPERIENCEt of all partners from the same audit 
firm in the sample in year t. General experience is 
measured as the number of years of experience 
as an auditor.; 
REL_AUDIT_RISKt-1 
 
=  AUDIT_RISKt-1 of the client company  – average 
AUDIT_RISKt-1  of  all  clients  within  the  sample 
which are audited by the same audit firm in year t; 
REL_CLIENT_BUSINESS_RISKt-1  
 
=  CLIENT_BUSINESS_RISKt-1 of the client compa-
ny – average  CLIENT_BUSINESS_RISKt-1 of all 
clients within the sample which are audited by the 
same audit firm in year t; 
AUDITOR_BUSINESS_RISKt-1  
 
=  Dummy variable indicating whether 1 if the client 
company  was  listed  on  the  Belgian  stock  ex-
change in year t-1, 0 otherwise; 
REL_SIZEt-1  
 
=  SIZEt-1 of the client Company– average SIZEt-1 of 
all clients within the sample which are audited by 
the same audit firm, for year t; 
WORKS_COUNCILt-1  
 
=  Dummy variable indicating 1 if the client company 
required a works council in year t-1, 0 otherwise; 
BIGNt  
 
=  Dummy  variable  indicating  whether  the  client 
company is audited by a Big N audit firm in year t 
(1) or not (0); and 
YEAR_DUMMIES  =  Dummy  variables  for  each  of  the  fiscal  years 
2000-2006. 
 
Similarly, to examine whether audit partners with greater industry expe-
rience are allocated to clients with respectively a higher audit risk, a higher 
client business risk and a higher audit business risk, a regression is esti-
mated in which the relative industry experience of the audit partner is re-
gressed on the risk variables and control variables, as reflected in the follow-
ing model: 
 
                                                     
                               
                                             
                                   
  




REL_INDUSTRY_EXPERIENCEt   =  INDUSTRY_EXPERIENCEi,t  of  the  engagement 
partner  –  the  average  INDUSTRY_ 
EXPERIENCEi,t  of  all  partners  from  the  same 
audit firm in the sample in year t. 
 
The remaining variables are defined as earlier. 
 
2.4.4 Test of hypotheses 
Ordinary least squares regressions with robust standard errors are esti-
mated to test the previously stated hypotheses. The sample includes mul-




are independent is therefore violated. To overcome this issue, robust stan-
dard errors are computed to allow observations to be correlated within clus-
ters of the same audit firm. To estimate whether audit firms allocate partners 
with greater expertise to relatively riskier clients, all the explanatory variables 
have been group mean centered, for each audit firm, per fiscal year. 
Table 2.8 shows the results for hypotheses 1, 2 and 3. Panel A shows the 
results for general partner experience as the dependent variable, panel B 
shows the results for partner industry experience as the dependent variable. 
Results are reported for 3 different samples: (1) a sample which includes 
only clients of Big N audit firms, (2) a sample that includes only clients of 
non-Big N audit firms, and (3) the full sample, which includes clients from 
both  Big N firms and non-Big N firms. This makes it possible  to observe 
possible differences in the use of partner expertise between Big N and non-
Big N audit firms. The adjusted R-square equals 1.13 percent for the full 
sample, and 1.50 percent for the sample consisting of Big N clients. The 
regression for the clients of non-Big N audit firms has a negative adjusted R-
square  (-0.60  percent).
24  This  indicates  that  some  of  the  explanatory  va-
riables may add no value to this model. The highest variance inflation factor 
(VIF) equals 2.02, indicating that multicollinearity is not a cause for concern. 
Year dummies are not reported for the sake of brevity. 
The  results  for  the  full  sample  show  that  the  coefficient  for  the 
REL_AUDIT_RISKt-1 is in the expected direction, but insignificant at conven-
tional  levels  (β=.059,  p>.10).  Analysis  of  the  subsamples  shows  that  the 
coefficient for REL_AUDIT_RISKt-1 is insignificant for the sample of Big N 
clients (β=-.015, p>.10), but positive and significant for the sample of Non-
Big N clients (β=.828, p<.10). This indicates that there is only limited support 
for hypothesis 1, which states that audit firms allocate partners with more 
expertise to clients that pose higher audit risk. General audit partner expe-
rience seems to be used to manage audit risk, but only by non-Big N audit 
firms. 
The coefficient for the variable REL_CLIENT_BUSINESS_RISKt-1 is in-
significant for each of the three samples, and thus provides insufficient evi-
dence to accept hypothesis 2, which states that audit firms allocate partners 
with greater expertise to clients that pose higher client business risk. A poss-
ible explanation for this finding is that the issuance of going concern opinions 
is  rules-based  in  Belgium,  leaving  limited  room for auditor  judgment  (e.g. 
Carcello et al. 2010). 
Hypothesis 3 is tested using the variable AUDITOR_BUSINESS_RISKt-1. 
The coefficient of this variable is positive and significant for the full sample 
(β=4.674, p<.01), as well as both subsamples. The coefficient equals 4.778 
(p<.01) for the Big N sample and 2.566 (p<.05) for the non-Big N sample. 
This means that listed clients of Big N (non-Big N) audit firms are, on aver-
age, audited by a partner with approximately 5 years (2.5 years) more expe-
rience than non listed clients. These results support the hypothesis that audit 
firms allocate partners with greater general experience to clients that pose a 
higher auditor business risk. However, it is possible that experienced audi-
tors  choose  to  audit  listed  companies  because  of  prestige  concerns  and 




Table 2.8 – Panel A: OLS regressions with general audit partner experience as the 
dependent variable for the estimation samples of Big N clients, Non-Big N clients and all 
clients. 
  

















INTERCEPT    -.043(-.07)  -1.749(-1.14)  -.153(-.23) 
REL_AUDIT_RISKt-1   +  -.015(-.06)  .828(1.85)*  .059(.29) 
REL_CLIENT_BUSINESS_RISKt-1  +  .059(.48)  -.085(-.10)  .051(.43) 
AUDITOR_BUSINESS_RISKt-1  +  4.778(5.75)***  2.566(2.33)**  4.674(6.45)*** 
REL_SIZEt-1   +  -.069(-.28)  -.411(-.58)  -.091(-.43) 
WORKS_COUNCILt-1  ?  .348(.76)  1.082(.95)  .426(1.08) 
BIGNt  ?  --  --  -.137(-.27) 
Adj. R-square    .0150  -.0060  .0113 
Model F-Value    28.19***  203.01***  435.12*** 
Highest VIF    2.02  2.00  1.97 
- *, **, *** Significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent levels and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
- The values before the brackets denote the coefficients. The values between brackets denote the t-values. 
- All continuous variables are group mean centered, with audit firms as the grouping variable. 
- Robust standard errors are used to account for possible correlated observations within clusters of the same audit firm.  
- Coefficients for the year dummy variables are not reported for the sake of brevity. 
- Variable definitions: 
REL_GENERAL_EXPERIENCEt   =  GENERAL_EXPERIENCEt  of  the  engagement  partner  –  the  average 
GENERAL_EXPERIENCEt  of  all  partners  from  the  same  audit  firm  in  the 
sample in year t. 
REL_AUDIT_RISKt-1 
 
=  AUDIT_RISKt-1  of  the  client  company  –  average  AUDIT_RISKt-1  of  all 
clients within the sample which are audited by the same audit firm in year t. 
REL_CLIENT_BUSINESS_RISKt-1  
 
=  CLIENT_BUSINESS_RISKt-1  of  the  client  company  –  average 
CLIENT_BUSINESS_RISKt-1  of  all  clients  within  the  sample  which  are 
audited by the same audit firm in year t. 
AUDITOR_BUSINESS_RISKt-1  
 
= Dummy variable indicating whether 1 if the client company was listed on 
the Belgian stock exchange in year t-1, 0 otherwise. 
REL_SIZEt-1  
 
=  SIZEt-1  of  the  client  Company–  average  SIZEt-1  of  all  clients  within  the 
sample which are audited by the same audit firm, for year t. 
WORKS_COUNCILt-1  
 
= Dummy variable indicating 1 if the client company required a works council 
in year t-1, 0 otherwise. 
BIGNt  
 
= Dummy variable indicating whether the client company is audited by a Big 
N audit firm in year t (1) or not (0). 
   
None of the control variables has a significant effect on the general expe-
rience of the allocated partner, suggesting partner allocation is not affected 
by these factors. This finding is in line with prior research which showed no 
clear effect between these control variables and the need for the use of ex-
pert personnel (e.g. Reynolds and Francis 2001; Sercu et al. 2002). 
Panel B of Table 2.8 shows the results for the regressions in which part-
ner industry experience is regressed on the risk and control variables. The 
model is significant for all three samples, and the R-square ranges from 4.00 
percent for the full sample, to 4.73 percent for the non-Big N sample. Va-
riance inflation factors do not indicate that multicollinearity is a concern. 
The coefficient for REL_AUDIT_RISKt-1 for the full sample is positive and 
significant at the 5 percent level (β=.011, p<.05), providing support for hypo-
thesis 1. Furthermore, the coefficient for REL_AUDIT_RISKt-1 is significant 
for both the sample of clients of Big N audit firms (β=.009, p<.10) and the 
sample of clients of non-Big N audit firms (β=.035, p<.01). This suggests that 
both Big N and non Big N audit firms allocate partners with greater industry 
experience to clients with a higher audit risk. 
The  coefficient  of  REL_CLIENT_BUSINESS_RISKt-1  is  insignificant 




firms  do  not  appear  to  use  audit  partner  industry  experience  to  manage 
client business risk. 
Opposed  to  the  hypothesized  direction,  AUDITOR_BUSINESS_RISKt-1 
has a significantly negative coefficient for the full sample (β=-.052, p<.05) 
and the sample of Big N audit firms (β=-0.58, p<.05). The coefficient is posi-
tive, but insignificant for the sample of companies audited by non-Big N audit 
firms  (β=-0.08,  p>.10).  A  possible  explanation  for  this  lack  of  support  for 
hypothesis 3 is that audit firms may consider client risk to be sufficiently ma-
naged by allocating an audit partner with greater general experience. 
Hence,  while  audit  firms  allocate  partners  with  greater  industry  expe-
rience to clients with a higher audit risk, they do not use industry experience 
as a risk management strategy for either client business risk or auditor busi-
ness risk.  
The control variable REL_SIZEt-1 is insignificant across all three samples, 
suggesting  that  client  size  does  not  play  a  role  in  the  partner  allocation 
process. 
The  control  variable  WORKS_COUNCILt-1  has  a  significantly  negative 
coefficient for the full sample (β=-0.067, p<.01) and the sample of clients 
from  Big  N  audit  firms  (β=-0.067,  p<.01).  The  coefficient  is  negative,  but 
insignificant for the sample of clients from non-Big N audit firms (β=-0.051, 
Table 2.8 – Panel B: OLS regressions with partner industry experience as the dependent 
variable for the estimation samples of Big N clients, Non-Big N clients and all clients. 
  

















INTERCEPT    .018(1.22)  .022(1.22)  .005(.30) 
REL_AUDIT_RISKt-1   +  .009(1.89)*  .035(2.75)***  .011(2.38)** 
REL_CLIENT_BUSINESS_RISKt-1  +  .007(1.29)  -.013(-.79)  .006(1.17) 
AUDITOR_BUSINESS_RISKt-1  +  -.058(-2.11)**  -.008(-.24)  -.052(-2.16)** 
REL_SIZEt-1   ?  -.002(-.61)  .012(1.03)  -.001(-.17) 
WORKS_COUNCILt-1  ?  -.067(-5.60)***  -.051(-1.62)  -.067(-6.25)*** 
BIGNt  ?  --  --  .016(1.09) 
Adj. R-square    .0439  .0473  .0400 
Model F-Value    20.55***  104.31***  452.73*** 
Highest VIF    2.02  2.00  1.97 
- *, **, *** Significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent levels and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
- The values before the brackets denote the coefficients. The values between brackets denote the t-values. 
- All continuous variables are group mean centered, with audit firms as the grouping variable. 
- Robust standard errors are used to account for possible correlated observations within clusters of the same audit firm.  
- Coefficients for the year dummy variables are not reported for the sake of brevity. 
- Variable definitions: 
REL_INDUSTRY_EXPERIENCEi,t   =  INDUSTRY_EXPERIENCEi,t  of  the  engagement  partner  –  the  average 
INDUSTRY_EXPERIENCEi,t of all partners from the same audit firm in the 
sample in year t. 
REL_AUDIT_RISKt-1  =  AUDIT_RISKt-1  of  the  client  company  –  average  AUDIT_RISKt-1  of  all 
clients within the sample which are audited by the same audit firm in year t. 
REL_CLIENT_BUSINESS_RISKt-1  
 
=  CLIENT_BUSINESS_RISKt-1  of  the  client  company  –  average 
CLIENT_BUSINESS_RISKt-1  of  all  clients  within  the  sample  which  are 
audited by the same audit firm in year t. 
AUDITOR_BUSINESS_RISKt-1  
 
= Dummy variable indicating whether 1 if the client company was listed on 
the Belgian stock exchange in year t-1, 0 otherwise. 
REL_SIZEt-1  
 
=  SIZEt-1  of  the  client  Company–  average  SIZEt-1  of  all  clients  within  the 
sample which are audited by the same audit firm, for year t. 
WORKS_COUNCILt-1  
 
= Dummy variable indicating 1 if the client company required a works council 
in year t-1, 0 otherwise. 
BIGNt  
 
= Dummy variable indicating whether the client company is audited by a Big 
N audit firm in year t (1) or not (0). 




p>.10). This suggests that Big N audit firms allocate a partner with lower 
industry  experience  to  clients  with  a  works  council.  A  works  council  may 
operate as an additional monitoring mechanism, allowing audit firms to allo-
cate an audit partner with less industry experience. 
The control variable BIGNt is insignificant for the full sample, indicating no 
difference in partner industry experience between Big N and non-Big N audit 
firms. Hence, Big N audit firms do not appear to be more likely than non-Big 
N auditors to appoint an industry expert to a client. 
 
2.4.5 Robustness checks 
To verify the robustness of the results reported in the previous section, three 
robustness checks are performed. First, logistic regressions are used to test 
whether relatively high (low) client risks result in an increased (decreased) 
likelihood that a partner with high expertise is allocated. Second, the regres-
sions are tested at the office level instead of the audit firm level to control for 
the possibility that partner allocation takes place at the local audit office level 
as opposed to the audit firm level. The final robustness test examines the 
use of audit partner expertise as a risk management strategy for newly ac-
quired clients. 
2.4.5.1. Logistic regressions 
Logistic  regressions  are  used  to  test  whether  audit  firms  are  more  (less) 
likely to allocate a partner with relatively high expertise to clients with rela-
tively high (low) risks. The dependent variable and the continuous indepen-
dent variables are recoded into dichotomous variables. For each fiscal year, 
the values above the median for an audit firm are set to 1, 0 otherwise. The 
models used for estimating a logistic regression are comparable to those 
used for the OLS regression. The models to examine the  use of general 
experience and industry experience are shown below. 
 
                                                  
                              
                                            
                                   
  




AM_GENERAL_EXPERIENCEt   =  Dummy variable indicating 1 if the general expe-
rience  of  the  engagement  partner  in  year  t  is 
higher than the median general experience of all 
partners from the same audit firm in the sample in 
year t, 0 otherwise; 
AM_AUDIT_RISKt-1   =  Dummy variable indicating 1 (0) if the audit risk of 
the client company in year t-1 is higher (equal or 
lower) than the median audit risk for year t-1 of all 
clients within the sample which are audited by the 
same audit firm in year t; 
AM_CLIENT_BUSINESS_RISKt-1  
 
=  Dummy variable indicating 1 (0) if the audit risk of 
the client company in year t-1 is higher (equal or 
lower) than the median audit risk for year t-1 of all 








=  Dummy variable indicating 1 (0) if the size of the 
client  company  in  year  t-1  is  higher  (equal  or 
lower)  than  the  median  size  for  year  t-1  of  all 
clients within the sample which are audited by the 
same audit firm in year t. 
 
The remaining variables are defined as earlier. 
 
                                                   
                              
                                            
                                   
  




AM_INDUSTRY_EXPERIENCEt   =  Dummy variable indicating 1 if the industry expe-
rience  of  the  engagement  partner  in  year  t  is 
higher than the median industry experience of all 
partners from the same audit firm in the sample in 
year t, 0 otherwise. 
 
The remaining variables are defined as earlier. 
 
Panel A of Table 2.9 provides the results of the logistic regressions with 
general experience as the dependent variable; Panel B of Table 2.9 provides 
the results for the logistic regressions with industry experience as the de-
pendent variable. 
The results of the logistic regressions using general experience as the 
dependent variable are largely consistent with the results shown in Panel A 
of Table 2.8. The model has a sufficient fit across all 3 samples, as indicated 
by the Hosmer and Lemeshow statistic which estimates the lack of fit. The 
statistic is insignificant for the three samples, therefore indicating no lack of 
fit. The maximum rescaled R-square ranges from 2.76 percent for the full 
sample to 7.65 percent for the non-Big N sample. 
The coefficient for AM_AUDIT_RISKt-1 is only significant (β=.486, p<.10) 
for the sample of companies audited by non-Big N audit firms. The coeffi-
cient is insignificant for the full sample and the sample of clients of Big N 
audit firms. These results are consistent with those reported in Panel A of 
Table 2.8, providing further support for hypothesis 1, confirming that clients 
of non-Big N audit firms with a higher audit risk are audited by partners with 
greater general experience. 
The effect of AM_CLIENT_BUSINESS_RISKt-1 is insignificant for the full 
sample, as well as the two subsamples. This confirms the conclusion that 
there is no support for hypothesis 2. 
The coefficient for AUDITOR_BUSINESS_RISKt-1 is positive and signifi-
cant for the full sample (β=2.284, p<.01) and the Big N sample (β=2.209, 
p<.01), but no longer significant for the sample consisting of only non-Big N 
clients (β=13.399, p>.10). This provides support for hypothesis 3, but only for 




Table  2.9  –  Panel  A:  Logistic  regressions  with  general  audit  partner  experience  as  the 
dependent variable for the estimation samples of Big N clients, Non-Big N clients and all clients. 
 
   









Sign  Coefficients  Coefficients  Coefficients 
INTERCEPT    .044(.10)  -.970(6.23)**  -.279(2.56) 
AM_AUDIT_RISKt-1  +  -.013(.02)  .486(3.79)*  .044(.28) 
AM_CLIENT_BUSINESS_RISKt-1  +  -.039(.20)  -.094(.14)  -.041(.24) 
AUDITOR_BUSINESS_RISKt-1  +  2.209(8.30)***  13.399(.00)  2.284(8.97)*** 
AM_SIZEt-1   +  -.015(.02)  .429(2.56)  .034(.13) 
WORKS_COUNCILt-1  ?  .070(.33)  .315(.62)  .090(.61) 
BIGNt  ?  --  --  .224(2.94)* 
Max Rescaled R Square    .0296  .0765  .0276 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Statistic    3.896(.866)  9.670(.346)  4.5915(.800) 
- *, **, *** Significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent levels and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
- The values before the brackets denote the coefficients. The values between brackets denote the Wald Chi-Square Statistics. 
- Coefficients for the year dummy variables are not reported for the sake of brevity. 
- Variable definitions: 
AM_GENERAL_EXPERIENCEt   =  Dummy  variable indicating  1 if  the general experience of the engagement 
partner in year t is higher than the median industry experience of all partners 
from the same audit firm in the sample in year t, 0 otherwise.  
AM_AUDIT_RISKt-1   = Dummy variable indicating 1 (0) if the audit risk of the client company in year 
t-1 is higher (equal or lower) than the median audit risk for year t-1 of all clients 
within the sample which are audited by the same audit firm in year t. 
AM_CLIENT_BUSINESS_RISKt-1  
 
= Dummy variable indicating 1 (0) if the audit risk of the client company in year 
t-1 is higher (equal or lower) than the median audit risk for year t-1 of all clients 
within the sample which are audited by the same audit firm in year t. 
AUDITOR_BUSINESS_RISKt-1  
 
=  Dummy  variable  indicating  whether  a  client  company  was  listed  on  the 
Belgian stock exchange in year t-1.  
AM_SIZEt-1  
 
= Dummy variable indicating 1 (0) if the size of the client company in year t-1 is 
higher (equal or lower) than the median size for year t-1 of all clients within the 
sample which are audited by the same audit firm in year t. 
WORKS_COUNCILt-1  
 
=  Dummy  variable  indicating  whether  a  client  company  had  more  than  100 
employees, and therefore required a works council. 
BIGNt  
 
= Dummy variable indicating whether the client company is audited by a Big N 
audit firm (1) or not (0). 
 
The variable BIGNt has a coefficient of .224 (p<.10) for the full sample, 
providing some evidence that clients of Big N audit firms are more likely to 
be audited by a more experienced audit partner than clients of non Big N 
audit firms. 
Results  for  the  logistic  regression  for  industry  experience  reported  in 
Panel B of Table 2.9 are generally consistent with those for the robust re-
gression for industry experience in panel B of Table 2.8. The model is signif-
icant for all three samples. The maximum rescaled R-square ranges from 
5.17 percent for the Big N sample, to 6.70 percent for the full sample. 
The coefficient for AM_AUDIT_RISKt-1 remains positive and significant for 
the full sample (β=.275, p<.01), the Big N sample (β=.243, p<.01), and the 
non-Big N sample (β=.543, p<.05). This indicates that both Big N and non-
Big N audit firms assign partners with a greater industry experience to clients 
with a higher audit risk, providing further support for hypothesis 1. 
The  coefficients  for  AM_CLIENT_BUSINESS_RISKt-1  and  AUDI-
TOR_BUSINESS_RISKt-1 are insignificant, therefore providing no support for 
hypotheses 2 and 3. Thus, audit firms do not seem to use partner industry 
experience  as  a  risk  management  strategy  for  clients  that  pose  either  a 
higher client business risk or a higher auditor business risk. 
The control variable WORKS_COUNCILt-1 has a negative and significant 




Table  2.9  –  Panel  B:  Logistic  regressions  with  audit  partner  industry  experience  as  the 
dependent  variable  for  the  estimation samples of Big N clients, Non-Big N clients and all 
clients 
   
 




















INTERCEPT    .154(1.16)  -1.075(7.23)***  -.767(18.71)*** 
AM_AUDIT_RISKt-1  +  .243(7.85)***  .543(4.67)**  .275(11.26)*** 
AM_CLIENT_BUSINESS_RISKt-1  +  .025(.08)  .091(.13)  .034(.17) 
AUDITOR_BUSINESS_RISKt-1  +  -1.034(2.48)  -11.286(.00)  -1.030(2.48) 
AM_SIZEt-1   ?  -.027(.07)  .124(.21)  -.005(.00) 
WORKS_COUNCILt-1  ?  -.634(27.56)***  -.812(2.88)*  -.648(31.08)*** 
BIGNt  ?  --  --  .880(44.29)*** 
Max Rescaled R Square    .0517  .0658  .0670 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Statistic    3.926(.864)  7.855(.448)  4.920(.766) 
- *, **, *** Significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent levels and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
- The values before the brackets denote the coefficients. The values between brackets denote the Wald Chi-Square Statistics. 
- Coefficients for the year dummy variables are not reported for the sake of brevity. 
- Variable definitions: 
AM_INDUSTRY_EXPERIENCEi,t  
 
= Dummy variable indicating 1 if the industry experience of the engagement 
partner in year t is higher than the median industry experience of all partners 
from the same audit firm in the sample in year t, 0 otherwise.  
AM_AUDIT_RISKt-1  
 
= Dummy variable indicating 1 (0) if the audit risk of the client company in year 
t-1  is higher (equal or lower)  than  the  median  audit  risk  for  year  t-1  of all 
clients within the sample which are audited by the same audit firm in year t. 
AM_CLIENT_BUSINESS_RISKt-1  
 
= Dummy variable indicating 1 (0) if the audit risk of the client company in year 
t-1  is higher (equal or lower)  than  the  median  audit  risk  for  year  t-1  of all 
clients within the sample which are audited by the same audit firm in year t. 
AUDITOR_BUSINESS_RISKt-1  
 
=  Dummy  variable  indicating  whether  a  client  company  was  listed  on  the 
Belgian stock exchange in year t-1.  
AM_SIZEt-1  
 
= Dummy variable indicating 1 (0) if the size of the client company in year t-1 
is higher (equal or lower) than the median size for year t-1 of all clients within 
the sample which are audited by the same audit firm in year t. 
WORKS_COUNCILt-1  
 
= Dummy variable indicating whether a client company had more than 100 
employees, and therefore required a works council. 
BIGNt  
 
= Dummy variable indicating whether the client company is audited by a Big N 
audit firm (1) or not (0). 
 
non-Big N clients (β=-.812, p<.10) and the full sample (β=-.648, p<.01), sug-
gesting  that  audit  firms  allocate  partners  with  less  industry  experience  to 
clients that have a works council. This is in line with the argumentation that 
the presence of a works council operates as a monitoring mechanism which 
allows allocating a partner with lower expertise. The effect of AM_SIZEt-1 is 
insignificant  across  all  three  samples.  BIGNt  has  a  positive  association 
(β=.880, p<.01) with the likelihood that an industry expert audits the client, 
indicating that clients of Big N audit firms are more likely to be audited by an 
industry expert than clients of non-Big N audit firms. This is consistent with 
the argumentation that partners working for larger audit firms can specialize 
more  into  specific  industries  than  auditors  working  for  smaller  audit  firms 
(e.g. Craswell et al. 1995). 
2.4.5.2 Local office analysis 
To control for the possibility that the allocation of experts takes place at the 
office level as opposed to the audit firm level, models (2.1) and (2.2) are 
tested at the local audit office level. For this purpose data on audit office 
locations are added to the sample of 2,554 observations, which was availa-
ble  for  all  but  43  observations.  Subsequently,  observations  are  removed 
which relate to offices for which only one audit partner accepted new clients 




(2.1) and (2.2) are used to examine whether the use of audit partner exper-
tise is driven by the local audit office. The main difference from the prior ana-
lyses is that audit partner expertise and client risk factors are mean centered 
at the local practice office instead of the audit firm level. 
The results of testing models (2.1) and (2.2) at the office level are dis-
played in Panels A and B of Table 2.10. Panel A shows the results for gen-
eral partner experience. Panel B shows the results for partner industry expe-
rience. Results in Panel A show that the main difference compared to the 
regressions  ran  at  the  firm  level  pertains  to  the  variable 
REL_CLIENT_BUSINESS_RISKt-1. Whereas Panel A of Table 2.8 and Panel 
A of Table 2.9 show no association between client business risk and general 
partner  experience,  Panel  A  of  Table  2.10  shows  a  negative  association 
between REL_CLIENT_BUSINESS_RISKt-1 and general partner experience 
for the full sample (β=-.490, p<. 01) and the Big N sample (β=-.503, p<.01), 
but not for the non-Big N sample (β=.220, p>.10). Hence, like before there is 
no support for hypothesis 2. In fact, there is even limited evidence of an ef-
fect that is in a direction opposed to hypothesis 2. This is in line with the 
argumentation that experienced partners are reluctant to audit clients with a 
relatively high business risk. 
The coefficient for REL_AUDIT_RISKt-1 is insignificant for all three sam-
ples. This confirms the prior finding that audit firms do not use general part-
ner experience as a risk management for audit risk. Hence, hypothesis 1 is 
not supported. The coefficient for AUDITOR_BUSINESS_RISKt-1 is positive 
and significant for the Big N sample (β=5.128, p<.01) and the full sample 
(β=5.157, p<.01), but could not be estimated for the sample of non-Big N 
clients due to a lack of observations with a stock exchange listing. Hence, 
like before there is evidence in support of hypothesis 3, but now only for Big 
N audit firms.  
Panel B of Table 2.10 shows the results for the office level regressions for 
audit partner industry experience. The adjusted R-square ranges between -
6.67 percent for the non-Big N sample and 3.20 percent for the sample con-
sisting of Big N clients. This suggests that some of the explanatory variables 
in the sample of the non-Big N firms do not add any value to the model. The 
coefficients  of  REL_AUDIT_RISKt-1  and  REL_CLIENT_ 
BUSINESS_RISKt-1  are  insignificant  across  all  three  samples.  Therefore 
there is no support for hypothesis 1 and hypotheses 2. The coefficient for 
AUDITOR_BUSINESS_RISKt-1  is  negative  and  significant  for  the  Big  N 
sample  (β=-.051,  p<.01)  and  the  full  sample  (β=-.070,  p<.01).  AUDI-
TOR_BUSINESS_RISKt-1  was  not  estimated  for  the  sample  of  non-Big  N 
clients due to a lack of observations with a stock exchange listing. A possible 
explanation for the lack of evidence on the use of industry experience at the 
local office is that industry experts may operate on a national level, auditing 
not only clients of their own local office, but also clients of other local offices 
(Francis et al. 2005). Furthermore, the coefficient for WORKS_COUNCILt-1 is 
no longer significant for the non-Big N sample (β=-.012, p>.10), while re-
maining significant for the Big N (β=-.076, p<.01) and the full sample (β=-
.070, p<.01). This could be due to the reduced sample size used in estimat- 




ing the regression for clients of non-Big N audit firms. The effect of the varia-
ble BIGNt remains positive and significant (β=.024, p<.05). 
2.4.5.3 Newly acquired clients 
The analyses thus far focused on the allocation of audit partners to existing 
clients.  Newly  acquired  clients  were  not  included  in  the  sample  because 
such clients are likely to be audited by the audit partner who attracted them, 
hence without any kind of internal allocation taking place.
25 However, as a 
robustness  check,  the  allocation  of  partners  to  new  clients  is  examined. 
Therefore, out of the sample of 74,730 observations, those observations are 
selected which relate to audit clients that are new to both the audit firm and 
the audit partner. Furthermore, only observations of audit firms are included 
for which more than one audit partner accepted new clients. This is required 
to measure the relative riskiness of newly accepted clients, as well as the 
relative expertise of the audit partners accepting new clients. The results of 
these tests are shown in Panels A and B of Table 2.11, for general partner 
experience and audit partner industry experience respectively.  
Panel A of Table 2.11 shows that the coefficient of REL_AUDIT_RISKt-1 
is negative and significant for the Big N sample (β=-.434, p<.05) and the full 
sample (β=-.393, p<.05), but insignificant for the non-Big N sample (β=-.196,  
Table 2.10 – Panel A: OLS regressions with general audit partner experience as the dependent 
variable  for  the  estimation  samples  of  Big  N  clients,  Non-Big  N  clients  and  all  clients.  All 
variables are mean centered at the local office level. 
  
   


















INTERCEPT    .481(.98)  -.107(-.20)  .377(.82) 
REL_AUDIT_RISKt-1   +  -.049(-.55)  1.477(1.64)  .042(.36) 
REL_CLIENT_BUSINESS_RISKt-1  +  -.503(-2.72)***  .220(.55)  -.490(-3.22)*** 
AUDITOR_BUSINESS_RISKt-1  +  5.128(4.92)***  --  5.157(5.36)*** 
REL_SIZEt-1   +  .001(.01)  -.973(-1.88)*  -.043(-.19) 
WORKS_COUNCILt-1  ?  .147(.31)  2.281(1.51)  .313(.83) 
BIGNt  ?  --  --  .058(.11) 
Adj. R-square    .0310  .0530  .0285 
Model F-Value    578.86  5.70  3117.88 
Highest VIF    1.79  2.00  1.74 
- *, **, *** Significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent levels and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
- The values before the brackets denote the coefficients. The values between brackets denote the t-values. 
- All continuous variables are group mean centered, with local audit offices as the grouping variable. 
- Robust standard errors are used to account for possible correlated observations within clusters of the same audit firm.  
- Coefficients for the year dummy variables are not reported for the sake of brevity. 
- Variable definitions: 
REL_GENERAL_EXPERIENCEt  
 
=  GENERAL_EXPERIENCEt  of  the  engagement  partner  –  the  average 
GENERAL_EXPERIENCEt of all partners from the same local office in the 
sample in year t. 
REL_AUDIT_RISKt-1  =  AUDIT_RISKt-1  of  the  client  company  –  average  AUDIT_RISKt-1  of  all 
clients within the sample which are audited by the same local office in year t. 
REL_CLIENT_BUSINESS_RISKt-1   =  CLIENT_BUSINESS_RISKt-1  of  the  client  company  –  average 
CLIENT_BUSINESS_RISKt-1  of  all  clients  within  the  sample  which  are 
audited by the same local office in year t. 
AUDITOR_BUSINESS_RISKt-1   = Dummy variable indicating whether 1 if the client company was listed on 
the Belgian stock exchange in year t-1, 0 otherwise. 
REL_SIZEt-1   =  SIZEt-1  of  the  client  Company–  average SIZEt-1  of  all  clients  within  the 
sample which are audited by the same local office, for year t. 
WORKS_COUNCILt-1   =  Dummy  variable  indicating  1  if  the  client  company  required  a  works 
council in year t-1, 0 otherwise. 
BIGNt   = Dummy variable indicating whether the client company is audited by a Big 
N local office in year t (1) or not (0). 




p>.10). These coefficients are in the opposite direction of what is predicted in 
hypothesis 1. This indicates that clients of Big N audit firms which have a 
higher audit risk are likely to be audited by an audit partner with fewer years 
of experience as an auditor. It is not possible to assess directly whether less 
experienced  (younger)  partners  attract  relatively  riskier  clients  than  more 
experienced  partners,  or  whether  these  risky  clients  are  allocated  to  less 
experienced  partners  at  a  central  level.  For  non-Big  N  audit  firms  there 
seems to be no relationship between the general experience of a partner 
and the audit risk of newly attracted clients. 
For the sample of clients of non-Big N audit firms there is no association 
between REL_CLIENT_BUSINESS_RISKt-1 and general partner experience 
(β=-.583, p>.10). The coefficient for the Big N sample is negative and signifi-
cant at the 10 percent level (β=-.397, p<.10), providing limited evidence that 
in Big N audit firms, newly acquired clients with a high client business risk 
are likely to be audited by less experienced audit partners. This finding is 
opposed to the expected direction of hypothesis 2.  
The  auditor  business  risk  of  newly  accepted  clients  (AUDI-
TOR_BUSINESS_RISKt-1)  is  positively  associated  with  the  general  expe-
rience of the audit partner assigned to new clients for the non-Big N sample 
(β=4.917, p<.01), but insignificant for the full sample (β=-1.285, p>.10) and  
Table 2.10  – Panel B: OLS regressions with partner industry experience as the dependent 
variable  for  the  estimation  samples  of  Big  N  clients,  Non-Big  N  clients  and  all  clients.  All 
variables are mean centered at the local office level. 
 

















INTERCEPT    .017(2.81)***  .004(.47)  -.006(-.53) 
REL_AUDIT_RISKt-1   +  -.001(-.15)  .004(.24)  -.001(-.10) 
REL_CLIENT_BUSINESS_RISKt-1  +  .002(.36)  -.017(-1.29)  .000(.10) 
AUDITOR_BUSINESS_RISKt-1  +  -.051(-2.41)**  --  -.052(-2.69)*** 
REL_SIZEt-1   ?  .001(.17)  .002(.19)  .000(.06) 
WORKS_COUNCILt-1  ?  -.076(-3.77)***  -.012(-.41)  -.070(-3.63)*** 
BIGNt  ?  --  --  .024(2.40)** 
Adj. R-square    .0320  -.0667  .0273 
Model F-Value    16.19  23.99  1761.96 
Highest VIF    1.79  1.97  1.74 
- *, **, *** Significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent levels and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
- The values before the brackets denote the coefficients. The values between brackets denote the t-values. 
- All continuous variables are group mean centered, with local audit offices as the grouping variable. 
- Robust standard errors are used to account for possible correlated observations within clusters of the same audit firm.  
- Coefficients for the year dummy variables are not reported for the sake of brevity. 
- Variable definitions: 
REL_INDUSTRY_EXPERIENCEi,t  
 
=  INDUSTRY_EXPERIENCEi,t  of  the  engagement  partner  –  the  average 
INDUSTRY_EXPERIENCEi,t of all partners from the same local office in the 
sample in year t. 
REL_AUDIT_RISKt-1 
 
= AUDIT_RISKt-1 of the client company – average AUDIT_RISKt-1 of all clients 
within the sample which are audited by the same local office in year t. 
REL_CLIENT_BUSINESS_RISKt-1  
 
=  CLIENT_BUSINESS_RISKt-1  of  the  client  company  –  average 
CLIENT_BUSINESS_RISKt-1 of all clients within the sample which are audited 
by the same local office in year t. 
AUDITOR_BUSINESS_RISKt-1   = Dummy variable indicating whether 1 if the client company was listed on the 
Belgian stock exchange in year t-1, 0 otherwise. 
REL_SIZEt-1  
 
=  SIZEt-1  of  the  client  Company–  average  SIZEt-1  of  all  clients  within  the 
sample which are audited by the same local office, for year t. 
WORKS_COUNCILt-1  
 
= Dummy variable indicating 1 if the client company required a works council 
in year t-1, 0 otherwise. 
BIGNt  
 
= Dummy variable indicating whether the client company is audited by a Big N 
local office in year t (1) or not (0). 




the Big N sample (β=.716, p>.10). Hence, hypothesis 3 is supported only for 
the non-Big N sample. The effects of the control variables are all insignifi-
cant. 
Overall, the results of this robustness test suggest that the use of general 
partner experience as a risk management strategy for newly acquired clients 
may be based on different factors compared to continuing clients. 
Panel B of Table 2.11 shows the outcomes of model (2.2) for newly ac-
quired  clients.  These  results  are  consistent  with  those  reported  for  re-
allocated clients. The model is significant for each of the three samples and 
the R-square ranges from 5.44 percent for the subsample of Big N clients to 
6.34 percent for the subsample of non-Big N clients. REL_AUDIT_RISKt-1 
has a positive association with audit partner industry experience for the full 
sample (β=.038, p<.01), as well as the Big N sample (β=.032, p<.01) and the 
non-Big N sample (β=.060, p<.01). Consistent with hypothesis 1, this indi-
cates that new clients with a higher audit risk are audited by partners with 
greater industry experience than clients with less audit risk. The variables 
REL_CLIENT_BUSINESS_RISKt-1,  AUDITOR_BUSINESS_RISKt-1,  and 
REL_SIZEt-1 of new clients are not significantly associated with the industry 
 
Table  2.11  –  Panel  A:  OLS  regressions  with  general  audit  partner  experience  as  the 
dependent  variable  for  the  estimation  samples  of  Big  N  clients,  Non-Big  N  clients  and  all 
clients. The sample includes only newly accepted clients. 
 
   











Sign  Coefficients  Coefficients  Coefficients 
INTERCEPT    -.022(-.05)  .701(2.30)**  .517(1.05) 
REL_AUDIT_RISKt-1   +  -.434(-2.26)**  -.196(-.45)  -.393(-2.36)** 
REL_CLIENT_BUSINESS_RISKt-1  +  -.397(-2.90)***  -.583(-1.02)  -.440(-3.27)*** 
AUDITOR_BUSINESS_RISKt-1  +  -1.285(-.68)  4.917(5.53)***  .716(.41) 
REL_SIZEt-1   +  .152(.77)  -.192(-.54)  .072(.46) 
WORKS_COUNCILt-1  ?  -.786(-1.19)  .871(.94)  -.415(-.81) 
BIGNt  ?  --  --  -.553(-1.24) 
Adj. R-square    .0209  .0057  .0186 
Model F-Value    6.22  24.58  9.52 
Highest VIF    1.81  2.00  1.98 
- *, **, *** Significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent levels and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
- The values before the brackets denote the coefficients. The values between brackets denote the t-values. 
- All continuous variables are group mean centered, with audit firms as the grouping variable. 
- Robust standard errors are used to account for possible correlated observations within clusters of the same audit firm.  
- Coefficients for the year dummy variables are not reported for the sake of brevity. 
- Variable definitions: 
REL_GENERAL_EXPERIENCEt   =  GENERAL_EXPERIENCEt  of  the  engagement  partner  –  the 
average  GENERAL_EXPERIENCEt  of  all  partners  from  the  same 
audit firm in the sample in year t. 
REL_AUDIT_RISKt-1 
 
= AUDIT_RISKt-1 of the client company – average AUDIT_RISKt-1 of 
all clients within the sample which are audited by the same audit firm 
in year t. 
REL_CLIENT_BUSINESS_RISKt-1  
 
=  CLIENT_BUSINESS_RISKt-1  of  the  client  company  –  average 
CLIENT_BUSINESS_RISKt-1 of all clients within the sample which 
are audited by the same audit firm in year t. 
AUDITOR_BUSINESS_RISKt-1  
 
= Dummy variable indicating whether 1 if the client company was 
listed on the Belgian stock exchange in year t-1, 0 otherwise. 
REL_SIZEt-1  
 
= SIZEt-1 of the client Company– average SIZEt-1 of all clients within 
the sample which are audited by the same audit firm, for year t. 
WORKS_COUNCILt-1  
 
=  Dummy  variable  indicating  1  if  the  client  company  required  a 
works council in year t-1, 0 otherwise. 
BIGNt  
 
= Dummy variable indicating whether the client company is audited 
by a Big N audit firm in year t (1) or not (0). 




experience of the audit partner. Newly attracted clients with a works council 
are audited by partners with less industry experience. Finally, the coefficient 
of Big N is insignificant (β=.001, p>.10), suggesting that, before taking client 
risks into account, clients of Big N and clients of non-Big N firms are equally 
likely to be audited by an industry expert. 
Summarizing  the  robustness  checks,  the  results  of  the  logistic  regres-
sions show that audit partner industry experience is used by non-Big N firms 
as a risk management strategy for audit risk, providing limited evidence for 
hypothesis 1. No support is found for the use of audit partner expertise as a 
risk management  strategy  for  newly  accepted  clients.  Similarly,  the  office 
level  analysis  shows  no  significant  association  between  partner  industry 
experience and audit risk, possibly because industry experts in Belgium are 
allocated at a national level instead of a local office level. Since Belgium is a 
geographically small country, it is viable for industry experts to travel to most 
of the audit firm‟s clients.  
Neither the main analysis nor the robustness checks provide evidence 
that audit partner expertise is used as a risk management strategy for client 
business risk, hence there is no support for hypothesis 2. In fact, the regres-
sions for the local office level and for newly accepted clients show that gen-
eral  partner  experience  is  negatively  associated  with  client  business  risk. 
Table 2.11 – Panel B: OLS regressions with partner industry experience as the dependent 
variable for the estimation samples of Big N clients, Non-Big N clients and all clients. The 
sample includes only newly accepted clients. 
 

















INTERCEPT    .001(.08)  -.019(-.98)  -.002(-.25) 
REL_AUDIT_RISKt-1   +  .032(17.89)***  .060(2.78)***  .038(6.84)*** 
REL_CLIENT_BUSINESS_RISKt-1  +  -.008(-1.14)  .016(1.23)  -.004(-.73) 
AUDITOR_BUSINESS_RISKt-1  +  .058(.78)  .102(1.58)  .072(1.39) 
REL_SIZEt-1   ?  .000(.12)  .013(.70)  .004(.75) 
WORKS_COUNCILt-1  ?  -.056(-14.26)***  -.062(-2.87)***  -.059(-8.66)*** 
BIGNt  ?  --  --  .001(.06) 
Adj. R-square    .0544  .0634  .0553 
Model F-Value    214.97  5.52  111.40 
Highest VIF    1.81  3.11  1.98 
- *, **, *** Significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent levels and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
- The values before the brackets denote the coefficients. The values between brackets denote the t-values. 
- All continuous variables are group mean centered, with audit firms as the grouping variable. 
- Robust standard errors are used to account for possible correlated observations within clusters of the same audit firm.  
- Coefficients for the year dummy variables are not reported for the sake of brevity. 




=  INDUSTRY_EXPERIENCEi,t  of  the  engagement  partner  –  the  average 
INDUSTRY_EXPERIENCEi,t  of  all  partners  from  the  same  audit  firm  in  the 
sample in year t. 
REL_AUDIT_RISKt-1 
 
= AUDIT_RISKt-1 of the client company – average AUDIT_RISKt-1 of all clients 
within the sample which are audited by the same audit firm in year t. 
REL_CLIENT_BUSINESS_RISKt-1   =  CLIENT_BUSINESS_RISKt-1  of  the  client  company  –  average 
CLIENT_BUSINESS_RISKt-1 of all clients within the sample which are audited 
by the same audit firm in year t. 
AUDITOR_BUSINESS_RISKt-1   = Dummy variable indicating whether 1 if the client company was listed on the 
Belgian stock exchange in year t-1, 0 otherwise. 
REL_SIZEt-1   =  SIZEt-1  of  the  client  Company–  average  SIZEt-1  of  all  clients  within  the 
sample which are audited by the same audit firm, for year t. 
WORKS_COUNCILt-1   = Dummy variable indicating 1 if the client company required a works council 
in year t-1, 0 otherwise. 
BIGNt  
 
= Dummy variable indicating whether the client company is audited by a Big N 
audit firm in year t (1) or not (0). 




This  could  indicate  that  more  experienced  partners  may  attempt  to  avoid 
being allocated to clients with increased client business risk.  
The results from the logistic regressions and the local office level regres-
sions show that general partner experience is used as a risk management 
strategy for auditor business risk, providing further support for hypothesis 3. 
 
 
2.5 Conclusions and limitations  
 
2.5.1 Conclusions 
The use of risk management strategies is important for an audit firm to man-
age the impact of client risks (i.e. audit risk, client business risk and auditor 
business risk) to reduce the possibility of incurring a loss on an engagement. 
Prior studies have examined the use of experience as a risk management 
strategy by looking at the planned allocation of partner or manager hours, 
but  the  actual  use  of  partner  expertise  has  not  yet  been  examined.  This 
study contributes to the literature by testing the actual use of partner exper-
tise as a risk management strategy using data from a complete audit market. 
From a risk management perspective as well as from a cost minimization 
perspective it can  be  argued that  audit firms benefit most from allocating 
partners with the most expertise to audit clients with the greatest risk. How-
ever,  due  to  personal  liability  issues  and  practice  development  concerns 
audit partners might be reluctant to audit clients that pose a high risk, which 
could result in a less than optimal allocation of partners across clients. It is 
therefore important to examine whether audit firms conform to audit stan-
dards by allocating partners with more expertise to clients that pose greater 
risks, or whether personal interests dominate resulting in less than optimal 
partner allocation, posing possibly high risks to the audit firms. 
This  study  uses  Belgian  data  on  audits  conducted  between  1998  and 
2006. The requirement that Belgian audit reports are signed with both the 
name of the audit firm as well as the name of the responsible audit partner 
enables  the  construction  client  portfolios  at  both  the  firm  and  the  partner 
level. Data from the Belgian Institute of Auditors furthermore allow the con-
struction of partner expertise measures. Together, this enables testing the 
actual use of audit partner expertise as a risk management strategy, as op-
posed to the planned allocation used in prior studies. 
Two measures of partner expertise are used in this study: general partner 
experience  and  partner  industry  experience.  The  results  show  that  audit 
firms  assign  partners  with more  general  experience  to  clients  with  higher 
auditor business risk. The use of expertise as a risk management strategy is 
further supported by the allocation of partners with more industry experience 
to clients that pose a higher audit risk. In addition, there is some support that 
non-Big  N  audit  firms  assign  partners  with  greater  general  experience  to 
clients with increased audit risk. No evidence is found that supports the use 
of partner expertise a risk management strategy for clients with a high client 




mean  that  client  business  risk  is  managed  ineffectively,  since  other  risk 
management strategies may be used to manage this type of client risk.  
Overall, the results support the main research question that audit partner 
expertise is used a risk management strategy. This finding is consistent with 
the requirements posed by auditing standards to adjust audit team composi-
tion based on client risk characteristics. However, audit firms and audit regu-
lators should consider why general experience is only used as a risk man-
agement strategy for auditor business risk. It is possible that audit partners 
with more years of experience are unwilling to audit clients that pose greater 
risks, unless a client is publicly listed due to prestige and career perspectives 
associated with audits of publicly listed clients. Audit risk and client business 
risk might therefore not be effectively managed. Hence, audits might benefit 
from rules and regulation to ensure that general partner experience is used 
to manage audit risk and auditor business risk. 
 
2.5.2 Limitations 
There are some limitations to this study. First of all, given that the research is 
conducted using public data, it  is not  possible to control for all other risk 
management strategies which an audit firm could use. This issue has been 
partly resolved by using a sample in which most of the other risk manage-
ment strategies are unlikely to be used, and in which the use of partner ex-
pertise as a risk management strategy is most likely to occur. 
Related to this is the issue that this study relies on public proxies of risk. 
Private measures of risk might be able to more accurately represent client 
risk, but are subject to a possible bias by the audit partner. 
Finally, the use of Belgian data might be considered an issue because 
this setting is in many ways different from the US setting, which is commonly 
researched. The most prominent difference is that Belgium has a low liti-
gious environment. However, prior research has shown that there are other 
mechanisms in place which make sure that audit quality is maintained at a 
sufficiently high level (Gaeremynck and Willekens 2003). In fact, it is even 
more likely that audit partner expertise is used as a risk management strate-
gy in more litigious environments where the possible impact of unmanaged 
risks is greater. 
 
2.5.3 Future research 
The current study examines the use of partner expertise as a risk manage-
ment strategy in a setting in which partner expertise is the most likely risk 
management  strategy.  This  setting  is  chosen  to  reduce  the  confounding 
impact of other potential risk management strategies. It would be valuable 
for future research to examine how firms make trade-offs between risk man-
agement strategies, and whether these risk management strategies operate 
as complements or substitutes. 
In addition, this study measures industry experience based on the sales 
revenues and total assets of the audit clients. Future research could incorpo-
rate audit fee data to measure market share and industry experience more 




Appendix 2.A: Description of IBR membership lists 
 
In Belgium, every auditor has to be registered with the IBR, the Belgian insti-
tute of auditors to practice auditing. From 1961 onwards the IBR has pro-
vided an annual overview of the auditors registered at the institute as part of 
their annual report. 
The annual overview consists of two lists. List A gives an overview of the 
names of the registered auditors, the date of first registration as an auditor, 
the spoken language of the auditors (Dutch or French), the audit firm they 
are associated with and their function within this firm. Since the year of the 
first registration is given, the years of experience as an auditor can be com-
puted. Audit partner experience can be computed from 1956 onwards. From 
the membership lists it shows that 1965 was the first year in which two audi-
tors merged forces into one audit firm. From this year onwards the member-
ship lists can also be used to provide insight into audit firm structures. List B 
provides additional information regarding audit firms since 1972. In this year 
the IBR first provided an overview of the audit firms that were registered at 
the institute, providing, amongst others, information regarding the location of 
the audit firm.  
In 1994 the audit firm structures became more complex, showing subsidi-
aries within audit firm organizations and the use of privately owned compa-
nies by auditors, used to acquire capital. To obtain insight into the primary 
audit firm an auditor  is associated  with (i.e. the firm that  is actually used 
when signing the auditor‟s report), auditors need to be matched to the ap-
propriate primary firm, as described in appendix B. 
 
 
Appendix 2.B - Overview of data selection steps 
 
This study relies on data from two sources, the Bel-First database and the 
IBR membership lists, which have to be matched. This section discusses 
steps that are taken take to match the two databases and to prepare the 
data for the regression analyses. 
 
Matching the Bel-First database with list A of the IBR membership lists 
1. In case of multiple audit partners or audit firms per audit client, those audit 
partners are removed that are not active anymore according to the IBR (i.e. 
those who are no longer registered in the IBR membership lists). 
2. In case of multiple audit partners or audit firms per audit client, those audit 
partners and those audit firms are removed for which the mandate starts in 
the future. 
3. If there still are multiple audit partners or audit firms per audit client, those 
audit partners and audit firms are removed for which the appointment date 
plus 3 years does not include the fiscal year, under the condition that for one 
of the other partners/firms the mandate does include the fiscal year. A cut-off 
of 3 years is used because audits in Belgium are assigned based on 3 year 




 4. If according to the database an audit partner belongs to multiple audit 
firms in one year (which could be due to spelling issues), then the firm for 
this partner is set to that firm which is most often mentioned for this partner 
within the same year, excluding observations for which the firm is initially 
unknown, or for which there are multiple partners. 
5. If still no audit firm is identified for a partner, then the firm as mentioned on 
the membership lists is used. The identification of the appropriate firm based 
on the membership lists is discussed in the next section.
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Matching procedure within the IBR membership lists 
List A of the membership lists provides an audit firm name with which the 
audit partner is associated. The audit firm mentioned in list A may however 
be used just to acquire capital and may be a subsidiary of another audit firm 
which is actually responsible for conducting audits of financial statements. 
To accurately identify the audit firm for which the audit partner works, it is 
necessary  to  match  subsidiary  audit  firms  to  their  parent  firms.  Matching 
audit firms mentioned in List A of the membership lists, to parent firms is 
done based on audit firm structures as described in List B of the membership 
lists. The firm which actually is responsible for conducting audits is labeled 
as the primary audit firm. A number of rules are used to complete this match-
ing, since it is possible for an auditor to be mentioned as a partner or man-
ager of multiple firms, while a firm can also be a subsidiary of multiple firms, 
sometimes resulting in complex audit firm structures. 
Whether an audit firm is merged with a parent firm depends on the num-
ber of partners and managers that are listed for both the parent company 
and the subsidiary. When the total of partners and managers listed for the 
parent company exceeds the total number of partners and managers listed 
for the subsidiary, then for those auditors working at the subsidiary the par-
ent company is recoded to be the auditor‟s primary audit firm. 
If an audit firm is listed as a subsidiary of multiple audit firms whose total 
number of partners and managers are at least equal to the total of partners 
and managers working at the subsidiary, then the firm with the largest total 
number is classified as the primary audit firm of the partners working at the 
subsidiary. 
When the number of partners plus managers at the parent company is 
smaller than this number for the subsidiary, then the subsidiary is classified 
as the auditor‟s primary audit firm.  
This procedure is repeated until all auditors are assigned only to a prima-
ry  audit  firm.  This  primary  audit  firm  is  used  for  those  audit  partners  for 






Table: Number of observations per industry (n=74,730) 
 
NACE 2 digit 
industry code 
 
Description  Number of 
observations 
10  Mining of coal and lignite; extraction of peat  112 
11  Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas; service activities incidental to oil 
surveying and gas extraction excluding 
104 
12  Coal mining  126 
13  Mining of metal ores  37 
14  Other mining and quarrying  413 
15  Manufacture of food products and beverages  2,726 
16  Manufacture of tobacco products  85 
17  Manufacture of textiles  1,420 
18  Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur  352 
19  Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness 
and footwear 
56 
20  Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; manufacture 
of articles of straw and manufacture plaiting materials 
497 
21  Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products  547 
22  Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media  1,337 
23  Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel  92 
24  Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products  1,729 
25  Manufacture of rubber and plastic products  1,060 
26  Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products  1,430 
27  Manufacture of basic metals  604 
28  Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment  2,031 
29  Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.  1,457 
30  Manufacture of office machinery and computers  93 
31  Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.  543 
32  Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus  265 
33  Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks  310 
34  Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers  574 
35  Manufacture of other transport equipment  161 
36  Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.  987 
37  Recycling  352 
45  Construction  4,243 
50  Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal and 
household goods 
2,964 
51  Wholesale and retail trade, with the exception of repair of motor vehicles and motor-
cycles 
20,969 
52  Retail trade, with the exception of repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of 
household goods 
2,788 
55  Hotels and restaurants  675 
60  Land transport; transport via pipelines  2,379 
61  Water transport  196 
62  Air transport  64 
63  Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities of travel agencies  3,070 
64  Post and telecommunications  386 
70  Real estate, renting and business activities  4,218 
71  Sellers of machinery and equipment without operator and of personal and household 
goods 
663 
72  Computer and related activities  1,705 
73  Research and development  113 
74  Other business activities  8,766 
75  Public administration and defence; compulsory social security  55 
80  Education  109 
85  Health and social work  303 
90  Sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and similar activities  406 
91  Activities of membership organization n.e.c.  18 
92  Recreational, cultural and sporting activities  760 
93  Other service activities  341 
95  Private households with employed persons  2 
99  Extra-territorial organizations and bodies  37 
Total    74,730 
 






1 The number of years of experience is often argued to be the main driver of expertise (Hamilton 
and Wright 1982). 
 
2 Reductions in the extent of testing are indicated to be mainly driven by either an improvement 
in the client‟s internal control system or favorable results from the prior year‟s audit. Reasons for 
increases in the extent of testing are more varied, such as: changes in the client environment, a 
poor quality of client-prepared data, detected problems during initial testing or analytical proce-
dures, and concerns about obsolescence or a cut-off problems. 
 
3 Vander Bauwhede and Willekens (2004) show that the amount of listed companies is small 
(150) relative to the number of companies that file their financial statements at the National 
Bank of Belgium (250.000) and relative to the number of inhabitants (in contrast to the UK and 
the US). 
 
4 In Belgium, audits are assigned based on three year renewable contracts, known as man-
dates. These contracts can only be ended early under exceptional circumstances. The aim of 
requiring three year mandates is to prevent low-balling behavior by audit firms, which could 
reduce audit quality in the first year(s) of the engagement since auditors may have incentives to 
under staff engagements in order to outbid the competing audit firms. 
 
5 Possible other reasons for audit partner changes include partner rotation structures, partner 
retirement, partner movement to another audit firm, and partners acquiring a different function 
within the audit firm. 
 
6 This includes cases where two partners from the same audit firm are responsible for the audit 
engagement, as well as cases where audit partners from different firms are jointly conducting 
the audit. 
 
7 Further tests show that clients audited by multiple audit partners are significantly more likely to 
have a high auditor business risk than clients audited by a single audit partner. No statistically 
significant difference is found for audit risk and client business risk. This suggests that the allo-
cation of multiple audit partners is used as a risk management strategy for auditor business risk, 
but not for audit risk and client business risk. 
 
8 If only one partner is accepting re-allocated clients, this partner‟s expertise is equal to the 
average expertise of the firm. By construction, this results in a relative expertise measure of 
zero. 
 
9 Bonner and Lewis (1990) identify four determinants of expertise, which are: general domain 
knowledge,  subspecialty  knowledge,  general  business  knowledge,  general  problem-solving 
ability. General domain knowledge, general business knowledge and general problem-solving 
ability are acquired through training and general experience. Subspecialty knowledge relates to 
industry or client specific knowledge. 
 
10 In total there are 48 auditors who left the audit profession for a certain period of time. These 
auditors are not penalized for the years not spent in the profession, since the experience they 
gained  outside  of  the  profession  may  have  increased  their  expertise.  Removing  companies 
audited by any of these 48 audit partners or penalizing these audit partners by subtracting the 
years spent outside the audit profession does not substantially change the results. 
 
11 Comparable results are obtained when industry experience is measured using the ratio of the 
number of audited clients within an industry to the total number of audited clients, or the ratio of 
audited assets within an industry divided by the total assets of all audited clients. 
 





12 Audit risk can be subdivided into inherent, control risk, and detection risk. There are no prox-
ies for control risk available in the current setting, and detection risk is a function of auditor 
effort. This study, therefore, focuses on the inherent risk component of audit risk. 
 
13 This issue is addressed by means of a factor analysis as discussed in section 4.2. 
 
14 While it may be argued that some of these control variables are also related to client risks, the 
factor analysis conducted in section 4.2 shows that they do not load on any of the risk factors. 
This justifies treating these variables as control variables instead of risk variables. 
 
15 The Big N is defined as Arthur Andersen. Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG and PwC. Arthur 
Andersen ceased to exist after the Enron scandal, and is therefore only included in the first four 
years of the sample. 
 
16 All variables have been winsorized at the top and bottom 1 percent to reduce the impact of 
outliers in the further analyses. 
 
17 An inspection of notes of annual meetings of shareholders shows that the audit partner as-
signment is officially confirmed during the annual general meeting of shareholders. 
 
18 Shapiro et al. (2002) warn that the usage of dichotomous variables in factor analyses may 
result in unexpected findings. They report that 19 randomly and independently generated dum-
my variables can result in 5 factor solutions explaining 30 percent of the total variance and 
rotated loadings exceeding the traditional .40 cutoff. Therefore, dichotomous variables are not 
included  in  the  factor  analysis,  and  are  included  into  the  regression  models  without  further 
modifications. 
 
19 Common factor analysis is also referred to as principal axis factoring. 
 
20 The latent root criterion suggests retaining only factors which have an eigenvalue exceeding 
one. 
 
21 Compared to an orthogonal rotation, an oblique rotation method is more realistic since it does 
not require the assumption that the underlying dimensions are uncorrelated with each other. 
 
22 When using the orthogonal VARIMAX rotation method the factor loadings are similar to the 
ones obtained with the oblique PROMAX rotation method. 
 
23 The results are robust to substituting the audit risk, client business risk and size factors by any 
of the single variables which compose the factors. 
 
24 Note though that all the regression models are significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
25  Assuming  that  there  is  a  reasonable  match  between  client  riskiness  and  audit  partner 
expertise. 
 
26 The Bel-First database is used as the main source to identify the audit firm, since this data-
base contains the names of the audit partner and audit firm as mentioned in the financial state-
ments, whereas the IBR membership lists require a matching procedure to identify the audit 





The Influence of Auditor-Client Economic 
Bonding on Audit Quality 
 
 
  ABSTRACT: Auditors receive audit fees from the clients they 
audit. This creates an economic bond between the auditor and 
the client. Regulators have expressed concerns about auditor-
client economic bonding, alleging that strong auditor-client 
economic bonding impairs audit quality. This study uses data on 
audits conducted in Belgium to examine whether auditors 
acquiesce to pressure from their more influential clients to 
provide more room for earnings management, thereby 
compromising audit quality. Results show that audit quality is 
lower for clients on which auditors are more economically 
dependent, but only when these clients engage in upward 
earnings management. Audit quality is not reduced when clients 
manage their earnings downwards, possibly because the 
auditor fears that income decreasing earnings management by 
the client will be detected by the tax authorities. The results 
suggest that public oversight is important to guarantee high 
audit quality. 
Key  Words:  Auditor-Client  Economic  Bonding,  Auditor 





This  study  examines  whether  increased  economic  client  dependence 
reduces  audit  quality.  The  objective  of  a  financial  statement  audit  is  to 
express an opinion on the reliability of the financial  statements (ISA 200; 
AU110).
1 The perceived credibility of the audit opinion, hence the value of 
the audit, is influenced by the perception of the economic dependence of the 
auditor on the client (Khurana and Raman 2006). 
Because clients pay their auditor to perform an audit, auditors may never 
be entirely independent from their clients, which could create a general bias 
in favor of clients (Mautz and Sharaf 1961; AICPA 1978; Wallman 1996). 
Auditors are economically dependent on clients for the audit fees. Clients are 
dependent on auditors for the auditor reports. Although auditors have few 
incentives to compromise audit quality when economic bonding to a client is 
limited, they may have greater difficulty in maintaining their independence 
from clients  for  which  the  audit  fees  are  relatively  large  given  their  client 
portfolio. Strong economic bonding to a client can increase the willingness of 
an auditor to accept questionable management assertions in order to retain 
the client and the future audit fees associated with that client (AICPA 1978; 




reduce  audit  quality  and  harm  the  informativeness  of  the  financial 
statements.  
While  large  clients  are  more  likely  to  constitute  economic  dependence 
than smaller clients, they also pose higher risks in case of an audit failure 
(Reynolds and Francis 2001). Litigation costs are positively correlated with 
client size (Lys and Watts 1994), and the negative impact of an audit failure 
on the auditor‟s reputation can be expected to be higher for a large client 
than  for  a  small  client.  These  size-related  risks  could  therefore  induce 
auditors to remain independent from their larger clients, allowing large clients 
similar,  or  even  less  discretion  to  manage  earnings  than  smaller  clients 
(Reynolds and Francis 2001). Hence, possible litigation and reputation costs 
have  an  off-setting  effect  on  audit  quality.  The  effect  of  auditor-client 
economic bonding on audit quality is therefore an empirical question. 
When  examining  the  effect  of  economic  bonding  on  audit  quality,  it  is 
important to focus on the appropriate level of decision making within an audit 
firm for at least two reasons. The first reason is that the costs of reputation 
losses and litigation may not be sufficient to offset the incentives to retain 
large clients because these costs are borne by the whole audit firm, while 
the benefits accrue to the individual partner or the local office (Reynolds and 
Francis 2001). Hence, there could be a moral hazard problem where audit 
partners do not make decisions which are in the best interest of the audit 
firm. The second reason is that while it is unlikely that a single client is a 
significant  source  of  revenue  for  an  audit  firm,  a  single  client  can  be  a 
significant source of revenue for a local office or an audit partner (Wallman 
1996; Francis et al., 1999). The Enron audit failure illustrates this. Although 
the fees earned from the Enron engagement were only 1% of the total fees 
earned by Arthur Andersen, the audit fees from Enron accounted for about 
27% of the audit fees of public clients for Arthur Andersen‟s Houston office 
(Healy and Palepu 2003). This underlines the importance of measuring client 
dependence at the level within the audit firm at which auditor independence 
is impaired. The current study therefore examines three levels of analysis: 
the audit firm level, the local office level, and the audit partner level. 
Using Belgian data on audits conducted for fiscal year 2006, this study 
examines whether auditors are able to withstand pressure from their larger 
clients to allow earnings management. Whether auditors acquiesce to client 
pressure  to  allow  earnings  management  depends  on  potential  reputation 
concerns, litigation losses and regulatory fines. Belgium has a low litigious 
environment.  Litigation  concerns  are  therefore  unlikely  to  provide  an 
incentive for auditors to refrain from allowing more earnings management 
discretion to clients on which they are economically dependent. Reputation 
risk is generally smaller for privately held companies than for publicly traded 
companies. The extent of public oversight in Belgium depends on whether 
clients  engage  in  income  increasing  or  income  decreasing  earnings 
management.  Tax  authorities  are  more  likely  to  detect  downward,  tax 
reducing, earnings management than upward earnings management. This 
setting therefore enables testing whether reputation concerns by auditors are 




whether public oversight is needed to ensure that audit quality is maintained 
at a sufficient level.
2 
Results indicate that auditors allow more upward earnings management 
discretion to clients on which they are more economically dependent. Hence, 
audit quality is impaired when an auditor has high economic dependence on 
a single client. This suggests that reputation concerns by auditors are not 
sufficient  to  offset  pressure  from  clients  to  allow  earnings  management. 
Auditors do  however constrain downward earnings  management more for 
clients that constitute a strong economic bond. This finding is consistent with 
Vander  Bauwhede  et  al.  (2003)  who  state  that  auditors  may  constrain 
downward  earnings  management  because  they  fear  that  this  type  of 
earnings  management  will  be  detected  by  the  tax  authorities.  Hence,  the 
results  suggest  that  public  oversight  is  required  to  prevent  auditors  from 
providing  more  earnings  management  discretion  to  clients  on  which  they 
have a greater economic dependence. 
This paper contributes to the literature on audit quality in several ways. 
First, this paper includes both public and private firms in the sample. Client 
acceptance  and  retention  decisions  are  based  on  entire  auditor  portfolios 
(Simunic and Stein 1990). The importance of a client for an auditor depends 
not only on the audit fees obtained from that client, but also on the audit fees 
of  the  remaining  clients.  Whereas  prior  studies  examined  the  effect  of 
auditor-client  economic  bonding  on  audit  quality  based  on  samples 
consisting of publicly listed clients only, this study incorporates both publicly 
listed and privately held companies, thereby providing more insightful results 
than  prior  studies.  The  inclusion  of  both  publicly  and  privately  held 
companies results in a more accurate measure of auditor-client economic 
bonding than one based solely on publicly traded companies. Prior studies 
use  data  on  public  clients  only,  leaving  out  private  companies,  thereby 
understating  the  total  revenues  earned  by  an  auditor  and  overstating  the 
influence  of  single  clients.
3  Furthermore,  including  only  publicly  traded 
companies leads to a selection bias because the smaller non-listed clients 
are excluded from the sample. Excluding privately held companies, which 
are generally smaller than publicly traded companies, reduces the variance 
of the economic client dependence measure. Hence, a lack of small clients 
may  explain  why  prior  studies  did  not  find  an  effect  of  auditor-client 
economic bonding on earnings management. 
Second, as opposed to publicly traded companies which generally face 
pressure to manage earnings upwards, privately held companies may have 
incentives to reduce reported earnings (e.g. to minimize taxes by reducing 
taxable  income).  In  combination  with  a  low  litigious  environment  and 
examination of the financial statements by the tax authorities, this provides 
further insight into how public oversight influences audit quality. 
Finally,  this  study  measures  auditor-client  economic  bonding  at  three 
levels  of  decision  making.  Whereas  most  studies  have  only  examined 
economic bonding at the audit firm level, or at the audit firm and the local 
practice  office  level,  this  study  also  considers  the  effect  of  economic 
dependence  on  clients  at  the  audit  partner  level.  One  other  study  which 




is a working paper by Coulton and Ruddock (2007). They argue that using 
this level of analysis leads to a better proxy of the economic bond between 
auditor  and  clients,  and  therefore  to  more  intuitive  results.  Their  study, 
however, only includes publicly traded companies, while this study includes 
public as well as private companies. 
The  remainder  of  this  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  3.2 
discusses relevant prior literature and the hypotheses development. Section 
3.3  describes  the  data  selection  and  outlines  the  research  methodology. 
Section 3.4 presents the results of the analyses. Finally, section 3.5 provides 
the conclusion and limitations. 
 
 
3.2 Prior literature and hypotheses development 
 
3.2.1 Audit quality 
Audit quality is defined by DeAngelo (1981b, p.186) as “the market-assessed 
joint probability that a given auditor will both (a) discover a breach in the 
client‟s accounting system, and (b) report the breach”. From this definition 
follows  that  audit  quality  is  a  function  of  auditor  competence  and  auditor 
independence. This paper focuses on the auditor independence component 
of audit quality. DeAngelo (1981a) and Watts and Zimmerman (1981) define 
auditor independence as the conditional probability that a discovered breach 
is reported. This refers to an auditor‟s ability to withstand client pressure to 
disclose selectively in the event a breach is discovered (DeAngelo 1981a). 
An auditor who lacks independence will be less likely to report a discovered 
breach, thus reducing audit quality. 
Both regulators and researchers in the field of auditing have examined 
which factors influence auditor independence. The main focus has been on 
the effects of increased tenure and the provision of various types of non-
audit  services  on  auditor  independence.  The  possible  detrimental  direct 
effect of audit fees on independence is however underrepresented (Wallman 
1996). The relationship between the audit fees earned from a single client 
and the total audit fees earned by an auditor becomes important when audit 
fees differ across clients (DeAngelo 1981b). Auditor independence could be 
harmed when an auditor receives a significant portion of its revenues from a 
single client (AICPA 1978, DeAngelo 1981b, Wallman 1996). 
The likelihood that an auditor maintains its independence depends on the 
revenues earned from a client, and the expected costs of an audit failure 
(Chaney  et  al.  2003).  Increased  economic  dependence  on  a  single  client 
could  create  incentives  for  an  auditor  to  be  less  strict  in  constraining 
earnings management in order to retain the client and its audit fees in the 
future  (AICPA  1978;  Commission  on  Public  Trust  and  Private  Enterprise 
2003).  However,  larger  clients  do  not  only  constitute  a  greater  economic 
bond than smaller clients, but also pose higher litigation and reputation costs 
in case of an audit failure (Lys and Watts 1994; Reynolds and Francis 2001). 
The effect of auditor-client economic bonding on audit quality is therefore 




Clients may represent a substantial part of a local office‟s or individual 
partner‟s revenues while only a minor part of the total firm‟s revenues. Thus, 
dependence issues will manifest themselves more strongly and more directly 
at  these  levels  compared  to  the  firm  level  (Wallman  1996).  An  individual 
audit partner may also be dependent upon a client for his status within the 
audit firm. Therefore, following the suggestion by Wallman (1996), Reynolds 
and Francis (2001) and Coulton and Ruddock (2007), this study considers 
economic dependence not just at the audit firm level, but also at the local 
office and the audit partner level. 
 
3.2.2 The association between auditor-client economic bonding and audit 
quality 
A number of studies (e.g. Reynolds and Francis 2001; Hunt and Lulseged 
2007; Coulton and Ruddock 2007; Coulton et al. 2007; Francis and Yu 2009) 
have tested  whether  auditor-client  economic bonding affects audit quality. 
The results are mixed. This section presents an overview of the main studies 
that have focused on the effect of auditor-client economic bonding on audit 
quality. 
Using a sample of U.S. listed companies, Reynolds and Francis (2001) 
examine  whether  economic  client  dependence  at  the  local  office  level 
induces Big N audit firms to allow larger clients, which constitute stronger 
economic bonding, more discretion to manage earnings than smaller clients. 
Contrary  to  their  hypothesis,  they  find  evidence  that  Big  N  audit  firms 
constrain  earnings management more for  clients  on  which  they  are  more 
dependent than for clients on which they are less dependent. They argue 
that Big N audit firms are unwilling to compromise their independence due to 
reputation costs associated with an audit failure. 
Chung  and  Kallapur  (2003)  also  examine  the  effect  of  auditor-client 
economic bonding on audit quality for U.S. listed companies. They find no 
statistically significant association between absolute abnormal accruals and 
auditor-client economic bonding. 
Evidence  from  the  property  casualty  insurance  industry  by  Gaver  and 
Paterson (2007) indicates that audit quality is not compromised for clients 
that constitute higher economic dependence. Consistent with Reynolds and 
Francis  (2001)  they  find  that  clients  are  instead  given  less  leeway  to 
understate  reserves  when  they  are  economically  significant  to  the  local 
practice office. 
Contrary  to  the  findings  by  Reynolds  and  Francis  (2001),  Chung  and 
Kallapur (2003) and Gaver and Paterson (2007), Ahmed et al. (2006) find 
that  there  is  a  significantly  positive  association  between  auditor-client 
economic bonding and (signed) discretionary accruals, but only for clients 
with  weak  corporate  governance.  This  suggests  that  audit  quality  is 
compromised for more influential clients with poor corporate governance. 
Following  prior  literature  which  suggests  that  Big  N  and  non-Big  N 
auditors differ in regard to audit quality, reputation costs, litigation costs, and 
client characteristics, Hunt and Lulseged (2007) examine the same question 




Big  N  audit  firms.  Similar  to  Reynolds  and  Francis  (2001)  who  used  a 
sample  of  clients  of  Big  N  audit  firms,  they  find  that  non-Big  N  auditors 
restrict  earnings  management  more  for  clients  that  constitute  a  stronger 
economic bond. This finding, however, only holds when economic bonding is 
proxied by the natural log of client sales, measured at the audit firm and the 
local office level. They find no effect of economic client dependence on audit 
quality when using audit fees as a proxy for economic client dependence.  
Using  data  on  audits  of  listed  U.S.  companies  by  Big  N  audit  firms, 
Francis and Yu (2009) report that increased auditor-client economic bonding 
at the office level is negatively associated with unsigned accruals. This is 
consistent with the findings of Reynolds and Francis (2001) and Hunt and 
Lulseged (2007) and implies that Big N auditors are more conservative for 
clients  that  constitute  a  stronger  economic  bond.  However,  they  find  that 
high  levels  of  economic  bonding  are  associated  with  greater  abnormal 
accruals  for  a  subsample  of  clients  that  report  small  profits,  suggesting 
economic dependence on these clients induces Big N auditors to allow more 
aggressive accounting. The authors focus on this subsample because there 
is  an  increased  probability  that  these  companies  engage  in  earnings 
management as they may face pressure to manage earnings upwards from 
a small loss to a small profit. 
An analysis of earnings response coefficients of listed U.S. companies by 
Ghosh  et  al.  (2009)  reveals  that  investors  perceive  audit  quality  to  be 
impaired when there is a high client importance, measured as the audit fees 
from a client as a percentage of total revenues of an audit firm. Furthermore, 
they do not find an association between earnings response coefficients and 
the non-audit fee ratio, suggesting that investors only perceive high levels of 
client importance to be a threat to auditor independence, not high non-audit 
fee ratios. 
Findings by Li (2009) suggest that the effect of auditor-client economic 
bonding on audit quality depends on the regulatory environment. She finds 
no effect of client importance, measured using ratios of client audit fee and 
client total audit fee to local office fee revenues, on the likelihood to issue a 
going  concern  opinion  prior  to  the  enactment  of  the  Sarbanes-Oxley  act. 
However, she reports that auditors are more likely to issue a going concern 
opinion post Sarbanes-Oxley. This finding indicates that there is a positive 
association between client importance and audit quality, but only when the 
regulatory  environment  provides  incentives  for  auditors  to  maintain  their 
independence due to reputation and litigation concerns. 
Adding to the literature, Coulton and Ruddock (2007) examine economic 
bonding at the audit partner level. Using data on Australian audits, they find 
no evidence that clients that generate a higher portion of an auditor‟s audit 
fees, non-audit fees or total fees are more likely to manage earnings. Similar 
to Reynolds and Francis (2001) and Hunt and Lulseged (2007), they find no 
evidence that auditors allow more earnings management discretion to clients 
on which they are more economically dependent. 
Based  on  a  sample  of  clients  of  non-Big  N  audit  firms,  Coulton  et  al. 
(2007) show that higher than expected audit fees are associated with higher 




more  upward  earnings  management  for  clients  on  which  they  are 
economically dependent. These findings are restricted to non-Big N auditors 
only, suggesting that Big  N auditors do not  allow clients that constitute a 
stronger economic bond more discretion to manage earnings. However, their 
measure of unexpected audit fees is calculated at the audit firm level. The 
difference in auditor-client economic bonding between the local office level 
and the audit firm level is more distinct for Big N audit firms than for non-Big 
N audit firms (Reynolds and Francis 2001). The lack of results for the Big N 
audit firm sample may therefore be due to a lack of focus on the relevant unit 
of decision making,  i.e. the local  office or the audit partner. Furthermore, 
while  this  study  provides  evidence  that  abnormally  high  audit  fees  impair 
auditor  independence,  it  finds  no  evidence  that  auditor  independence  is 
impaired for large clients that generate high normal (expected) audit fees, 
even though such an effect is likely to exist (Wallman 1996). 
Chen  et  al.  (2010)  examine  whether  client  importance  influences  the 
propensity of auditors to issue modified audit opinions. Based on a sample of 
publicly listed companies in China, they report that client importance at the 
audit  partner  level,  but  not  at  the  local  office  level,  impairs  audit  quality. 
Furthermore,  they  report  that  improvements  in  the  legal  and  regulatory 
environment in 2001 caused auditors to become more conservative. After 
the changes, they find a positive association between the probability that a 
modified audit opinion is issued and client importance at the partner level. 
This  finding  suggests  that  improvements  in  investor  protection  and 
shareholder litigation reduce the negative effect of auditor-client economic 
bonding on audit quality. 
Using a similar model to Chen et al. (2010), Chi et al. (2010) do not find a 
significant association between client importance at the audit partner level 
and  audit quality for a sample of both listed  and non-listed companies  in 
Taiwan.  Furthermore,  they  find  no  effect  of  client  importance  on  the 
likelihood to issue a going concern opinion or the likelihood to meet or beat 
earnings targets. 
In conclusion, these studies find mixed results on the effect of auditor-
client economic bonding on audit quality. A possible reason for these mixed 
results can be found in the sample selection of these studies. Most of these 
studies included only listed companies in the construction of client portfolios, 
omitting  non-listed  clients.  This  may  cause  a  bias  in  the  economic 
dependence  measure.  The  current  study  tries  to  overcome  this  problem 
using a sample of both listed and non-listed companies. The next section 
discusses the setting of this study, because the setting influences when an 
association between auditor-client economic bonding and audit quality can 
be expected. The hypothesis development is presented in section 3.2.4. 
3.2.3 The Belgian setting 
This section discusses the appropriateness of the current setting, and how 
client and auditor behavior are influenced by this setting. 
The first way in which the setting of the current study differs from that of 
prior studies is related to the cost of litigation. Most prior studies use data on 




Belgian data. The litigation rate in Europe is lower than in the United States 
(Gietzmann and Quick 1998, Aerts 2002). Wingate (1997) assigns a litigation 
index  of  4.82  to  Belgium,  which  is  comparable  to  most  other  European 
countries,  but  significantly  lower  than  the  litigation  index  of  15  which  is 
assigned to the United States. Following Chaney et al. (2003), auditors can 
be expected to be more likely to allow client earning management in a low 
litigious environment than in a high litigious environment. 
Furthermore,  the  current  study  makes  use  of  both  publicly  traded  and 
privately held companies, whereas most prior studies included only public 
clients. Litigation and reputation costs for the auditor in case of a detected 
audit failure are generally lower for privately held companies because their 
financial statements are less scrutinized by investors, financial analysts or 
regulating  authorities  of  stock  exchanges  (Chaney  et  al,  2004;  Vander 
Bauwhede and Willekens 2004). Hence, auditors might be expected to allow 
more earnings management discretion to privately held companies than to 
listed companies. Trueman and Titman (1988), Coppens and Peek (2005) 
and Burgstahler et al. (2006) provide evidence that not only publicly traded 
companies, but also private firms manage earnings. Examining the role of 
auditors in earnings management reduction is therefore also relevant in a 
European  setting  where  only  a  small  percentage  of  the  companies  are 
publicly traded. 
Another  factor  that  is  relevant  for  the  hypotheses  development  is  the 
degree of alignment between financial and tax accounting. The probability 
that an audit failure is  detected  is higher  in high tax alignment countries, 
such as Belgium, than in low tax alignment countries because the financial 
statements in high tax alignment countries are relatively more scrutinized by 
the  tax  authorities  (Van  Tendeloo  and  Vanstraelen  2008).  The  increased 
probability that an audit failure is detected in high tax alignment countries 
results  in  a  higher  risk  of  loss  of  reputation  and  regulatory  fines  for  the 
auditor than in low tax alignment countries.
4 Auditors in high tax alignment 
environments  can  therefore  be  expected  to  constrain  client  earnings 
management more than in low tax alignment environments. 
Hence,  on  the  one  hand,  the  low  litigious  environment  and  lower 
reputation  costs  compared  to  the  United  States  may  result  in  Belgian 
auditors being relatively more likely to acquiesce to client pressure to allow 
earnings management. Examination of the financial statements by the tax 
authorities,  on  the  other  hand,  creates  incentives  for  Belgian  auditors  to 
constrain client earnings management (Vander Bauwhede et al. 2003; Van 
Tendeloo and Vanstraelen 2008). Vander Bauwhede et al. (2003) report that 
upward earnings management is not constrained in Belgium due to a lack of 
litigation, but downward earnings management is limited by Big 6 auditors 
due to fear of tax authorities.  
Whether auditor-client economic bonding results in impaired audit quality 
depends  on  whether  pressure  by  influential  clients  to  allow  earnings 
management  is  offset  by  potential  litigation  costs,  reputation  costs  and 
regulatory  fines.  Since  potential  litigation  costs  are  low  in  Belgium,  the 
offsetting  effect  is  a  function  of  reputation  concerns  and  public  oversight 




management, this setting  enables  examining  whether reputation concerns 
are  sufficient  to  offset  pressure  by  individual  clients  to  allow  earnings 
management  or  whether  public  oversight  is  required  to  ensure  that  audit 
quality  is  not  comprised  for  clients  on  which  auditors  are  economically 
dependent. 
3.2.4 Hypotheses development 
Given the mixed findings of prior studies, and the possible lack of results due 
to  sample  selection  bias,  this  study  follows  the  theoretical  arguments 
outlined  at  the  beginning  of  this  section  for  the  formulation  of  the 
hypotheses. Increased auditor-client economic bonding induces auditors to 
allow more earnings management discretion to clients on which they have 
higher  economic  dependence  (AICPA  1978;  Commission  on  Public  Trust 
and  Private  Enterprise  2003).  However,  auditors  have  incentives  to  act 
independently because of reputation concerns and litigation costs. Hence, 
there  is  tradeoff  between  economic  dependence  on  the  one  hand  and 
reputation  and  litigation  costs  on  the  other  hand  (Reynolds  and  Francis 
2001). 
As opposed to settings investigated in prior research in which auditors 
have incentives to constrain upward earnings management due to litigation 
and  reputation  costs,  upward  earnings  management  is  less  scrutinized  in 
Belgium and the cost of litigation is lower. Potential reputation losses and 
litigation costs associated with upward earnings management by clients are 
therefore lower in Belgium than in settings used in prior research. Because 
of  reduced  reputation  concerns  and  litigation  costs  auditors  have  less 
incentives to constrain upward earnings management by clients. Therefore, 
auditors are expected to generally allow more influential clients more leeway 
to manage earnings upwards.  
While auditor-client economic bonding is expected to impair audit quality 
for clients that manage earnings upwards, this is not expected for clients that 
engage in downward earnings management. Tax authorities are focused on 
restricting downward earnings management because this lowers the taxable 
income. The probability that financial misstatements are detected by the tax 
authorities is therefore higher when clients engage  in downward earnings 
management than when they engage in upward earnings management. This 
increases potential reputation concerns on the part of the auditor vis-à-vis 
the  tax  authorities,  and  increases  the  expected  cost  of  allowing 
misstatements.  Therefore,  auditor-client  economic  bonding  is  expected  to 
have  no  detrimental  effect  on  audit  quality  for  clients  that  engage  in 
downward earnings management. 
Two  different  hypotheses  are  used  to  test  whether  auditor-client 
economic  bonding  influences  audit  quality,  because  the  extent  to  which 
auditors allow client earnings management is likely to differ depending on 
whether clients engage in upward or downward earning management. Due 
to fear of the tax authorities, auditors are more likely to allow upward than 
downward  client  earnings  management.  The  first  hypothesis  relates  to 
clients  that  engage  in  upward  earnings  management.  The  second 




and are therefore more likely to have their financial statements scrutinized by 
the tax authorities. The first hypothesis is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Auditor-client economic bonding induces auditors to be 
more lenient towards clients that engage in income increasing earnings 
management. 
 
For  clients  engaging  in  case  of  downward  earnings  management  the 
following is hypothesized: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Auditor-client economic bonding does not induce auditors 
to be more lenient towards clients that engage in income decreasing 
earnings management. 
 
Auditor-client economic bonding is more likely to manifest itself at the 
audit partner level than at the local practice office level or audit firm level. 
Therefore,  the  results  are  expected  to  be  strongest  when  auditor-client 





This section discusses the selection of the sample, and the specification of 
the model used to test the hypotheses. 
 
3.3.1 Sample selection 
This study uses data on audits conducted in the Belgian audit market for 
fiscal year 2006. Data on audits conducted during this fiscal year is used, as 
it is the most recent year for which both financial and auditor information are 
available. 
The Belgian setting has a number of unique characteristics, which allow 
testing the hypotheses as stated above. Belgian corporate law requires both 
public and private companies above a certain size limit to have their financial 
statements audited by a statutory auditor. Furthermore, all audited financial 
statements report audit firm and audit partner information. This facilitates the 
empirical construction of client portfolios at both the audit firm and the audit 
partner  level,  incorporating  both  public  and  private  firms.  In  addition,  het 
Instituut  van  de  Bedrijfsrevisoren  (IBR,  the  Belgian  Institute  of  Auditors) 
publishes an annual membership list which contains various types of audit 
partner  information,  such  as  the  local-practice  office  at  which  an  audit 
partner works. This enables the empirical construction of client portfolios at 
the office level.
5 
These characteristics of the Belgian audit market and the availability of the 
required  financial  data  and  auditor  information  allow  testing  whether 
economic client dependence has a detrimental effect on audit quality. This 
enables the current study to make a contribution to the current literature that 




setting allows measuring client portfolios more accurately than prior studies 
by incorporating both listed and non-listed companies in the client portfolios. 
Table 3.1, displayed below, gives an overview of the sample selection. 
Financial data on audited Belgian companies are collected using the Bel-
First  database.  The  initial  sample  includes  20,166  companies  which  are 
audited in 2006. Utilities (four digit NACE industry codes between 4,000 and 
4,100)  and  financial  institutions  (four  digit  NACE  industry  codes  between 
6,500 and 6,720) are excluded from the sample due to their specific audit 
requirements  and  circumstances  (n=1,397).  Furthermore,  these  industries 
are highly regulated.To accurately reflect auditor-client economic bonding, 
subsidiaries  (n=2,809)  are  removed  from  the  sample,  while  consolidated 
financial  information  is  used  for  parent  companies.  An  additional  6,790 
observations  are  removed  because  of  missing  financial  or  auditor 
information. Companies for which more than one audit partner is indicated 
are  also  removed  because  the  relative  importance  for  each  of  the  audit 
partners  is  unknown  (n=595).  Following  Carey  and  Simnett  (2006),  172 
observations with unstable revenues are removed from the sample.
6 Finally, 
32  observations  are  removed  because  there  are  not  enough  other 
observations with the same two digit NACE industry code to  estimate the 
measure  of  audit  quality.  This  results  in  a  final  sample  of  8,371  usable 
observations. 
 
3.3.2 Model specification 
Prior studies have used various proxies for audit quality, such as the extent 
of litigation against an auditor (e.g. Palmrose 1988), the propensity to issue a 
qualified  audit  report  (e.g.  Hopwood  et  al.  1994;  Vanstraelen  2000),  the 
frequency of earnings restatements (Raghunandan et al. 2003; Kinney et al. 
2004), and the degree of client earnings management (e.g. Francis et al. 
1999). Most of the concerns about economic client dependence are focused 
on the extent to which it influences the degree to which auditors allow client 
earnings management (e.g. AICPA 1978; Commission on Public Trust and 
Private Enterprise 2003). This study therefore uses the extent of earnings 
management  to  proxy  for  audit  quality.  High  quality  audits  are  commonly 
argued to constrain management‟s choice of accounting procedures which 
are  used  to  manage  earnings  (Becker  et  al.  1998,  Francis  et  al.  1999, 
Frankel et al. 2002). However, as argued in the current study, high levels of 
auditor-client  economic  bonding  may  increase  the  likelihood  that  auditors 
acquiesce  to  client  pressure  to  allow  earnings  management,  resulting  in 
lower audit quality.  
Table 3.1: Sample selection 
 
  A) Initial Sample 
 
  20,166 
Less: Utilities and Financial Institutions 
 
-1,397   
Less: Subsidiaries 
 
-2,809   
Less: Missing values 
 
-6,790   
Less: More than 1 audit partner 
 
-595   
Less: Outliers 
 
-172   
Less: Observations within small industries 
 
-32   
B) Sample for analyses    8,371 




Consistent with prior studies which have examined the effect of auditor-
client  economic  bonding  on  earnings  management  (e.g.  Ashbaugh  et  al. 
2003; Coulton  and Ruddock 2007;  Coulton et al. 2007) the current study 
makes use of a performance adjusted cross sectional modified-Jones (1991) 
model  to  estimate  the  extent  of  discretionary  accruals  to  measure  client 
earnings management to proxy for audit quality. Ashbaugh et al. (2003) and 
Kothari  et  al.  (2005)  demonstrate  that  controlling  for  underlying  company 
performance  improves  the  specification  of  the  modified-Jones  model 
(Dechow  et  al.  1995).  Therefore,  current  year  return  on  assets  (ROA)  is 
included to control for client performance.
7 Following Vander Bauwhede and 
Willekens (2004) and Coulton and Ruddock (2007), lagged total accruals are 
included in the model to control for the reversing nature of accruals (e.g. 
DeFond and Park. 2001). A constant is included in the model to control for 
any heteroskedasticity that is not alleviated by scaling by total assets and to 
mitigate  any  problems  related  to  an  omitted  size  variable  (Kothari  et  al. 
2005). Discretionary accruals are equal to the residual of the model ϵijt. The 
following model is estimated by industry (two-digit NACE code): 
 
                   
 
      
                                        




t  =  year, t-1 refers to the prior year; 
TACCijt  =  total accruals, scaled by total assets in year t-1. Following Dechow et 
al. (1995) and Leuz et al. (2003), total accruals are computed as 
TACCijt = ( ∆CAijt - ∆CASHijt ) - ( ∆CLijt - ∆STDijt - ∆TPijt ) - DEPijt, where 
∆CAijt = change in total current assets, ∆CASHijt = change in cash/cash 
equivalents, ∆CLijt = total current liabilities, ∆STDijt = change in short-
term debt included in current liabilities, ∆TPijt = change in income taxes 
payable, DEPijt = depreciation and amortization expense for company i 
in industry j for year t; 
Aijt-1  =  total assets for company i in industry j for year t-1; 
∆SALESijt  =  change  in  sales  in  year  t,  scaled  by  total  assets  for  company  i  in 
industry j for year t-1; 
∆RECijt  =  change  in  accounts  receivable  in  year  t,  scaled  by  total  assets  for 
company i in industry j for year t-1; 
PPEijt  =  year-end  property,  plant  and  equipment,  scaled  by  total  assets  for 
company i in industry j for year t-1; 
ROAijt  =  return on assets, calculated as operating income divided by total assets 
for company i in industry j for year t-1; 
TACCijt-1  =  TACC in year t-1, scaled by total assets for company i in industry j for 
year t-1; and 
ϵijt  =  unexpected portion of total accruals for company i in industry j for year 
t. 
 
Model (3.2), as stated below, is estimated to test the association between 
the  strength  of  the  auditor-client  economic  bond  and  audit  quality  (as 
captured  by  absolute  discretionary  accruals).  The  absolute  value  of 
discretionary accruals is used to proxy for audit quality because clients can 




earnings  downwards.  The  absolute  amount  of  discretionary  accruals  is 
considered to be an appropriate measure of earnings management (Warfield 
et al. 1995). A higher (lower) amount of absolute discretionary accruals is 
associated  with  a  greater  (lower)  degree  of  earnings  management.  The 
model  is  tested  separately  for  a  sample  of  clients  that  manage  earnings 
upwards and a sample of clients that manage earnings downwards to enable 
examining the effect of public oversight on audit quality. 
The model,  displayed  below,  is  estimated  at  three  different  levels:  the 
level of the audit firm, the level of the local practice office, and the level of 
the audit partner. For each level of decision making, the absolute amount of 
discretionary  accruals  is  regressed  upon  a  proxy  for  the  auditor-client 
economic bond measured at that level and a number of control variables. 
The subsequent section  discusses the selection and measurement of the 
explanatory variables.  
 
                                          
                                                
                                                




ABSDACC  =  Absolute  value  of  discretionary  accruals  scaled  by  lagged  total 
assets; 
ECONBOND  =  ECONBOND is computed as the ratio of the natural log of revenues 
of the client to the sum of the natural log of revenues of all clients of 
the same auditor. ECONBOND is measured at the audit firm level 
(ECONBOND_FIRM), the local office level (ECONBOND_OFFICE) 
or the audit partner level (ECONBOND_PARTNER). This measure is 
further discussed below; 
TENURE<3  =  1 if the audit partner has been the engagement partner on a client 
company for 2 years or less, and 0 otherwise; 
TENURE>7  =  1 if the audit partner has been the engagement partner on a client 
company for more than 7 years, and 0 otherwise; 
MANDATE  =  1 if the audit is conducted in the last year of the three year renewable 
mandate (audit engagement), and 0 if it is conducted in either of the 
first two years; 
PBANK  =  1  if  the  client  has  a  high  risk  of  going  bankrupt,  based  on  the 
bankruptcy prediction model by Ooghe and Verbaere (1982), and 0 
otherwise; 
LISTED  =  1  if  the  client  is  listed  on  the  Belgian  stock  exchange,  and  0 
otherwise; 
LN_AGE  =  natural logarithm of the company age measured in years;  
CFO   =  cash  flow  from  operations,  scaled  by  beginning  of  the  year  total 
assets;
8 
LEV  =  total liabilities divided by total assets; 
GROWTH  =  growth in total assets from the previous to the current fiscal year; 
BIGN  =  1  if  the  client  is  audited  by  one  of  the  Big  4  audit  firms,  and  0 
otherwise; 
LN_ASSETS  =  natural logarithm of total assets of the client company (€000) at fiscal 
year-end; and 
LOSS  =  1 if the operating income of the client was negative in the prior fiscal 
year, and 0 otherwise. 




As audit fee data are not publicly available in Belgium, this study has to 
rely on a proxy to measure audit fees, and subsequently economic client 
dependence.  Prior  literature  (e.g.  Francis  1984,  Moizer  and  Turley  1987, 
Craswell  et  al.  1995,  Reynolds  and  Francis  2001)  has  reported  a  high 
correlation between the natural log of client sales revenues and audit fees. 
Therefore, this study measures economic client dependence (ECONBOND) 
as the natural log of the client‟s revenues divided by the sum of natural log of 
revenues  of  all  clients  belonging  to  one  unit  (i.e.  audit  firm 
(ECONBOND_FIRM), local office (ECONBOND_OFFICE), and audit partner 
(ECONBOND_PARTNER).
9  Prior  studies  have  used  similar  measures  to 
proxy  for  client  influence  (e.g.  Reynolds  and  Francis  2001,  Hunt  and 
Lulseged 2007, Francis and Yu 2009).
10  
In addition to the experimental variables, a number of control variables 
are included based on prior literature (e.g. Reynolds and Francis 2001; Hunt 
and Lulseged 2007; Carey and Simnett 2006; Coulton and Ruddock 2007; 
Coulton et al. 2007; Francis and Yu 2009; Knechel and Vanstraelen 2007). 
First  of  all,  the  study  controls  for  tenure  (the  length  of  the  auditor-client 
relationship). Audit quality during the first years of the engagement may be 
relatively lower due to increased economic client dependence as a result of 
low-balling (DeAngelo, 1981a) or unfamiliarity with the client (e.g. Geiger and 
Raghunandan 2002; Johnson et al. 2002; Carcello and Nagy 2004; Carey 
and Simnett 2006).
11 Long tenure could lead to an erosion of audit quality 
due to the development of personal relationships between the client and the 
audit partner or due to a familiarity threat which could impair an auditor‟s 
critical appraisal ability (Carey and Simnett 2006). Evidence concerning the 
effect  of  long  tenure  on  audit  quality  is  mixed  (e.g.  Johnson  et  al.  2002; 
Myers et al. 2003; Carcello and Nagy 2004; Carey and Simnett 2006; Manry 
et al. 2008). Audit partner tenure is computed based on the appointment 
date of the audit partner, which is reported in the Bel-First database.
12 Two 
dummy variables are used to distinguish short (less than 3 years) and long 
tenure (more than 7 years). These cut-offs are consistent with Carey and 
Simnett (2006).
13 A positive coefficient for TENURE<3 (partner tenure of less 
than 3 years) on the amount of absolute discretionary accruals is expected. 
The  effect  of TENURE>7  (partner  tenure  of more  than  7  years)  on  audit 
quality is unclear. 
Audits  in  Belgium  are  assigned  to  audit  firms  based  on  three  year 
renewable  contracts,  referred  to  as  a  mandates.  Because  of  this,  it  is 
possible that auditors become more lenient towards the client  in the final 
year of the engagement, hoping to retain the client for another three years, 
resulting in higher absolute discretionary accruals (Vanstraelen 2000).
14 The 
variable MANDATE indicates whether an audit is conducted in the last year 
of the three year contract. MANDATE is computed based on the audit firm 
appointment  date  reported  in  the  Bel-First  database.
15  MANDATE  is 
expected to have a positive coefficient.
16 
The next control variable, LISTED, indicates whether a company is listed 
on  the  Belgian  stock  exchange.  Publicly  traded  firms  have  incentives  to 
manage  earnings  in  order  to  meet  or  beat  earnings  targets  or  analyst 




ownership  is  more  concentrated  in  privately  held  firms,  resulting  in  lower 
agency  costs  for  privately  held  companies  than  for  publicly  traded 
companies, making private companies less likely to manage earnings (Fama 
and  Jensen  1983).  However,  agency  problems  may  still  be  present  for 
private  firms  between  bankers  and  shareholders,  and  bankers  and 
management (Dye, 1988; Vander Bauwhede et al. 2003; Vander Bauwhede 
and  Willekens,  2004).  Furthermore,  financial  statements  of  privately  held 
firms are more likely to be influenced by tax reduction incentives (Vander 
Bauwhede  and  Willekens  2004;  Ball  and  Shivakumar  (2005).  Potential 
litigation costs and reputation losses are larger for listed companies, creating 
an incentive for auditors to constrain earnings management more for listed 
companies  (Chaney  et  al,  2004;  Vander  Bauwhede  and Willekens  2004). 
Evidence  about  differences  in  earnings  management  between  public  and 
private companies is mixed. Using data on the US banking industry, Beatty 
et al. (2002) on the one hand show that public companies engage more in 
earnings management than privately held companies. Vander Bauwhede et 
al. (2003), on the other hand, show that listed firms engage less in earnings 
management than non listed firms. This is also found by Burgstahler et al. 
(2006)  who  show  that  capital  markets  increase  earnings  informativeness. 
The  effect  of  LISTED  on  absolute  discretionary  accruals  is  therefore  not 
directly obvious. Therefore, no expectation is formed regarding the sign of 
LISTED. 
Cash flow from operations (scaled by total assets) is included because 
accruals  and  cash  flows  are  on  average  negatively  correlated  (Dechow 
1994; Sloan 1996). Hence, CFO is expected to be negatively associated with 
discretionary accruals. 
Companies  with  high  debt  levels  have  incentives  to  use  accruals  to 
manage earnings upwards in order to meet debt covenants (DeFond and 
Jiambalvo 1994). High leverage is also related to the risk of default (Ohlson 
1980;  Beneish  and  Press  1995).  Financially  distressed  companies  have 
stronger  incentives  to  manage  earnings  upwards  to  avoid  liquidation 
(Reynolds and Francis 2001). However, distressed companies engaged in 
contractual  renegotiations  with  lenders,  unions,  government,  and/or 
management have incentives to manage earnings downwards. Asset write-
offs and reduced dividends can help management to signal to lenders that 
they  are  committed  to  streamlining  operations  (DeAngelo  et  al.  1994). 
Losses and dividend reductions can be used to convince unions about the 
need for wage concessions (Liberty and Zimmerman 1986; DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo  1991).  The  effects  of  client  leverage  and  bankruptcy  risk  on 
discretionary  accruals  are  therefore  unclear.  Bankruptcy  risk  is  measured 
using the dummy variable PBANK. A value of 1 (0) for PBANK indicates a 
high  (low)  bankruptcy  risk.  Client  leverage  (LEV)  is  measured  as  total 
liabilities divided by total assets. 
Accruals are likely to be positively associated with a company‟s growth 
opportunities (Johnson et al. 2002). Consistent with prior studies (e.g. Carey 
and Simnett 2006; Hunt and Lulseged 2007), this study controls for growth 




Prior literature has shown that the amount of accruals is dependent upon 
company age (Anthony and Ramesh 1992). Younger companies are more 
likely to experience financial distress (Carey and Simnett 2006), increasing 
the pressure to manage earnings. Company age (LN_AGE) is computed as 
the  natural  logarithm  of  the  number  of  years  since  the  formation  of  the 
company.  A  negative  association  between  LN_AGE  and  the  amount  of 
absolute discretionary accruals is expected.  
Audit firm size is proxied by a dummy variable, BIGN, which indicates 
whether the audit firm is one of the Big N audit firms.
17 Big N audit firms are 
generally expected to deliver higher quality audits than non-Big N audit firms 
(DeAngelo 1981b). This argument is supported by prior studies conducted in 
the United States which show that Big N audit firms are less likely to allow 
earnings  management  by  clients  (e.g.  Becker  et  al.  1998;  Francis  et  al. 
1999; Francis and Krishnan 1999). Evidence on audit-quality differentiation 
in the European private client segment is however mixed (Vander Bauwhede 
et  al.  2003;  Vander  Bauwhede  and  Willekens  2004;  Van  Tendeloo  and 
Vanstraelen 2008). Consistent with the theoretical argument by DeAngelo 
(1981b),  a  negative  effect  of  BIGN  on  absolute  discretionary  accruals  is 
expected. 
Company  size  is  found  to  be  correlated  with  operating  characteristics 
which  cause  large  firms  to  have  lower  absolute  amounts  of  discretionary 
accruals (Reynolds and Francis 2001). Company size is measured as the 
natural log of total assets (LN_ASSETS). A negative association between 
LN_ASSETS  and  the  magnitude  of  absolute  discretionary  accruals  is 
expected. 
Finally,  consistent  with  Frankel  et  al.  (2002)  and  Carey  and  Simnett 
(2006), a dummy variable is included which measures whether a company 
incurred  a  loss  in  the  prior  fiscal  year  (LOSS).  Brown  (2001)  finds  that 
companies which report losses are less likely to report earnings surprises. A 
negative association between loss and discretionary accruals is expected. 
 
 
3.4 Descriptive statistics and results 
 
This section provides an overview of descriptive statistics and discusses the 
results of the tests of the hypotheses. 
 
3.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3.2 provides winsorized descriptive statistics on the sample of 8,371 
observations
18.  Panel  A  shows  that  the  absolute  discretionary  accruals 
(ABSDACC) are on average 12 percent of lagged total assets. The mean of 
auditor-client  economic  bonding  is  3.1  percent  at  the  firm  level 
(ECONBOND_FIRM), 5.3 percent at the office level (ECONBOND_OFFICE), 
and 7.4 percent at the partner level (ECONBOND_PARTNER). As expected, 
this shows that independence related problems are more likely to occur at 




Table 3.2 - Panel A: Descriptive statistics (n=8,371) 
 
Variables  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
DACC  -.000  -.002  .177  -.582  .587 
ABSDACC  .120  .076  .130  .000  .587 
ECONBOND_FIRM  .031  .005  .060  .001  .357 
ECONBOND _OFFICE  .053  .027  .075  .002  .487 
ECONBOND _PARTNER  .074  .043  .089  .010  .548 
TENURE<3  .240  0  .427  0  1 
TENURE>7  .322  0  .467  0  1 
MANDATE  .369  0  .483  0  1 
PBANK  .245  0  .430  0  1 
LISTED  .002  0  .039  0  1 
AGE  24.775  20  17.292  3  85 
CFO  .099  .083  .223  -.703  .888 
LEV  .626  .663  .260  .032  1 
GROWTH  .101  .051  .323  -.615  1.788 
BIGN  .427  0  .495  0  1 
ASSETS  26,845,080  6,629  81,258,190  139,000  663,291,000 
LOSS  .051  0  .221  0  1 
Variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. 
ABSDACC  = absolute amount of discretionary accruals scaled by lagged total assets 
ECONBOND_FIRM  = economic bonding of an audit firm to a client, computed as the ratio of the natural  log of 
revenues of the client to the sum of the natural log of revenues of all clients of the same audit 
firm 
ECONBOND _OFFICE  = economic bonding of a local office to a client, computed as the ratio of the natural log of 
revenues of the client to the sum of the revenues of total assets of all clients of the same local 
office 
ECONBOND _PARTNER  = economic bonding of an audit partner to a client, computed as the ratio of the natural log of 
revenues of the client to the sum of the natural log of revenues of all clients of the same audit 
partner 
TENURE<3  = 1 if the audit partner is the engagement partner on a client company for 2 years or less, and 0 
otherwise 
TENURE>7  = 1 if the audit partner is the engagement partner on a client company for more than 7 years, 
and 0 otherwise 
MANDATE  =  1  if  the  audit  is  conducted  in  the  last  year  of  the  three  year  renewable  mandate  (audit 
engagement), and 0 otherwise 
PBANK  = 1 if the client has a high risk of going bankrupt, based on the bankruptcy prediction model by 
Ooghe and Verbaere (1982), and 0 otherwise 
LISTED  = 1 if the client is listed on the Belgian stock exchange, and 0 otherwise 
AGE  = company age measured in number of years 
CFO  = cash flow from operations, scaled by beginning of the year total assets 
LEV  = total liabilities divided by total assets 
GROWTH  = growth in total assets from the previous to the current fiscal year 
BIGN  = 1 if the client is audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms, and 0 otherwise 
ASSETS  = total assets of the client company at fiscal year-end 
LOSS  = 1 if the operating income of the client was negative in the prior fiscal year, and 0 otherwise 
   
The control variables show that 24% of the companies are audited by the 
same  partner  for  less  than  3  years  (TENURE<3),  and  32.2%  of  the 
companies  is  audited  by  the  same  audit  partner  for  over  7  years 
(TENURE>7).  PBANK  has  a  mean  of  .245,  meaning  that  24.5%  of  the 
companies in the sample have a high risk of going bankrupt. Only 0.2% of 
the companies in the sample are listed on the Belgian stock exchange. The 
average age of companies (AGE) within the sample is just below 25 years. 
Operating cash flows (CFO) are on average equal to 9.9% of lagged total 
assets.  Leverage  (LEV)  is  on  average  62.6%.  Companies  experience  on 
average  a 10.1%  growth  in total assets (GROWTH). The mean company 
size  (ASSETS)  expressed  in  total  assets  is  26.85  million  Euro.  From  the 
clients in the sample, 5.1% experienced an operating loss in the prior fiscal 
year (LOSS). 
In order to provide additional insight into the sample, Panel B of Table 3.2 
compares clients of Big N audit firms with clients of non-Big N audit firms. 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Panel  B  shows  that  the  economic  dependence  on  individual  clients 
(ECONBOND_FIRM)  is  significantly  larger  (t=50.73)  larger  for  non-Big  N 
audit firms (mean=.053) than for Big N audit firms (mean=.001), as displayed 
by the difference in means. This finding is as expected, because Big N audit 
firms have larger client portfolios than non-Big N audit firms. Local offices of 
non-Big N audit firms are significantly more dependent upon single clients 
(ECONBOND_OFFICE, mean=.073) than local offices of Big N audit firms 
(mean=.025). A similar effect is found at the audit partner level, where the 
mean for ECONBOND_PARTNER is .092 for auditors of non-Big N audit 
firms  and  .050  for  auditors  working  for  Big  N  audit  firms.  Auditor-client 
economic bonding therefore is more likely to impair auditor independence for 
non-Big N auditors than for Big N auditors.  
Furthermore, the table shows that clients of Big N audit firms differ from 
clients of non-Big N audit firms on various other characteristics. Clients of 
Big N audit firms have on average more discretionary accruals (ABSDACC; 
mean=.134) than clients of non-Big N audit firms (.110), which could indicate 
that Big N auditors allow their clients more discretion to manage earnings 
than do non-Big N auditors. 
The clients of Big N audit firms (23.72 years) are on average younger 
(AGE) than those of non-Big n audit firms (25.56 years), and the tenure of 
Big N audit firms is on average lower (following the scores on the dummy 
variables TENURE<3 and TENURE>7). On average, the leverage (LEV) of 
clients of Non-Big N audit firms (.633) is higher than for clients of Big N audit 
firms (.617). Clients of Big N audit firms are on average larger (44.05 million 
Euros) than clients of non-Big N audit firms (14 million Euros). Finally, clients 
of big N audit firms are less likely to have an operating loss in the previous 
fiscal year (mean=.018) than clients of non-Big N audit firms (mean=.076). 
Consistent with prior research (e.g. Shu 2000), clients of Big N audit firms 
appear to be less risky than clients of non-Big N audit firms. Clients of Big N 
audit firms do not significantly differ from clients of non-Big N audit firms with 
respect to MANDATE, PBANK, LISTED, CFO and GROWTH. 
The  correlation  matrix  is  displayed  in  Table  3.3.  The  auditor-client 
economic  bonding  variables  (ECONBOND_FIRM,  ECONBOND_OFFICE, 
and ECONBOND_PARTNER) are significantly and positively correlated with 
each other (ranging between a minimum correlation of .652 and a maximum 
correlation  of  .803).  This  is  however  not  a  cause  of  concern  for  the 
regression analyses since each time only one of these variables is included 
in  the  model.  The  size  of  correlations  among  the  remaining  explanatory 
variables does not raise concerns related to multicollinearity.
19 
 
3.4.2 Multivariate results 
Table 3.4 presents the results of the multivariate regressions using absolute 
discretionary  accruals  as  a  proxy  for  audit  quality.  A  higher  value  of 
discretionary accruals indicates lower audit quality. To test hypotheses 1 and 
2, the sample is split into two subsamples. The first subsample consists of 
clients with upward earnings management. The other subsample consists of 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































pretation,  absolute  discretionary  accruals  are  used  as  the  dependent 
variable for both subsamples. Higher absolute discretionary accruals indicate 
greater  client  earnings  management  and  lower  audit  quality.  Separate 
regressions are ran for the audit firm level (ECONBOND_FIRM), the local 
practice  office  level  (ECONBOND_OFFICE)  and  the  audit  partner  level 
(ECONBOND_PARTNER).  The White  test  rejects  the  hypothesis  that  the 
residuals  of  the  models  are  homoscedastic  (White  1980).  To  control  for 
heteroskedasticity, White-corrected standard errors are reported.  
The  results  for  the  subsample  of  clients  with  positive  discretionary 
accruals,  columns  1-3,  show  that  the  coefficients  for  ECONBOND_FIRM 
(β=-.018,  p>.10)  and  ECONBOND_PARTNER  (β=-.004,  p>.10)  are 
negative,  while  the  coefficient  of  ECONBOND_OFFICE  (β=.10,  p>.10)  is 
positive. All coefficients are insignificant, which suggests that auditors do not 
give in to pressure from clients with a strong economic bond to allow more 
earnings management, nor do they constrain earnings management more 
than  for  less  influential  clients.  However,  auditors  also  do  not  constrain 
earnings management more for clients with a strong economic bond than for 
clients with a weak economic bond. Hence, auditor-client economic bonding 
does not appear to have an effect on audit quality. Hypothesis 1 is therefore 
not  supported.  Results  for  the  subsample  of  clients  with  negative 
discretionary  accruals  are  displayed  in  columns  4-6  of  Table  3.4.  The 
coefficient for ECONBOND is negative for each of the three levels, but only 
significant at the local office level (ECONBOND_OFFICE; β=-.038, p<.05). 
This  suggests  that  auditors  do  not  allow  clients  with  a  greater  economic 
bond more room to manage earnings downwards. This finding is consistent 
with  Hypothesis  2,  which  states  that  auditors  do  not  acquiesce  to  client 
pressure  to  manage  earnings  downwards.  Instead,  auditors  constrain 
downward earnings management for clients for which economic bonding at 
the local office is stronger.  
The coefficients for the control variables and their significance levels are 
consistent across all three levels of decision making within audit firms. For 
the sake of brevity, the discussion is limited to the audit partner level. The 
coefficients on TENURE<3 (β=.004, p>.10) and TENURE>7 (β=-.003, p>.10) 
are insignificant for the positive discretionary accruals subsample. Hence the 
length of the auditor-client relationship does not appear to have an effect on 
audit  quality.  For  the  sample  with  income  decreasing  accruals,  the 
coefficients for both measures of tenure, TENURE<3 (β=.004; p>.10) and 
TENURE>7 (β=.001; p>0.10) are positive but insignificant.  
Contrary  to  the  expectation,  but  consistent  with  Vanstraelen  (2000), 
MANDATE  has  a  negative,  but  insignificant  coefficient  for  the  positive 
discretionary  accruals  sample  (β=-.003,  p>.10)  and  the  negative 
discretionary accruals sample (β=.-002; p>.10). This suggests that auditors 
do not allow more earnings management in the last year of the renewable 
mandate  in  order  to  increase  the  probability  of  a  renewal  of  the 
engagement.
20  
Companies which are in financial distress (PBANK) have smaller positive 
discretionary  accruals  (β=-.383,  p<.01)  and  larger  negative  discretionary 




DeAngelo et al. (1994) that companies in financial distress have incentives 
to  manage  earnings  downwards  to  either  signal  their  commitment  to 
reorganizations  or  to  convince  unions  about  the  necessity  of  wage 
reductions. 
 Publicly traded companies (LISTED) do not appear to differ from non-
listed companies with respect to the amount of either positive discretionary 
accruals  (β=.-075;  p>.10)  or  negative  discretionary  accruals  (β=.-005; 
p>.10). 
 The coefficient for company age (LN_AGE) is significantly negative for 
both  samples  (β=-.008,  p<.01,  β=.-004;  p<.10).  This  suggests  that  older 
companies engage less in earnings management than younger companies. 
Hence, audit quality seems to be positively related with client age.  
Cash flows from operations (CFO) are negatively associated (β=-.383, 
p<.01)  with  positive  discretionary  accruals,  and  positively  associated  with 
negative  discretionary  accruals  (β=.385,  p<.01),  which  shows  that 
companies  with  higher  cash  flows  from  operations  have  lower  signed 
discretionary  accruals,  consistent  with  findings  from  prior  literature  (e.g. 
Frankel et al. 2002). 
More  highly  leveraged  firms  (LEVERAGE)  have  smaller  positive 
discretionary  accruals  (β=-.018,  p>.10)  and  larger  negative  discretionary 
accruals  (β=.057,  p<0.01)  which  suggests  that  companies  with  higher 
leverage have lower (signed) discretionary accruals, consistent with findings 
by prior studies (e.g. Hunt and Lulseged 2007). 
The coefficient of asset growth (GROWTH) for the subsample of clients 
with positive discretionary accruals is significantly positive (β=.110, p<.01). 
The effect of asset growth on the amount of negative discretionary accruals 
is insignificant (β=.011, p>.10). Hence, there is evidence that faster growing 
companies  have  incentives  to  manage  earnings  upwards,  but  not 
downwards. Prior studies either found no effect of growth on discretionary 
accruals (e.g. Carey and Simnett 2006) or a positive effect on both positive 
and negative discretionary accruals (e.g. Hunt and Lulseged 2007). 
Contrary to the expectations, Big N audit firms seem to allow their clients 
more upwards (β=.020, p<0.01) and downwards (β=.022, p<0.01) earnings 
management discretion than non-Big N audit firms. This finding is in line with 
other  European  studies  which  show  mixed  results  regarding  audit-quality 
differentiation in the European private client segment (Vander Bauwhede et 
al.  2003;  Vander  Bauwhede  and  Willekens  2004;  Van  Tendeloo  and 
Vanstraelen 2008). 
Size  (LN_ASSETS)  has  a  negative  association  with  the  amount  of 
positive  discretionary  accruals  (β=-.017,  p<0.01).  The  coefficient  of 
LN_ASSETS for the negative discretionary accruals sample is negative (β=-
.014, p<0.01). Consistent with Carey and Simnett (2006), this result shows 
that  the  degree  of  earnings  management  is  relatively  lower  for  larger 
companies  than  for  smaller  clients.  Hence,  audit  quality  is  positively 
associated with client size.  
Finally,  the  coefficient  of  LOSS  is  negative,  but  insignificant  (β=-.002, 
p>.10) for the sample of clients with positive discretionary accruals. Hence, 




manage earnings upwards in the current year. The effect of LOSS on the 
absolute amount of discretionary accruals is negative and significant (β =  
-.034,  p<.01)  for  the  sample  of  clients  that  engage  in  income  decreasing 
earnings management. Hence, audit quality is higher for clients that reported 
a loss in the previous year and manage earnings downwards in the current 
year. 
 
3.4.3 Strong versus weak economic bonding 
A possible explanation for the general lack of significance of ECONBOND is 
the correlation of this variable with client portfolio size. The large variation in 
client portfolio size across audit firms makes it unlikely for this measure to 
pick up the effect of influential clients in larger portfolios. While a client is 
more  likely  to  induce  economic  dependence  when  the  client  portfolio  is 
small, it is still possible for an auditor with a large portfolio to be economically 
dependent  upon  a  single  client  (Francis  and  Yu  2009).  Therefore,  a  new 
variable  (HIGH_ECONBOND)  is  constructed  which  measures  whether  a 
client  is  larger  or  smaller  than  the  median  client  within  a  portfolio.  This 
dummy  variable  has  a  value  of  1  if  a  client  is  relatively  large  given  an 
auditor‟s  portfolio  (above  median  ECONBOND),  and  0  otherwise.  This 
variable is measured at the audit firm level (HIGH_ECONBOND_FIRM), the 
local office level (HIGH_ECONBOND_OFFICE), and the audit partner level 
(HIGH_ECONBOND_PARTNER). 
To  test  whether  the  amount  of  discretionary  accruals  is  related  to 
HIGH_ECONBOND, the following model is estimated: 
 
                                               
                                                
                                                




HIGH_ECONBOND  =  1 if there is a strong economic bond between the auditor 
and  the  client,  and  0  otherwise.  HIGH_ECONBOND  is 
measured  at  the  audit  firm  level 
(HIGH_ECONBOND_FIRM),  the  local  office  level 
(HIGH_ECONBOND_OFFICE)  or  the  audit  partner  level 
(HIGH_ECONBOND_PARTNER). 
 
The other variables are defined as earlier. 
 
Results  of  the  model  estimating  economic  client  dependence  using  a 
dummy variable based on the relative economic bonding of a client within an 
auditor‟s portfolio are displayed in Table 3.5. 
The coefficients for HIGH_ECONBOND for the subsample of clients with 
positive discretionary accruals (columns 1-3) are positive and significant at 
the  audit firm level (HIGH_ECONBOND_FIRM; β=.021,  p<0.01), the  local 
office  level  (HIGH_ECONBOND_OFFICE;  β=.021,  p<0.01,)  and  the  audit 
partner  level  (HIGH_ECONBOND_FIRM;  β=.021,  p<0.01).  This  provides 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































sure by large clients to allow upward earnings management. Hence, auditors 
seem to compromise audit quality for clients engaging in upward earnings 
management  if  they  are  economically  dependent  on  these  clients. 
Reputation  concerns  therefore  appear  to  be  insufficient  to  offset  the 
detrimental effect of auditor-client economic bonding on audit quality. 
Columns 4-6 display the results for the subsample of clients with negative 
discretionary  accruals.  The  coefficients  for  HIGH_ECONBOND_FIRM  (β=  
-.012,  p<0.01),  HIGH_ECONBOND_OFFICE  (β=-.011,  p<0.01)  and 
HIGH_ECONBOND_PARTNER  (β=-.013,  p<0.01)  are  all  significantly 
negative. Consistent with hypothesis 2, this suggests that auditors do not 
allow clients with which they have a stronger economic bond more discretion 
to manage earnings downwards. In fact, audit quality is higher for clients on 
which  auditors  are  economically  dependent.  This  finding  suggests  that 
auditors  do  not  compromise  audit  quality  for  clients  on  which  they  are 
economically dependent if public oversight is present. 
The results for the control variables are consistent with those reported in 
Table 3.4, with the exception of the coefficient for LN_AGE in the negative 
discretionary  accruals  subsample,  which  is  no  longer  significant  (β= 
-.004,p>0.10). 
 
3.4.4 Summary of results 
The  previous  analyses  show  that  the  results  are  dependent  upon  the 
measure  of  economic  bonding.  ECONBOND,  the  measure  used  by 
Reynolds and Francis (2001) and Hunt and Lulseged (2007), only provides 
evidence of a relationship between auditor-client economic bonding at the 
local practice office for a subsample of companies engaging in downward 
earnings management. This measure is however dependent upon portfolio 
size, and therefore unlikely to pick up the effect of influential clients in large 
portfolios. To acknowledge that single clients can create an economic bond 
in large client portfolios (e.g. Francis and Yu 2009) an alternative measure of 
client-economic bonding is used, which classifies clients as either large or 
small  within  an  auditor‟s  portfolio.  The  results  for  this  measure, 
HIGH_ECONBOND,  show  that  auditors  allow  clients  to  which  they  have 
higher economic dependence more discretion to manage earnings upwards. 
The coefficient for HIGH_ECONBOND is significantly positive in the sample 
with positive discretionary accruals irrespective of whether client economic 
bonding is measured at the audit firm, the local practice office level or the 
audit  partner  level.  This  provides  evidence  in  support  of  Hypothesis  1. 
Consistent  with  hypothesis  2,  a  negative  association  is  found  between 
auditor-client economic bonding and the amount of discretionary accruals. 
Hence, auditors constrain earnings management more for clients on which 
they  are  economically  dependent.  These  findings  are  consistent  with  the 
argumentation that auditors constrain downward earnings management due 
to a fear that tax authorities discover any irregularities (Vander Bauwhede et 
al. 2003). Hence, reputation concerns alone are not sufficient for auditors to 




therefore  appears  to  be  necessary  to  mitigate  the  detrimental  effect  of 
auditor-client economic bonding on audit quality. 
 
3.4.5 Robustness checks 
A number of robustness checks are conducted to examine the sensitivity of 
the results to alternative specifications and sample selection criteria. 
3.4.5.1 Auditor type 
Coulton and Ruddock (2007) find that any evidence of a detrimental effect of 
auditor-client  economic  bonding  on  auditor  independence  is  restricted  to 
cases where the auditor is a non-Big N auditor. A possible explanation for 
this finding is that the potential cost of an audit failure is higher for Big N 
audit firms than for non-Big N audit firms, which creates incentives for Big N 
auditors  to  further  constrain  client  earnings  management.  To  examine 
whether  the  results  reported  in  the  previous  section  are  dependent  upon 
auditor type, regression model (3.3) is estimated separately for Big N audit 
firms and Non-Big N audit firms, reported respectively in Table 3.6 and Table 
3.7. For these regressions, the dichotomous measure of economic bonding, 
HIGH_ECONBOND, is  used because  this variable is likely  to  be a  better 
measure of economic bonding than the continuous variable ECONBOND. As 
explained in section 4.3, the continuous variable may not pick up the effect 
of economic bonding due to the large variation in client portfolio size (see 
section 3.4.3). 
The results in Tables 3.6 and 3.7 are consistent with those reported in 
Table 3.5. For the subsample of clients with positive discretionary accruals, 
the coefficients on HIGH_ECONBOND_FIRM, HIGH_ECONBOND_OFFICE 
and HIGH_ECONBOND_PARTNER are positive and significant, for both Big 
N  and  non-Big  N  audit  firms.  For  the  subsample  of  clients  with  negative 
discretionary  accruals,  the  coefficients  of  HIGH_ECONBOND_FIRM, 
HIGH_ECONBOND_OFFICE  and  HIGH_ECONBOND_PARTNER  are 
significantly negative, also for both the Big N and the Non-Big N samples. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the results hold for both Big N and non-
Big N audit firms. It is possible that audit partners are more concerned with 
their own pay off than with the reputation of the audit firm, because audit 
partners  receive  most  of  the  benefits  associated  with  an  audit,  while  the 
potential litigation costs and reputation losses are shared with the audit firm. 
One noticeable difference from the results reported in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 
is that a significantly negative effect is found for TENURE>7 in the sample of 
clients with positive discretionary accruals audited by non-Big N clients. This 
indicates that non-Big N audit quality improves with longer tenure for clients 
that engage in upward earnings management. 
3.4.5.2 Quartiles 
As  a  robustness  check  to  verify  whether  the  results  reported  for 
HIGH_ECONBOND are not driven by an arbitrary cut-off at the median client 
within  an  audit  portfolio,  ECONBOND  is  categorized  into  quartiles.  Four 
 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































dummy variables per level within an audit firm are used to categorize clients 
within a portfolio from weak (ECONBOND_Q1) to strong (ECONBOND_Q4) 
economic bonding. To analyze whether categorizing clients within quartiles 
affects the results, the following model is estimated:
21 
 
                                              
                                             
                                                    




ECONBOND_Q2  =  1 if the strength of the economic bond between the auditor and 
the client is between the 25
th and 50
th percentile of all clients 
within the auditor‟s portfolio, and 0 otherwise. ECONBOND_Q2 
is measured at the audit firm level (ECONBOND_FIRM_Q2), 
the local office level (ECONBOND_OFFICE_Q2) and the audit 
partner level (ECONBOND_PARTNER_Q2); 
ECONBOND_Q3  =  1 if the strength of the economic bond between the auditor and 
the client is between the 50
th and 75th
th percentile of all clients 
within the auditor‟s portfolio, and 0 otherwise. ECONBOND_Q3 
is measured at the audit firm level (ECONBOND_FIRM_Q3), 
the local office level (ECONBOND_OFFICE_Q3) and the audit 
partner level (ECONBOND_PARTNER_Q3); and 
ECONBOND_Q4  =  1 if the strength of the economic bond between the auditor and 
the client is between the 75
th and 100
th percentile of all clients 
within the auditor‟s portfolio, and 0 otherwise. ECONBOND_Q4 
is measured at the audit firm level (ECONBOND_FIRM_Q4), 
the local office level (ECONBOND_OFFICE_Q4) and the audit 
partner level (ECONBOND_PARTNER_Q4). 
 
The  results  of  estimating  model  (3.4)  are  reported  in  Table  3.8.  The 
direction  of  the  coefficients  is  consistent  with  those  reported  for 
HIGH_ECONBOND  in  Table  3.5.  Further  tests  show  that  the  coefficients 
also differ significantly between quartiles. This indicates that the results are 
robust  to  categorizing  auditor-client  economic  bonding  using  quartiles 
instead of medians. 
 
3.4.5.3 Abnormal working capital accruals 
Becker  et  al.  (1998)  argue  that  managers  have  greater  discretion  with 
respect to working capital accruals than total accruals. Furthermore, Young 
(1999) shows that discretionary accruals estimated by the modified Jones 
model may contain systematic errors when normal accruals are estimated 
including  depreciation.  Therefore,  as  a  sensitivity  analysis,  the  effect  of 
auditor-client economic bonding on audit quality is estimated using abnormal 
working capital accruals as a proxy of audit quality. Abnormal working capital 
accruals are estimated using a model by Ferguson et al. (2004) and Antle et 
al. (2006). Consistent with model (3.1), current year return on assets (ROA) 
are included to control for underlying company performance (Kothari et al. 
2005).  Lagged  working  capital  accruals  is  included  to  control  for  the 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































reversing  nature  of  accruals  (Vander  Bauwhede  and  Willekens  2004; 
Coulton  and  Ruddock  2007).  A  constant  is  added  to  control  for 
heteroskedasticity  and  to  mitigate  problems  related  to  an  omitted  size 
variable (Kothari et al. 2005). Abnormal working capital accruals are equal to 
the residual of the model. The following model is estimated by industry (two-
digit NACE code): 
 
                  
 
      
                                        




t  =  year, t-1 refers to the prior year; 
WCAijt  =  working  capital  accruals,  scaled  by  lagged  total  assets.  Following 
Ferguson et al. (2004), working capital accruals is computed as WCAijt 
= (∆CAijt - ∆CASHijt) - ∆CLijt 
where  ∆CAijt  = change  in  total current  assets,  ∆CASHijt  =  change  in 
cash/cash equivalents, ∆CLijt = total current liabilities for company i in 
industry j for year t; 
Aijt-1  =  total assets for company i in industry j for year t-1; 
∆SALESijt  =  change  in  sales  in  year  t,  scaled  by  total  assets  for  company  i  in 
industry j for year t-1; 
∆RECijt  =  change  in  accounts  receivable  in  year  t,  scaled  by  total  assets  for 
company i in industry j for year t-1; 
ROAijt  =  return on assets, calculated as operating income scaled by total assets 
for company i in industry j for year t-1; 
WCAjt-1  =  WCA in year t-1, scaled by total assets for company i in industry j for 
year t-1; 
ϵijt  =  unexpected portion of total accruals for company i in industry j for year 
t. 
 
The following two models are estimated to examine the effects of the 
continuous measure of auditor-client (ECONBOND),  and  the dichotomous 
measure  of  auditor-client  economic  bonding  (HIGH_ECONBOND)  on  the 
amount of absolute abnormal working capital accruals. 
  
                                          
                                                
                                                
                          
(3.6) 
 
                                               
                                                
                                                




ABSAWCA  =  Absolute value of abnormal working capital accruals scaled by lagged 
total assets. 
 




The estimations of models (3.6) and (3.7) are shown in Table 3.9 and 
Table 3.10, respectively. The results are generally in line with those shown 
earlier.  ECONBOND  has  no  significant  effect  on  the  amount  of  income 
increasing  abnormal  working  capital  accruals,  irrespective  of  whether 
auditor-client economic bond is measured at the audit firm level (β=-.025, 
p>.10), the local office level (β=-.002, p>.10) or the audit partner level (β=-
.016,  p>.10).  The  coefficient  for  ECONBOND_FIRM  for  the  sample  of 
companies  engaging  in  income  decreasing  abnormal  working  capital 
accruals is negative and significant (β=-.042, p<.10). ECONBOND no longer 
has  a  significant  association  with  income  decreasing  working  capital 
accruals when measured at the local office (β=-.020, p>.10). The coefficient 
for ECONBOND measured at the audit partner level is also insignificant (β=-
.012,  p>.10).  Hence,  only  weak  evidence  of  an  effect  of  economic  client 
dependence  on  audit  quality  are  found  when  audit  quality,  proxied  by 
abnormal working capital accruals, is regressed upon a continuous measure 
of auditor-client economic bonding. 
Table  3.10  shows  that  the  coefficients  HIGH_ECONBOND_FIRM 
(β=.011,  p<.01),  HIGH_ECONBOND_OFFICE  (β=.01,  p<.01)  and 
HIGH_ECONBOND_PARTNER (β=.013, p<.01) are positive and significant 
for each of the three levels in the positive abnormal working capital accruals 
sample. The coefficients for HIGH_ECONBOND are negative and significant 
across each of the three levels, HIGH_ECONBOND_FIRM (β=-.018, p<.01) 
HIGH_ECONBOND_OFFICE  (β=-.016,  p<.01)  and  HIGH_ECONBOND_ 
PARTNER  (β=-.017,  p<.01),  in  the  negative  abnormal  working  capital 
accruals sample. These results are consistent with the results reported in 
Table  3.5  and  suggest  that  auditors  allow  more  discretion  to  manage 
earnings  upwards  for  clients  on  which  they  have  higher  economic 
dependence.  This  provides  further  support  for  hypothesis  1.  Supporting 
hypothesis 2, the regressions based on abnormal working capital accruals 
show that auditors do not allow more earnings management discretion to 
more influential clients that manage earnings downwards. In fact, auditors 
constrain  downward  earnings  management  for  clients  with  a  stronger 
economic bond. 
3.4.5.4 Additional tests 
Further  tests  shows  that  results  are  robust  to  omitting  publicly  traded 
companies or companies with consolidated financial statements, excluding 
observations  belonging  to  audit  partners  with  small  client  portfolios 
(consisting of less than four clients), including industry dummies based on 
two-digit  NACE-codes,  measuring  going  concern  risk  (PBANK)  using  a 
continuous variable, and limiting the estimation of discretionary accruals to 
industries with at least 30 observations. 
Furthermore,  auditor-client  economic  bonding  is  estimated  using 
Herfindahl  weights,  which  place  more  weight  on  clients  with  a  high 
economic-bonding than the previously used continuous measure. Using the 
Herfindahl  weights  yields  results  similar  to,  but  not  stronger  than,  those 
obtained using the continuous measure of auditor-client economic bonding. 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The results are generally consistent across all levels of decision making 
within the audit firm. To examine whether auditor-client economic bonding is 
more likely to impair audit quality at lower levels of decision making within 
the audit firm, the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model is used to 
test whether the models, estimated at the three levels of decision making 
within  an  audit  firm,  differ  significantly  from  each  other.  Results  do  not 
support the argument that auditor-client economic bonding is more likely to 
manifest itself at lower levels of decision making. 
 
 
3.5 Conclusion and limitations 
 
3.5.1 Conclusion 
Auditors are required to provide an independent opinion on the reliability of 
the financial statements of their clients. However, clients pay the auditor for 
performing  the  audit,  making  it  impossible  for  auditors  to  be  completely 
independent from their clients. Regulators have expressed concerns as to 
whether  auditors  can  remain  sufficiently  independent  from  their  more 
influential clients. 
Using data on statutory audits conducted in Belgium, this paper examines 
whether  audit  firms  acquiesce  to  pressure  by  clients  with  a  stronger 
economic  bond  to  allow  them  more  discretion  to  manage  earnings.  The 
Belgian setting creates the opportunity to incorporate both public and private 
companies in the construction of client portfolios, resulting in more accurate 
measures of economic client dependence. Furthermore, it allows examining 
the effect of auditor-client economic bonding on audit quality at three levels 
of decision making: the audit firm level, the local office level, and the audit 
partner level. 
Consistent with the hypotheses, this study finds evidence that audit firms 
allow more earnings management discretion to clients on which they have 
stronger  economic  dependence.  This  implies  that  strong  auditor-client 
economic  bonding  impairs  audit  quality.  This  result  is  however  limited  to 
clients  that  manage  their  earnings  upwards.  Auditors  do  not  allow  clients 
more  discretion  to  manage  earnings  downwards,  possibly  because  tax 
authorities are more likely to scrutinize the financial statements of companies 
which engage in income, and hence tax, decreasing earnings management. 
Auditors only allow clients more discretion to manage earnings when clients 
manage earnings upwards. Hence, consistent with prior studies (e.g. Vander 
Bauwhede et al. 2003; Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen 2008), it seems that 
public  oversight  mitigates  the  detriment  of  economic  bonding.  This  study 
therefore underlines the importance of public oversight. 
 
3.5.2 Limitations and future research 
One limitation of the current study is that it measures auditor-client economic 
bonding based on client revenues instead of audit fees, because audit fee 
data  was  not  publicly  available  in  Belgium  at  the  time  of  the  study.  The 




with  audit  fees  (e.g.  Francis  1984,  Craswell  et  al.  1995,  Reynolds  and 
Francis 2001). In addition, the Belgian Institute of Auditors requires a direct 
relationship  between  the  level  of  the  audit  fees  and  client  characteristics. 
Every auditor has to report an overview of its clients, the audit fees and the 
amount  of  hours  to  the  Belgian  Institute  of  Auditors,  who  verify  the 
appropriateness of the audit fees. The use of client revenues instead of audit 
fees  does  therefore  not  seem  to  be  a  major  concern.  It  would  still  be 
valuable  to  replicate  this  study  at  a  later  moment  in  time,  if  a  setting 
becomes  available  where  regulators  require  both  public  and  private 
companies to disclose audit fees. 
Even though auditors are expected to be more likely to acquiesce to client 
pressure to allow earnings management in the last year of their three year 
renewable  contract,  no  effect  of  MANDATE  on  the  degree  of  earnings 
management  by  clients  is  found.  Future  research  could  use  data  on  the 
subsequent fiscal year to examine whether an auditor switch occurred. Such 
a switch is likely to indicate that negotiations between auditor and client were 
more difficult than for cases where the audit mandate was renewed. It would 
be  interesting  to  test  whether  more  earnings  management  discretion  was 
given to clients that subsequently switched to another audit firm, because 
the  auditor  might  have  been  under  pressure  to  allow  client  earnings 
management in order to increase the likelihood of mandate renewal. 
 







1 Requiring the financial statements to be prepared in all material aspects in accordance with 
applicable financial reporting standards. 
 
2 Belgium is characterized by a high alignment between financial reporting and tax accounting. 
As a result of this, tax authorities are one of the main users of the financial statements. The 
Belgian tax authorities provide a credible threat which is comparable to the threat provided by 
financial analysts, investors or stock market regulators (Vander Bauwhede et al. 2003; Van 
Tendeloo and Vanstraelen 2008). 
 
3 A client‟s influence is measured relative to the influence of the other clients within an auditor‟s 
client portfolio. Given that most clients do not have a stock exchange listing, omitting these 
clients  from  the  sample  makes  that  the  relative  influence  of  the  included  clients  will  be 
significantly overstated. 
 
4 A higher probability of material misstatement detection can also be argued to result in higher 
litigation costs. These costs are however small in low litigious environments. The effect of high 
tax alignment on litigation costs in a low litigious environment, such as Belgium, will therefore be 
small. 
 
5 This relies on the assumption that all clients audited by an audit partner pertain to the same 
local practice office. 
 
6 As explained in section 3.3.2, this study uses the amount of discretionary accruals to proxy for 
audit quality. These outliers are removed because the estimation of discretionary accruals is 
likely to be unreliable for companies that experienced extreme growth (or declines) in sales 
(Carey and Simnett 2006). Companies in the top and bottom 1% of the distribution of changes 
in revenues are classified as outliers. 
 
7 Kothari et al. (2005) demonstrate that controlling for firm performance using current year return 
on assets (ROA) instead of lagged ROA results in a better performing accrual measure. 
 
8 Consistent with Leuz et al. (2003), cash flows from operations are computed as operating 
income minus total accruals. 
 
9 Audit fees are also commonly proxied for by the total assets of a client (Hay et al. 2006). The 
results are robust to calculating economic client dependence based on client total assets. 
 
10 Hunt and Lulseged (2007) measure economic client dependence using the log of sales, as 
well as using client audit fees. Coulton and Ruddock (2007), and Coulton et al. (2007) also use 
audit fees to measure economic client dependence. 
 
11 In Belgium audits are assigned based on three year renewable contracts. One of the aims of 
this requirement is preventing the occurrence of low-balling and its possible detrimental effect 
on audit quality. 
 
12  The  audit  partner  appointment  date  was  unavailable  for  161  observations.  For  these 
observations audit partner tenure is computed based on audit partner data available from 1998 
until 2006. Hence, audit partner tenure could be computed for all observations in the initial 
sample. 
 
13 The results on TENURE<3 AND TENURE>7 are robust to increasing or decreasing the cut-
offs by one year. Using a continuous measure of tenure yields no significant results. 
 
14 The mandate usually starts at the annual meeting of shareholders which assigned the auditor, 
and ends at the annual meeting of shareholders following the third statutory audit (IBR, 2004). 





15 The appointment data of the audit firm was unavailable for 59 observations. For these cases, 
MANDATE is computed based on observed audit firm switches. 
 
16  The  variables  MANDATE  and  TENURE<3 measure  two  separate  constructs. TENURE<3 
refers to length of the audit engagement, MANDATE indicates whether the audit is conducted in 
the last year of the renewable mandate. The correlation between the two variables is negative (-
.084) and significant. Excluding either of the two variables from the model does not have a 
notable effect on the coefficient or significance of the other variable. 
 
17  Big  N  refers  to  the  four  largest  audit  firms:  Deloitte,  Ernst  &  Young,  KPMG,  and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers. 
 
18 Variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% to remove the influence of outliers. 
 
19  This  also follows  from the  low  variance  inflation  factors  (VIFs) when  estimating the  OLS 
regressions. The highest VIF across all regressions is 2.71. 
 
20 Auditors might compromise audit quality in the second year of the mandate if the decision to 
renew the mandate is taken one year before the end of the mandate. Further analysis shows 
that auditors do not allow clients more room to manage earnings in the second year of the 
mandate either. Hence, there is no evidence that auditors compromise audit quality in second 
year of the engagement in order to increase the probability of being selected as the auditor in 
the subsequent 3 years. 
 
21  No  dummy  variable  for  ECONBOND_Q1  is  included  in  the  regression  model,  because 
including dummy variables for all categories would cause perfect multicollinearity.  89 
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ABSTRACT: This study investigates the extent to and man-
ner in which competition in the market for audit services af-
fects  audit  quality  supplied  by  auditors.  Data  on  the  audit 
market, client portfolios and client earnings management in 
Belgium is used to examine the relationship between com-
petition and quality in the auditing industry. Spatial analysis 
and dynamic market share analysis are used to analyze the 
level of competition in the audit market. Geographical coor-
dinates of local audit offices and audit clients are used to 
compute the degree of local competition faced by auditors. 
Three separate measures of competition are used to ex-
amine the effect of competition on audit quality. First of all, a 
locally  defined  Herfindahl  index  is  used  to  measure  local 
market  concentration.  Second,  changes  in  market  shares 
are used to test the relationship between competition and 
audit quality at three different levels: the audit firm level, the 
local  audit  office  level  and  the  audit  engagement  partner 
level. Finally, a competitor density measure is introduced to 
proxy for local competition. 
Results suggest that increased competition in the market 
for audit services is associated with higher audit quality. Fur-
thermore, the results indicate that high concentration ratios 
do not necessarily result in lower competition and reduced 
audit quality. 





The impact of competition in the market for audit services on auditor behav-
ior has been examined since the study of Zeff and Fossum (1967). Research 
on the effect of competition on audit quality is driven by concerns that the 
audit market is not competitive (e.g. Dopuch and Simunic 1980; Hermanson 
et al. 1987). These concerns are related to high concentration levels in the 
markets  for  audit  services  (Pearson  and  Trompeter  1994;  Buijink  et  al. 
1998). In highly concentrated industries there is an increased potential  for 
collusive behavior by the largest suppliers,  which would result in reduced 
competition (Yardley et al. 1992).  
For most of the 20
th century, the audit market was dominated by eight 
large accounting firms, commonly referred to as the Big 8. The market for 




the Big 6 as a result of two mergers. In this year, Ernst & Whinney merged 
with Arthur Young, and Deloitte, Haskins & Sells merged with Touche Ross. 
The market concentration further increased when the Big 6 became the Big 
5 due to the merger of Price Waterhouse with Coopers & Lybrand in 1998. 
The demise of Arthur Andersen in 2002 reduced the number of large interna-
tional audit firms to four. This further increased concerns about the effect of 
high  concentration  in  the  market  for  audit  services  on  audit  quality 
(Government  Accountability  Office  2003).  High  concentration  levels  are, 
however, not necessarily related to reduced competition, since a market can 
be competitive despite high (static) concentration levels (Buijink et al. 1998).
1 
It is therefore important to examine the effect of competition on audit quality, 
as opposed to the effect of concentration levels on audit quality. Research 
on the relationship between competition and audit quality is required to sup-
port regulators in maintaining and enhancing audit quality. 
There is theoretical justification to link competition and quality. The eco-
nomics of industrial organization can be used as a conceptual framework to 
specify  the  relationship  between  competition  and  quality.  The  structure-
conduct-performance paradigm (S-C-P) implies that conditions of supply and 
demand determine market structure, which in turn determines firm behavior, 
which subsequently determines firm performance, of which quality is an ex-
ample. It is unclear what the effect of competition on audit quality is. Stan-
dard economic theory argues that competition will have a positive effect on 
quality (e.g. Spence 1975; Leland 1977; Mussa and Rosen 1978). However, 
it is not clear if this also holds for the market of audit services for a number of 
reasons. First of all, audits are labor intensive services of which the quality 
level is difficult to observe. Competition in markets where the quality level is 
hard to observe may have a negative impact on the incentives of suppliers to 
invest in providing high quality products (Leland 1979; Kranton 2003). Sec-
ond, reduced audit fees as a result of competition may make auditors more 
dependent on clients, since auditors will rely more on future quasi rents to 
offset  initial  losses  (DeAngelo  1981a).  Reduced  auditor  independence  re-
sults in lower audit quality (DeAngelo 1981b). Finally, the market for audit 
services is a highly regulated market. Educational, licensing and certification 
requirements  are  imposed  by  regulators  to  ensure  audit  quality.  Besides 
ensuring a minimum quality level, these requirements act as barriers to entry 
that may limit competition in the audit market (Dopuch and Simunic 1980). 
Furthermore, entry into the top-tier section of the audit market has proven to 
be very difficult for mid-sized audit firms, due to the required capacity and 
recognition  thereof  needed  to  audit  publicly  traded  companies  (European 
Commission 2010). Hence, while economic theory predicts a positive asso-
ciation  between  competition  and  quality,  it  is  not  clear  what  the  effect  of 
competition on audit quality is due to the specific characteristics of the audit 
market. 
Several studies have tested whether the market for audit services is com-
petitive  (e.g.  Simunic  1980;  Buijink  et  al.  1998).  However,  the  number  of 
studies that have attempted to test the effect of the level of competition in the 
audit market on audit quality is low (e.g. Copley and Doucet 1993; Johnstone 




First, unlike prior studies, this study incorporates both listed and non-listed 
audit clients in the construction of auditors‟ client portfolios. It is important to 
analyze complete portfolios since decisions made by an auditor with respect 
to individual clients will be influenced by the auditor‟s complete client portfo-
lio, consisting of both publically listed and privately traded companies (Simu-
nic and Stein 1990). The analysis of the effect of competition on audit quality 
based  on  complete  audit  portfolios  will  therefore  result  in  more  insightful 
results than an analysis based on publically listed clients only. Second, this 
study  introduces  a  local  competitor  density  measure.  Compared  to  previ-
ously used measures, the local competitor density measure incorporates the 
geographical locations of  auditors and  audit clients  more precisely,  which 
enables it to better measure local competition. 
To examine the relationship between competition in the market for audit 
services and the quality of audit services that auditors supply, data is used 
on audits conducted in Belgium between  1998 and 2006.  Audit  quality  is 
proxied by discretionary accruals. The extent of competition that an auditor 
faces is measured using three separate measures. First of all, based on the 
geographical locations of local audit offices and audit clients, a Herfindahl 
index is computed for each local audit market. Although concentration ratios, 
such as the Herfindahl index, are commonly used in audit research, it can be 
questioned whether concentration ratios capture competition. The Herfindahl 
index is used to enhance the comparability of this study with prior literature. 
Second, a measure of market share mobility is used to measure the degree 
of competition at three levels: (1) the audit firm level, (2) the local practice 
office  level,  and  (3)  the  audit  engagement  partner  level.  This  measure  is 
based on absolute changes in market share. Third, based on geographical 
locations of auditors and both actual and potential clients, a local competitor 
density measure is computed. Competitor density is a function of the number 
of competing auditors and the number of potential audit clients per local au-
dit market. The advantage of this measure is that it reflects that there is a 
different set of possible auditors for each client as a result of geographic 
dispersion of clients and auditors within local audit markets. 
The  results  based  on  the  Herfindal  index  suggest  that  audit  quality  is 
higher in more concentrated audit markets. Results based on the mobility 
measures show that absolute changes in audit firm market shares are posi-
tively related to audit quality. There is, however, no significant association 
between audit quality and changes in market shares of local audit offices 
and  audit  partners.  The  lack  of  a  significant  association  between  market 
share mobility, measured at the local office level and audit partner level, and 
audit  quality  is  most  likely  due  to  the  relatively  small  changes  in  market 
shares at these levels of analysis. The final measure of competition, com-
petitor density, is negatively associated with the absolute amount of discre-
tionary accruals, suggesting a positive association between competition and 
audit quality. Hence, overall, the results suggest that competition in the mar-
ket for audit services is positively associated with audit quality. Furthermore, 
the results show that market concentration and competition are two separate 
concepts. This is in line with prior studies that showed that audit markets can 




  The next section discusses prior literature on the link between competi-
tion and quality, followed by hypothesis development. Section 4.3 outlines 
the  methodology  and  data  selection.  Results  are  provided  in  section  4.5, 
followed by conclusions in section 4.5. 
 
 
4.2 Prior literature and hypothesis development 
 
Audit quality is defined as the joint probability that a material misstatement is 
detected, and subsequently reported by the auditor (DeAngelo 1981b). From 
this follows that audit quality is a function of both auditor competence and 
auditor independence. Both of these factors can be affected by the level of 
competition  in the  audit market. Competition may eliminate the  price pre-
mium needed to induce companies to provide high quality products (Kranton 
2003). Hence, auditors might respond by allocating fewer resources to cli-
ents that pay relatively low audit fees. This would harm auditor competence 
and increase the probability that material misstatements are not detected by 
the auditor. Furthermore, competition may lead to situations where auditors 
accept lower than normal audit fees in order to obtain or retain a client, ex-
pecting to offset low revenues or early losses with quasi rents to be charged 
for  future  audits,  which  may  result  in  impaired  independence  (DeAngelo 
1981a). Thus, competition may negatively affect audit quality by impairing 
either auditor competence or auditor independence. 
Prior studies have analyzed the effect of market concentration on audit 
fees (e.g. Pearson and Trompeter 1994; Johnson et al. 1995; Iyer and Iyer 
1996; Willekens and Achmadi 2003; Bandyophadhyay and Kao 2004), the 
effect of competition on audit fees (e.g. Maher et al. 1992), and the effect of 
audit market concentration on audit quality (Kallapur et al. 2008). Research 
on the association between competition in the market for audit services and 
audit quality is however sparse (e.g. Copley and Doucet 1993; Johnstone et 
al. 2004).
2 
This section discusses prior literature on competition and audit quality. 
Standard  economic  theory  on  the  relationship  between  competition  and 
quality in product markets is discussed in section 4.2.1. Section 4.2.2 looks 
at  the  effect  of  competition  on  quality  in  service  markets.  Section  4.2.3 
focuses more specifically on the effect of competition in the market for audit 
services on audit quality, and furthermore provides hypothesis development.  
 
4.2.1 Competition and quality in product markets 
Numerous  economic  studies  have  examined  how  competition  influences 
quality  for  product  markets  (see  Spence  1975;  Leland  1977;  Mussa  and 
Rosen 1978, Banker et al. 1998; Kranton 2003). This section gives an over-
view of the main findings of these studies. 
Spence (1975) argues that the quality level provided in a non-competitive 
market is likely to deviate from the optimal level of quality because of dis-
crepancies between average and marginal valuations of quality by consum-




and quality. This is confirmed by Leland (1977) who analytically shows that 
monopolists under-provide quality given an output level. Mussa and Rosen 
(1978) show analytically that it is beneficial for a monopolist to increase the 
total quality range by reducing the quality level at the lower end. Average 
quality  would,  therefore,  rise  with  increased  competition.  Additionally,  the 
prices set by a monopolist will be higher than the competitive prices for any 
quality level. Overall, these studies suggest that increased competition will 
result in higher quality.  
While  the  above  mentioned  studies  suggest  a  positive  association  be-
tween competition and quality, Banker et al. (1998) analytically show for an 
oligopolistic market that the effect of competition on quality depends on the 
cost functions of the dominant and the smaller companies. Increases in the 
number of competitors result in improved quality, unless the dominant firm 
has  a  relative  cost  advantage  in  providing  quality.  Competition  results  in 
reduced quality when the dominant firm is able to provide quality at a lower 
cost than the smaller competitors. 
Kranton (2003) also questions the positive effect of competition on qual-
ity. She argues that competition for market shares can eliminate the price 
premium needed to induce companies to produce high quality products, and 
states that companies trade-off the one-time benefit of providing low quality 
for the high quality price (saving the costs of delivering high quality com-
pared to the costs of delivering low quality) against the discounted value of 
future profits from delivering high quality to repeat buyers. Increases in com-
petition may, therefore, reduce the quality level. 
The studies in this section all relate to produce markets. The next session 
discusses the effect of competition on quality for service markets. 
 
4.2.2 Competition and quality in service markets in general 
The previous section discussed the effect of competition on quality for prod-
uct markets. Service markets, however, differ in various ways from product 
markets. As opposed to product markets, service markets in general involve 
a lack of inventories and portability, a high degree of customer contact, pos-
sible joint production, customer-specific inputs, and intangibility (Karmarkar 
and Pitbladdo 1995). Economic theories on product markets may not apply 
to markets for services due to the fact buyer knowledge may be different in 
service markets than in product markets (Yardley et al. 1992).  
For  a  market  where  the  quality  level  is  not  observable,  Leland  (1979) 
shows analytically that increases in the number of competing firms result in 
diminished incentives for companies to invest in quality improvements since 
each  firm  undertaking  quality  improvements  bears  the  full  cost  of  those 
improvements,  while  the  benefit  from  the  improvements  is  shared  by  all 
competing firms. In case of a lot of competing firms, the average increase in 
quality  from  a  quality  improvement  by  a  single  firm  will  approach  zero. 
Hence, the optimal level of quality improvement for each firm will be zero. 
From this can be concluded that competition may have a negative effect on 




Several studies have  examined the effect of competition on quality for 
service markets. For example, Domberger and Sherr (1989) show that liber-
alization of the market for legal services in the United Kingdom and Wales 
resulted in reduced fees and increases in satisfaction ratings. Hence, they 
show that increased competition resulted in improved quality. Bradford and 
Martin (2000) examine the effect of partnerships on quality in the medical 
profession.  They  conclude  that  partners  only  compete  on  quality  when 
demand  is  restricted.  Mazzeo  (2003)  examines  the  relationship  between 
competition and quality in the U.S. airline market. He shows that high market 
concentration is associated with longer flight delays and longer scheduled 
flights,  and  concludes  that  increased  competition  has  a  positive  effect  on 
service quality. 
In conclusion, while Leland (1979) found analytically that competition may 
reduce quality when the quality level is not directly observable, Domberger 
and Sherr (1989), Bradford and Martin (2000), and Mazzeo (2003) reported 
positive associations between competition and quality for service markets. 
The next section discusses the effect of competition on quality for the market 
for audit services. 
 
4.2.3 Competition and quality in the audit market 
The previous section discussed the effect of competition on quality for ser-
vice markets. The audit market, however, is a service market with specific 
regulations (Yardley et al. 1992). The arguments provided in the previous 
section may therefore not be applicable to the market for audit services. The 
market  for  audit  services  is  characterized  by  standards  and  regulations 
aimed  at  assuring  a  minimum  quality  level,  such  as  educational  require-
ments,  licensing  and  mandatory  peer-reviews.  These  requirements  create 
barriers to entry at the firm level and the partner level. Dopuch and Simunic 
(1980) argue that the significance of barriers to entry at the firm level, as 
opposed to barriers to entry at the individual level, provide an explanation for 
the dominance of large accounting firms in the market for audit services, a 
dominance  which  is  not  observed  in  other  service  markets.  Despite  the 
dominance  of  large  audit  firms,  Dopuch  and  Simunic  conclude  that  the 
market for audit services is competitive based on a comparison of audit fees 
between Big N and non-Big N audit firms. This section will continue by first 
giving an overview of a number of analytical studies. The discussion will then 
continue  by  looking  at  empirical  studies  that  examined  the  effect  of 
competition  on  audit  quality.  This  section  concludes  with  the  hypothesis 
development. 
Ronnen (1991) shows analytically that imposing minimum quality stan-
dards will result in intensified competition since it decreases the range of 
quality levels which sellers can provide. Minimum quality standards force low 
quality sellers to increase  their quality  as to meet the standards.
3 Hence, 
imposing minimum quality standards will increase both quality and competi-
tion, suggesting that there is a positive association between competition and 




An economic analysis by Hermanson et al. (1987) shows that increases 
in competition enforced by regulators results in lower audit fees. They further 
argue that price reductions may result in impaired audit quality if these lower 
prices do not allow audit firms to earn a normal profit. Lower audit fees may 
force auditors to reduce their emphasis on providing high quality audits. In-
stead,  they  may  try  to  generate  revenues  through  other,  more  profitable, 
non-audit services. From this follows that competition and audit quality are 
likely to be negatively associated. This is opposite to the positive association 
that followed from the analytical model presented by Ronnen (1991). 
Chaney et al. (2003) also use an analytical approach to examine the rela-
tionship between competition and audit quality. They argue that when decid-
ing whether to report a misstatement or not, auditors trade off the cost of 
reporting misstatements in a client‟s financial statements and the litigation 
and reputation costs in case an audit failure is detected. The cost of report-
ing a material misstatement equals the loss of future revenues in case the 
audit contract is terminated by the client. The authors state that the degree 
of competition is not expected to influence the litigation and reputation cost 
of not reporting truthfully. However, the effect of competition on the cost of 
reporting a material misstatement is unclear. Competition will lower the cost 
of reporting a material misstatement because audit fees and revenues will 
fall. However, competition may also increase the cost of reporting a material 
misstatement, because the probability that a client switches to another audit 
firm increases. The net effect of reduced audit fees and increased likelihood 
of losing a client on the cost of reporting a material misstatement is not di-
rectly clear. Hence, based on this analytical model it is not possible to con-
clude what the effect of increased competition on audit quality is. 
In  addition  to  these  analytical  studies,  there  are  a  number  of  studies 
which empirically test the effect of competition on audit quality. Copley and 
Doucet (1993) use archival data to examine the impact of competition on 
audit quality for U.S. governmental audits. Using audit quality assessments 
by Regional Inspectors General they define audit quality as a dichotomous 
variable,  indicating  either  acceptable  or  unacceptable  quality.  Measuring 
competition as the number of soliciting bids for the audit engagement, the 
authors conclude that increased competition leads to higher quality audits. In 
addition  they  conclude  that  increased  competition  lowers  audit  fees.  This 
study provides evidence of a positive association between competition and 
audit quality. 
Based on  the  evaluations  of prospective clients by a single audit firm, 
Johnstone et al. (2004) test for the differences in engagement planning and 
audit pricing between situations with competitive bidding and situations with 
non-competitive bidding (i.e. whether or not there were other audit firms bid-
ding on the prospective client). They find that when the audit firm is in a 
competitive bidding environment, planned audit hours are higher, while audit 
fees are lower. This suggests that competition may lead to higher audit qual-
ity. 
Kallapur et al. (2008) test the effect of local competition on audit quality. 
They use the Herfindahl index of market concentration measured at the met-




accrual  based  measures  as  proxies  for  audit  quality.  They  find  that  audit 
quality is higher in more concentrated markets. 
Similary, Francis et al. (2010) report, based on a sample of audits con-
ducted in 40 different countries, that the quality of Big N audits is positively 
associated with Big N market share concentration. However, concentration 
within the Big N results in reduced audit quality. 
Because of the mixed theoretical arguments and empirical findings, the 
following non-directional hypothesis is posed: 
 
Hypothesis: Competition in the market for audit services influences audit 
quality. 
 
The next section discusses the sample selection and methodology used 





This section discusses the methodology used to test the hypothesis stated in 
the previous section. Section 4.3.1 discusses the sample selection. This is 
followed by a discussion of the proxy of audit quality in section 4.3.2. The 
experimental  variables  are  presented  in  section  4.3.3.  The  selection  of 
control variables is discussed in section 4.3.4. The regression models that 
are used to test the effect of competition on audit quality  are provided in 
section 4.3.5.  
 
4.3.1 Sample selection 
To test the hypothesis, the data need to meet a number of requirements. 
First of all, client portfolios for every  audit firm, local  audit  office and  en-
gagement partner need to be constructed to measure the effect of competi-
tion between audit firms. This requires that the name of the audit firm, the 
local office location, and the name of the engagement partner are available 
for  every  audited  company.  Second,  to  measure  competition  at  the  local 
office level and the audit partner level, data on audit office location and client 
location  are  required.  Finally,  financial  data  for  the  audited  companies  is 
required. 
For the purpose of this study, the Belgian audit market meets the above 
mentioned  requirements.  Data  are  obtained  from  three  different  data 
sources: The Bel-First database, membership lists of „het Instituut van de 
Bedrijfsrevisoren‟ (IBR, the Belgian Institute of Auditors), and Google Earth. 
The Bel-First database contains the financial data of companies  which 
are required to have their accounts audited and which have to submit their 
annual accounts to the National Bank of Belgium. These financial statements 
also include the name of the audit firm that has audited the client. Further-
more, the name of the individual auditor signing the audit report can be de-




therefore possible to construct complete client portfolios of all Belgian audit 
firms, local practice offices and audit partners.  
The annual membership lists of the IBR list all active individual auditors 
and audit firms for each year. The membership lists of the IBR are used to 
determine at which local office an audit partner is employed. The member-
ship list of 2006 was the most recent membership list available at the time of 
the study. Financial data and information about the audit firm and the en-
gagement partner were available from 1998 onwards. The dataset is there-
fore restricted to audits conducted between 1998 and 2006. Financial data 
from  the  Bel-First  database  are  collected  from  unconsolidated  financial 
statements in order to accurately measure client shifts between audit firms. 
The third data source, Google Earth, is used to determine the geographi-
cal coordinates of auditor and client locations. These coordinates are used to 
measure the distance between each actual and possible auditor-client pair. 
These distances are used to construct proxies for the degree of competition 
in local audit markets. 
In  the  Bel-First  database,  167,377  company-year  observations  (28,735 
unique companies) are available between 1998 and 2006. For ease of refer-
ence, this sample is labelled sample A. Observations are removed for rea-
sons discussed below (see also Table 4.1 below).  
First of all, observations are removed for which the audit firm name, audit 
partner  name,  local  audit  office  location  or  client  location  are  missing 
(n=13,098). In order to enable the computation of changes in audit partner 
portfolios,  audit  clients  with  more  than  one  audit  partner  are  removed 
(n=12,368). Observations for which total assets are unknown are removed 
as well (n=906), because the competition measures are computed based on 
client  assets.  This  results  in  a  sample  of  141,005  observations  (26,844 
unique  companies)  which  is  used  to  compute  the  experimental  variables. 
This sample is referred to as sample B.  
In order to construct the sample based on which the effect of competition 
on audit quality is examined, another 38,539 observations with missing fi-
nancial  information are removed. Utilities (four digit  NACE industry codes 
between 4,000 and 4,100) and financial institutions (four digit NACE-codes 
between 6,500 and 6,720) are removed from the sample (n=9,470), because 
of their specific audit requirements and circumstances. Furthermore, 1,856 
observations  with  extreme  sales  volatility,  as  well  as  341  observations  in 
industries  with  less  than  10  observations  are  excluded  from  the  sample, 
because the regression model used to construct the audit quality measure 
cannot be reliably estimated for these observations.
4 This results in a sample 
of 90,529 observations (19,025 unique companies) which is used to examine 
the effect of competition in the market for audit services on audit quality. This 
sample is referred to as sample C.  




Table 4.1: Sample selection 
  A) Initial Sample    167,377 
Less: observations with missing auditor information or 
without client location 
-13,098   
Less: observations with multiple audit partners  -12,368   
Less: clients for which total assets are unknown  -906   
B) Sample used to compute measures of competition    141,005 
Less: Missing financial information  -38,539   
Less: Financial institutions and insurance companies  -9,470   
Less: observations with extreme sales growth  -1,856   
Less: Less than 10 observations per industry  -341   
C) Sample for regression analyses    90,529 
Less: Observations with incomplete prior year data  -31,176   
D) Sample for change regressions    59,353 
     
This study also examines the effect of market share mobility on relative 
changes in audit quality between years. This requires the availability of cur-
rent and prior year financial and auditor information. A lack of prior year data 
results in the removal of 31,176 observations. The effect of changes in com-
petition on changes in audit quality is tested based on a sample of 59,353 
observations (15,359 unique companies). This sample is referred to as sam-
ple D. 
 
4.3.2 Dependent variable 
Prior studies have used several proxies for audit quality, such as the number 
of court decisions in which an auditor was found guilty of performing below 
the required level (e.g. Palmrose 1988), the frequency of earnings restate-
ments (Raghunandan et al. 2003; Kinney et al. 2004), and the likelihood of 
issuing a qualified audit report (e.g. Hopwood et al. 1994; Vanstraelen 2000). 
The most commonly used proxy for audit quality relates to the level earnings 
management  by  clients.  High  quality  audits  are  argued  to  constrain 
management‟s choice of accounting procedures which are used to manage 
earnings (e.g. Becker et al. 1998, Francis et al. 1999, Reynolds and Francis 
2001, Myers et al. 2003, Krishnan 2003, Carey and Simnett 2006). Client 
earnings management is commonly proxied by discretionary accruals. 
This study uses the modified Jones-model (1991) to estimate the quality 
of the reported earnings using discretionary accruals. Consistent with prior 
studies (e.g. Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Kothari et al. 2005), this study controls 
for performance using current year return on assets (ROA).
5 Lagged total 
accruals  are  included  to  control  for  the  reversing  nature  of  accruals  (e.g. 
DeFond  and  Park  2001).  An  intercept  is  included,  because  this  allows 
controlling for heteroscedasticity, and mitigates problems due to an omitted 
size variable (Kothari et al. (2005). The following model is estimated for each 
industry and year: 
 
                   
 
      
                                        
                               
(4.1) 
 





i  =  audit client; 
j  =  main  industry  in  which  the  client  operates,  based  on  two-digit  NACE 
industry codes; 
t  =  year, t-1 refers to the prior year; 
TACCijt  =  total  accruals,  scaled  by  lagged  total  assets.  Following  Dechow  et  al. 
(1995) and Leuz et al. (2003), total accruals are computed as 
TACCijt = ( ∆CAijt - ∆CASHijt ) - ( ∆CLijt - ∆STDijt - ∆TPijt ) - DEPijt 
where  ∆CAijt  =  change  in  total  current  assets,  ∆CASHijt  =  change  in 
cash/cash equivalents, ∆CLijt = total current liabilities, ∆STDijt = change in 
short-term debt included in current liabilities, ∆TPijt = change in income 
taxes  payable,  DEPijt  =  depreciation  and  amortization  expense  for 
company i in industry j for year t; 
Aijt-1  =  total assets for company i in industry j for year t-1; 
∆SALESijt  =  change in sales in year t, scaled by total assets for company i in industry j 
for year t-1; 
∆RECijt  =  change  in  accounts  receivable  in  year  t,  scaled  by  total  assets  for 
company i in industry j for year t-1; 
PPEijt  =  year-end  property,  plant  and  equipment,  scaled  by  total  assets  for 
company i in industry j for year t-1; 
ROAijt  =  return on assets, calculated as operating income divided by total assets 
for company i in industry j for year t-1; 
TACCijt-1  =  TACC in year t-1, scaled by total assets for company i in industry j for year 
t-1; and 
ϵijt  =  unexpected portion of total accruals for company i in industry j for year t-1. 
 
The  residual  of  the  model  ϵijt  is  used  as  the  measure  of  discretionary 
accruals.  Higher  discretionary  accruals  are  associated  with  more  client 
earnings management, and therefore reflect lower audit quality. 
 
4.3.3 Experimental Variables 
This  study  uses  three  different  measures  of  competition.  As  explained  in 
section 3.1, the experimental variables are computed based on sample B, 
which includes 141,005 observations.  
Table 4.2 gives an overview of the three experimental variables. The first 
measure is the Herfindahl index. This measure of market concentration is 
computed  at  the  local  office  level.  The  effect  of  market  concentration  on 
audit quality is tested using sample C, which is the largest possible sample 
that allows testing the effect of market concentration on audit quality. The 
second  experimental  variable  is  the  market  share  mobility  measure.  The 
effect of market share mobility on audit quality is examined at the audit firm 
level, the local office level, and the audit partner level. The regressions used 
for market share mobility are based on sample D because prior year data is 
required to compute market share mobility. The final measure of competition, 
competitor density, is computed at the audit partner level. This is required to 
control for the capacity levels of local audit offices. The regressions based 
on competitor density are estimated using sample C. 
The three different measures of competition and their respective levels of 
analysis are discussed in detail in sections 3.3.1 to 3.3.3. 




Table 4.2: Overview of the experimental variables and the levels of analysis at which each 
variable is measured. 
Variables    Level of analysis 
   
Firm level  Local office level  Audit partner level 
1.  Herfindahl index    X   
2.  Market share mobility  X  X  X 
3.  Competitor density      X 
       
4.3.3.1 Experimental variable: Herfindahl index 
The  first  measure  used  to  proxy  for  competition  is  the  Herfindahl  index, 
which is a concentration measure that audit researchers have adopted from 
the area of industrial organization. Most of the criticism on the auditing indus-
try relies on the concentration doctrine, which provides a motivation for con-
centration-performance studies in the audit literature (Dopuch and Simunic 
1980).  One  advantage  of  the  Herfindahl  index  over  other  concentration 
ratios, such as the C4 and C8 ratios, is that it takes the market shares of all 
market participants into account, as opposed to the market shares of only 
the largest companies. 
The degree of seller concentration in a market is commonly interpreted as 
a measure of the degree of competition in a market (e.g. Carlton and Perloff 
1994). However, despite the fact that concentration measures are commonly 
used in audit research to proxy for competition (e.g. Simunic 1980; Pearson 
and Trompeter 1994) it can be questioned whether concentration measures 
actually capture the level of competition in a market. A dynamic analysis of 
audit market structure by Buijink et al. (1998) shows that audit markets are 
competitive notwithstanding high (static) concentration levels. Concentration 
ratios, for example, may not capture price cutting and dynamics of relative 
market share, which would be a sign of competitive behavior (Yardley et al. 
1992; Pearson and Trompeter 1994). 
Recognizing the criticism on the use of concentration ratios as proxies for 
competition, this study uses the Herfindahl index for two reasons. First of all, 
it is used to enhance the comparability of this study with prior studies. Sec-
ond, the simultaneous use of this measure and two other proxies for compe-
tition can provide further insight into the mixed evidence found by prior stud-
ies on the relationship between competition and audit quality. 
The Herfindahl index (HERFINDAHLk) is computed as follows: 
 
                             
  




HERFINDAHLk  =  Herfindahl index for local audit market k; 
k  =  local audit market; 
i  =  local audit office that audits clients in the local market k; 
Nk  =  number of local audit offices that compete for audit clients within 
local market k; 
TAik  =  the sum of the natural logarithms of total assets of all clients 
within local audit market k that are audited by audit office i; and 
TAk  =  the sum of the natural logarithms of total assets of all clients 
within local audit market k.  




The Herfindahl index is measured at the local office level, consistent with 
the argument by Wallman (1996) and Francis et al. (1999) that competition 
takes place at the local office level. Using a Herfindahl index measured at 
the firm level is not feasible in the current setting due to the limited number 
of years of analysis.
6 A Herfindahl index computed at the audit partner level 
is unlikely to capture market concentration, because the client portfolios of 
single audit partners are relatively small. A concentration ratio measured at 
the  audit  partner  level  would  therefore  signal  that  audit  markets  are  not 
concentrated regardless of the actual degree of market concentration. 
Spatial  analysis  is  used  to  determine  the  local  markets  in  which  local 
offices compete. The distances between local audit offices and both actual 
and potential clients are computed based on the geographical coordinates of 
local audit offices and clients. The coordinates of each local audit office are 
obtained at the city level. The coordinates for each audit client are based on 
their postal code. These coordinates are used to compute the geographical 
distances between every local audit office and every audit client within the 
sample.  
Univariate analysis shows that 75% of the audited companies are within a 
50  kilometer  distance  from  their  client.  Therefore,  a  50  kilometer  range 
around a local office is expected to provide a reasonable estimation of the 
local market in which a local office operates. For each local office, the local 
audit  market,  k,  is  based  on  the  number  of  clients  within  a  50  kilometer 
distance from the local office.
7 
Since audit fees are not publicly available in Belgium, this study relies on 
a proxy of auditor revenues to compute local office market shares. Market 
shares of local audit offices are needed to compute the Herfindahl indexes. 
Prior studies have used the natural logarithms of client revenues and client 
assets as proxies for audit fees (e.g. Simunic 1980; Hay et al. 2006). Sales 
revenue data for many small Belgian companies are not available in the Bel-
First  database.  Using  client  sales  revenues  to  proxy  for  audit  fees  would 
therefore  result  in  the  removal  of  a  large  part  of  the  sample,  creating  a 
possible bias in the computation of the competition measures. The current 
study therefore uses the natural logarithm of client assets to proxy for audit 
fees.  
TAik equals the sum of the natural logarithms of total assets of all clients 
within local audit market k that are audited by audit office i. TAk equals the 
sum of the natural logarithms of total assets of all clients within local audit 
market k. Hence, the ratio TAik/TAk equals the proxy for the market share of 
each firm within local audit market k. The sum of the squared market shares 
of all auditors competing in local market  k equals the Herfindahl index of 
local audit market k (HERFINDAHLk). A higher value of the Herfindahl index 
indicates that the market is more concentrated. 
4.3.3.2 Experimental variable: market share mobility 
The second measure of competition follows the mobility measure used by 
Buijink et al. (1998). Market share mobility captures auditor switches that are 
ignored by concentration measures, such as the Herfindahl index. A market 




opposed to market concentration. This dynamic measure of market structure 
is computed based on the change in auditor market share from the previous 
to the current fiscal year. Changes in market share are more likely to occur 
in competitive markets than in less competitive audit markets (Yardley et al. 
1992). Hence, market share mobility is positively associated with the level of 
competition. 
The following model shows the computation of the absolute change in 
market share: 
 
           
    
   
 
      
     
    (4.3) 
 
where: 
|∆MSit|  =  absolute value of the change in market share for auditor i 
in year t; 
i  =  audit firm, local audit office, or audit partner; 
t  =  year, t-1 refers to the previous year; 
TAit  =  the  sum  of  the  natural  logarithms  of  total  assets  of  all 
clients that are audited by auditor  i (i.e. audit firm, local 
audit office, or audit partner); and 
TAt  =  the  sum  of  the  natural  logarithms  of  total  assets  of  all 
clients in the Belgian audit market. 
 
Whereas  Buijink  et  al.  (1998)  compute  market  share  mobility  at  the 
national level, the current study measures market share mobility measure at 
the audit firm level, the local office level, and the audit partner level.
8 The 
computation of this measure requires auditor information for both the current 
and  the  prior  fiscal  year.  Since  these  data  are  not  available  for  all 
observations, the effect of this competition measure is examined using the 
reduced sample of 59,353 observations (sample D). 
The market share of auditor i for year t (MSit) is computed as the sum of 
the natural logarithms of total assets of clients audited by auditor i, divided 
by the sum of the natural logarithms of total assets of all audited companies 
in Belgium during year t. The market share of auditor i in year t-1 (MSit-1) is 
computed in a similar manner.  
This  study  uses  the  absolute  change  in  market  share  to  measure  the 
competition faced by an auditor, as opposed to the signed change in market 
share, because a signed change in market share can be interpreted as a 
measure of performance (i.e. better performing auditors are more likely to 
gain market share, and vice versa). Absolute changes in market share are 
used to control for the performance effect.  
4.3.3.3 Experimental variable: competitor density 
Auditors face different competitors for each client due to the geographical 
dispersion of local audit partners and audit clients. Hence, there is a different 
set of potential auditors for each audit client within a local audit market. The 
previously  discussed  measures  of  competition,  the  Herfindahl  index  and 
market share mobility, do not take this into account, and may therefore not 
accurately  reflect  the  level  of  competition  in  local  audit  markets.  To 




local  competition:  COMPETITOR_DENSITYk.  This  measure  incorporates 
both  actual  and  potential  auditor-client  combinations  within  a  local  audit 
market.  It  furthermore  takes  into  account  that  audit  clients  within  a  local 
market face different competitors due to their geographical locations. 
Competitor density is measured at the audit partner level and is based on 
the number of audit partners and audit clients that compete in a local market. 
In doing so, this measure implicitly accounts for local office size, which is 
related to the office‟s audit capacity. Since audits of financial statements are 
labor intensive, the number of audit partners is a direct measure of capacity 
(Buijink et al. 1998). Competitor density measured at the audit partner level 
therefore  provides  a  better  approximation  of  local  competition  than 
competitor density measured at the local office level.
9 
Local competitor density is computed as follows: 
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where: 
COMPETITOR_DENSITYk  =  measure of competition in local audit market k; 
k  =  local audit market; 
i  =  audit partner that, given his geographical location, is 
able to compete for clients in local market k; 
∑TA_CLIENTSik  =  The  sum  of  the  natural  logarithms  of  assets  for  all 
clients in local market k that can potentially be audited 
by audit partner i; 
∑TA_CLIENTSk  =  The  sum  of  the  natural  logarithms  of  assets  for  all 
clients in local market k; and 
#CLIENTSk  =  number of potential clients in local audit market k. 
 
The  construction  of  the  local  competitor  density  measure  requires 
defining  local  audit  markets.  For  each  audit  partner  in  Belgium,  a  local 
market k is defined based on the location of the local audit office for which 
he works. First of all, all actual and potential clients within a 50 kilometer 
distance from the local office are identified.
10 Second, for each client within 
this local  audit market, it  is examined which audit  partners can audit this 
client. The number of competing audit partners is computed as the number 
of  audit  partners  within  a  50  kilometer  distance  of  that  client,  under  the 
constraint that the client is not more than 10 percent larger than the largest 
client  currently  within  the  portfolio  of  the  local  office  for  which  the  audit 
partner works.
11 
For each audit partner that can audit at least one client in local market k, 
a ratio is computed as the sum of the natural logarithms of client assets that 
this auditor could audit (∑TA_CLIENTSik), divided by the sum of the natural 
logarithms of assets of all clients in audit market k (∑TA_CLIENTSk). This 
ratio reflects an estimation of the percentage of audit fees of the total market 
for which each audit partner can compete. 
The sum of these ratios for all audit partners that compete on local market 
k can be interpreted as an equivalent of the number of audit partners that 




divided by the sum of the number of actual and potential clients within local 
market k (#CLIENTSk) to create a measure of competitor density for local 
market  k.
12  COMPETITOR_DENSITYk  is  positively  associated  with  the 
degree of competition in a local market. 
 
4.3.4 Control variables 
Following prior literature, additional client-specific explanatory variables are 
included to control for their potential effect on discretionary accruals (e.g. 
Becker 1998; Reynolds and Francis 2001; Hunt and Lulseged 2007; Carey 
and Simnett 2006; Coulton and Ruddock 2007; Coulton, Ruddock and Taylor 
2007; Knechel and Vanstraelen 2007; Francis and Yu 2009).  
A dichotomous measure of audit firm size, BIGN, is included to control for 
the  possibility  that  Big  N  audit  firms  provide  higher  quality  audits  due  to 
reputation  concerns  (e.g.  DeAngelo  1981b)  or  economies  of  scale  (e.g. 
Johnson et al. 2002). This variable equals one if the company is audited by 
one of the Big N audit firms, 0 otherwise.
13 A negative association between 
BIGN and ABSDACC is expected.
14 
Publicly traded companies differ from privately held companies in their 
incentives  to  manage  earnings.  The  dummy  variable  LISTED  indicates 
whether  a  company  is  listed  on  the  Belgian  stock  exchange  or  not. 
Companies  that  are  listed  on  a  stock  exchange  may  face  pressure  to 
manage  earnings  upwards  in  order  to  meet  or  beat  earnings  targets  or 
analyst forecasts (Beatty et al. 2002; Fischer and Stocken 2004). However, 
potential  litigation  costs  and  reputation  losses  are  larger  for  listed 
companies,  creating  an  incentive  for  auditors  to  constrain  earnings 
management more for listed companies than for private companies (Chaney 
et  al,  2004;  Vander  Bauwhede  and  Willekens  2004).  Evidence  about 
differences in earnings management between public and private companies 
is mixed (e.g. Beatty et al. 2002; Vander Bauwhede et al. 2003; Burgstahler 
et al. 2006). Therefore, no expectation is expressed regarding the sign of 
LISTED. 
Cash  flow  from  operations  scaled  by  total  assets  (CFO)  is  included 
because  accruals  and  cash  flows  are  found  to  be  negatively  correlated 
(Dechow  1994;  Sloan  1996).  A  negative  association  between  CFO  and 
discretionary accruals is therefore expected. 
The control variables LEVERAGE and PBANK are included to control for 
differences in earnings management incentives related to client leverage and 
financial distress. Based on the bankruptcy prediction model developed by 
Ooghe and Verbaere (1982), companies with an increased bankruptcy risk 
have a value of 1 for PBANK, 0 otherwise.
15 Companies with high leverage 
or high bankruptcy risk can use asset write-offs to signal to lenders that they 
are  committed  to  streamlining  operations  (DeAngelo  et  al.  1994)  and  to 
signal the need for wage  concessions to unions (Liberty and Zimmerman 
1986; DeAngelo and DeAngelo 1991). More highly leveraged firms and firms 
in distress may, on the other hand, also have more incentives to manage 




Jiambalvo 1994, Reynolds and Francis 2001). It is therefore not clear what 
the net effects of LEVERAGE and PBANK on discretionary accruals are. 
The  amount  of  discretionary  accruals  is  expected  to  be  positively 
associated with a company‟s growth opportunities (GROWTH), measured as 
the change in total assets (Johnson et al. 2002, Carey and Simnett 2006; 
Hunt and Lulseged 2007). 
Client company size (SIZE) is correlated with operating characteristics 
which reduce the absolute amounts of discretionary accruals (Reynolds and 
Francis  2001).  A  negative  coefficient  of  SIZE  is  therefore  expected. 
Company  size  is  measured  as  the  natural  log  of  total  asset,  with  client 
assets stated in thousands of Euros. 
Younger  companies  are  more  likely  to  experience  financial  distress 
(Carey  and  Simnett  2006),  increasing  the  pressure  to  manage  earnings. 
Company age (LN_AGE) is computed as the natural logarithm of the number 
of  years  since  the  formation  of  the  company  obtained  from  the  Bel-First 
database. A negative coefficient of LN_AGE is expected. 
Companies which report operating losses are found to be less likely to 
report future earnings surprises (Brown 2001). A control variable, LOSS, is 
therefore included to control for the possible effect of reporting a  loss  on 
audit quality. LOSS has a value of 1 if the company reported an operating 
loss in the prior year, 0 otherwise. A negative association between LOSS 
and discretionary accruals is expected. 
Finally, to control for possible year effects, year dummies for all except 
the first year are included. 
 
4.3.5 Regression models 
This section presents the regression models that are used to examine the 
effect of competition on audit quality. 
4.3.5.1 Regression model: the effect of market concentration on audit quality 
The model displayed below is used to test the effect of market concentration, 
measured using the HERFINDAHL index, on audit quality. The dependent 
variable of this model is derived from the modified Jones model as explained 
in section 3.2. The absolute value of discretionary accruals is used, because 
clients can manage earnings either upwards or downwards depending on 
their circumstances (Warfield et al. 1995). 
 
                                                         
                                                         
                            
  
                        
(4.5) 
 
where:   




=  Herfindahl  score  for  the  local  market  k  defined  as  the 
potential clients within a 50 kilometer distance from the local 
audit office; 
PBANK  =  1 if the client has a high risk of going bankrupt, based on the 




(1982), and 0 otherwise; 
LISTED  =  1 if the client is listed on the Belgian stock exchange, and 0 
otherwise; 
LN_AGE  =  natural logarithm of the company age measured in years;  
CFO   =  cash flow from operations, scaled by beginning of the year 
total assets;
16 
LEV  =  total liabilities divided by total assets; 
GROWTH  =  growth in total assets from the previous to the current fiscal 
year; 
BIGN  =  1 if the client is audited by one of the Big N audit firms, and 
0 otherwise; 
SIZE  =  natural  logarithm  of  total  assets  of  the  client  company 





1 if the operating income of the client was negative in the 
prior fiscal year, and 0 otherwise; and 
YEAR_DUMMIES  =  one dummy variable per year, for the years 1999-2006. 
 
The remaining variables are defined as earlier. 
 
This  regression  model  is  estimated  using  the  sample  of  90,529 
observations (sample C), which is the largest sample size available for the 
regression analysis given the data requirements. 
4.3.5.2 Regression model: the effect of market share mobility on audit quality 
The effect of the absolute values of changes in market shares on changes in 
absolute  discretionary  accruals  is  tested  using  model  (4.6).  The  delta 
variables in this model are computed by subtracting the prior year value of 
the observations from the current year value. The expected directions of the 
change variables are similar to those explained for model (4.5). No change 
variable is included for company age, as the change in age is always equal 
to one year. Furthermore, ∆LISTED is not included because of the limited 
number of observations that experienced a change in stock listing status. 
Year dummies are included to control for possible year effects. 
   
                                                             
                                                  
     
  




∆ABSDACC  =  the change in the absolute amount of discretionary accruals 






the absolute change in market share of the audit firm year t-
1 to year t, measured at three different levels: the audit firm 
level,  the  local  office  level,  and  the  audit  partner  level: 
|∆MS_FIRM|, |∆MS_OFFICE|, and |∆MS_PARTNER|; 
∆PBANK  =  change in the likelihood of bankruptcy (PBANK) from year t-
1 to year t; 
∆LISTED  =  change in stock exchange listing from year t-1 to year t; 
∆CFO   =  change in cash flow from operations, scaled by beginning of 
the year total assets from year t-1 to year t; 
∆LEV  =  change in total liabilities divided by total assets from year t-1 
to year t; 
∆GROWTH  =  change in the growth in total assets from year t-1 to year t; 




1 to year t; 
∆SIZE  =  change in the natural logarithm of total assets of the client 







change in the profitability status of the client from year t-2 to 
year t-1; and 
one dummy variable per year, for the years 2000-2006. 
 
This model is estimated using the 59,353 observations for which prior 
year data is available (sample D). Prior year data is required to compute the 
changes in value from the prior to the current year. 
4.3.5.3 Regression model: the effect of competitor density on audit quality 
The effect of competitor density on audit quality is tested based on the model 
displayed  below.  The  experimental  variable  is  COMPETITOR_DENSITY. 
The  absolute  amount  of  discretionary  accruals  is  used  to  proxy  for  audit 




COMPETITOR_DENSITY  =  the  ratio  of  the  weighted  number  of  competing  audit 
partners divided by the number of potential clients in a 
local audit market. 
 
The remaining variables are defined as earlier. 
 
This  model  is  estimated  based  on  sample  C  (n=90,529),  which  is  the 




4.4. Descriptive statistics and results 
 
This section first presents the descriptive statistics. This is followed by an 
overview  of  the  multivariate  results,  categorized  per  type  of  competition 
variable. A number of robustness checks conclude this section. 
 
4.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table  4.3  presents  the  descriptive  statistics.  The  descriptive  statistics  for 
sample C are shown in Panel A of Table 4.3. Panel B of Table 4.3 displays 
the  descriptive statistics for sample D. Panel  A shows that the estimated 
discretionary accruals are on average 12.5 percent of the beginning of the 
year total assets. This is in line with prior research (e.g. Reynold and Francis 
2001). The Herfindahl index has a mean of 0.016, which according to the 
criteria posted by  Shepherd (1990)  is indicative of a loose oligopoly. The 
concentration ratio is lower than the concentration ratios commonly reported 
 
                                                    
                                                           
                                       
  
                        




Table 4.3 – Panel A: Descriptive statistics for sample C, i.e. the sample for the regression 
analyses of models 5 and 7 (n=90,529) 
 
Variables  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
DACC  .000  .007  .188  -.692  .624 
ABSDACC  .125  .075  .141  .000  .692 
HERFINDAHL  .016  .016  .004  .009  .030 
COMPETITOR_DENSITY  .050  .044  .018  .033  .148 
PBANK  .296  0  .456  0  1 
LISTED  .003  0  .058  0  1 
AGE  23.124  18  16.946  2  83 
CFO  .098  .080  .228  -.734  .940 
LEV  .640  .686  .267  .015  1 
GROWTH  .091  .024  .440  -.810  3.936 
BIGN  .453  .498  .498  0  1 
ASSETS (IN € THOUSANDS)  21,580.150  5,280  65,469.350  4.000  538,104.000 
LOSS  .072  0  .259  0  1 
- All variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. 
- Variable definitions: 
DACC  = amount of discretionary accruals scaled by lagged total assets 
ABSDACC  = absolute amount of discretionary accruals scaled by lagged total assets 
HERFHINDAHL  = Herfindahl score for the local market, defined based on the clients within a 
50 kilometer distance from the local audit office 
COMPETITOR_DENSITY  = the ratio of the weighted number of competing audit partners divided by 
the  number  of  potential  clients  in  the  local  audit  market,  defined  as  the 
potential clients within a 50 kilometer distance from the local audit office. 
PBANK  = 1 if the client has a high risk of going bankrupt, based on the bankruptcy 
prediction model by Ooghe and Verbaere (1982), and 0 otherwise 
LISTED  = 1 if the client is listed on the Belgian stock exchange, and 0 otherwise 
AGE  = company age measured in number of years 
CFO  = cash flow from operations, scaled by beginning of the year total assets 
LEV  = total liabilities divided by total assets 
GROWTH  = growth in total assets from year t-1 to year t 
BIGN  = 1 if the client is audited by one of the Big N audit firms, and 0 otherwise 
ASSETS  = total assets of the client company (€000) at fiscal year-end 
LOSS  = 1 if the operating income of the client was negative in the prior fiscal year, 
and 0 otherwise 
   
in prior studies conducted in the U.S. (e.g. Tomczyk and Read 1989). The 
lower  market  concentration  is,  at  least  partially,  a  result  of  the  sample 
selection. The aggregate  market share of the dominant  firms is positively 
associated with the size of audit clients (Dopuch and Simunic 1980). Hence, 
market concentration can be expected to be lower in a setting which includes 
not only listed, but also non-listed companies which are generally smaller 
than listed companies. 
Panel B of Table 4.3 shows that |∆MS_FIRM| has a mean value of .004, 
indicating  that  market  shares  of  audit  firms  change  on  average  by  0.4 
percent of the total Belgian audit market in a single  year. The values for 
|∆MS_OFFICE|  (0.2  percent)  and  |∆MS_PARTNER|  (0.004  percent)  are 
naturally lower, since the market shares are computed at a national level. 
Furthermore,  the  Table  4.shows  that  the  largest  change  in  market  share 
within one year was 3.6 percent for an audit firm, 1.4 percent for a local audit 
office, and 0.2 percent for an audit partner. COMPETITOR_DENSITY has a 
mean of .050, and ranges from .033 to .148, indicating that there are large 
differences in competition across local audit markets. 
Regarding the control variables, Panel A of Table 4.3 indicates that 29.6 
percent of the companies in the sample had an increased risk of bankruptcy, 
and  that  0.3  percent  of  the  companies  were  listed  on  the  Belgian  stock 
exchange.  The  average  company  age  is  just  over  23  years  and  ranges 




Table  4.3  –  Panel  B:  Descriptive  statistics  for  sample  D,  i.e.  the  sample  for  the  change 
regressions of model 6 (n=59,353)  
 
Variables  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
∆ABSDACC  .001  -.000  .157  -.512  .531 
|∆MS_FIRM|  .004  .001  .006  .000  .036 
|∆MS_OFFICE|  .002  .000  .003  .000  .014 
|∆MS_PARTNER|  .000  .000  .000  .000  .002 
∆PBANK  -.005  0  .308  -1  1 
∆CFO  -.002  .001  .273  -.915  .861 
∆LEV  -.011  -.004  .119  -.985  .985 
∆GROWTH  -.009  .000  .461  -1.849  1.781 
∆BIGN  .004  0  .162  -1  1 
∆ASSETS (IN € THOUSANDS)  734.680  62.000  5,402.660  -18,754.160  33,572.490 
∆LOSS  -.007    .110  -1  1 
- All variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. 
- Variable definitions: 
∆ABSDACC  = change in the absolute amount of discretionary accruals scaled by lagged total 
assets from the previous to the current fiscal year 
|∆MS_FIRM| 
 
= the absolute change in market share of the audit firm f from year t-1 to year t, 
based on the natural logarithm of client assets 
|∆MS_OFFICE| 
 
= the absolute change in market share of the audit firm from year t-1 to year t, 
based on the natural logarithm of client assets 
|∆MS_PARTNER|  = the absolute change in market share of the audit firm from year t-1 to year t, 
based on the natural logarithm of client assets 
∆PBANK  = change in likelihood of bankruptcy from year t-1 to year t 
∆CFO  = change in cash flow from  operations, scaled by  beginning of the  year total 
assets from year t-1 to year t 
∆LEV  = change in total liabilities divided by total assets from year t-1 to year t 
∆GROWTH  = change in the growth in total assets from year t-1 to year t 
∆BIGN  = change in auditor size (Big N versus Non Big N) from year t-1 to year t 
∆ASSETS  = change in the total assets of the client company (€000) from year t-1 to year t 
∆LOSS  = change in the profitability status of the client from year t-2 to year t-1 
   
between 2 and 83 years. Cash flows from operations are on average equal 
to 9.8% of beginning of the year assets. Companies in the sample have on 
average a leverage of 64 percent. The average company size, measured in 
assets, is 21.6 million euro. The average growth in assets is 9.1 percent. 
45.3  percent  of  the  companies  in  the  sample  are  audited  by  Big  N  audit 
firms.  Finally,  the  descriptive  statistics  indicate  that  7.2  percent  of  the 
companies had an operating loss in the prior year. 
Furthermore, from Panel B of Table 4.3 follows that the mean value of 
∆PBANK is -.005, indicating that the risk of bankruptcy decreased slightly 
over  the  sample  period.  The  mean  value  of  ∆CFO  is  negative  (-.002), 
showing  that  cash  flows  from  operations  became  smaller  relative  to 
beginning of the year total assets. Leverage (-.011) and asset growth (-.009) 
also decreased over the sample period. The market share of Big N audit 
firms increased during the period of analysis, on average by 0.4% per year. 
The average annual increase in client size equals 1.319 million euro. Finally, 
∆LOSS has a negative value (-.007), suggesting that clients became more 
likely to report profits. 
The correlation matrices are shown in Table 4.4. Panel A of Table 4.4 
shows  the  correlation  matrix  for  the  variables  in  models  (4.5)  and  (4.7), 
based on sample C. Panel B of Table 4.4 shows the correlation matrix for 
sample D. This panel includes the variables stated in model (4.6). Most of 
the  correlations  between  variables  are  significant,  but  low.  Only  the 




are  not  simultaneously  included  in  the  model.  Correlation  between 
competition  variables  is  therefore  not  an  issue.  Variance  inflation  factors 
(VIF) reported with the regression outputs suggest that multicollinearity of 
the explanatory variables is not of concern. 
The  Pearson  correlation  between  HERFINDAHL  and  ABSDACC  is 
significant  and  negative,  providing  some  preliminary  evidence  that  audit 
quality  is  higher  in  more  concentrated  audit  markets.  However,  the 
Spearman  correlation  between  HERFINDAHL  and  ABSDACC  is 
insignificant.  No  preliminary  evidence  is  found  of  an  association  between 
market share mobility and audit quality. The significantly negative Pearson 
and  Spearman  correlations  between  COMPETITOR_DENSITY  and 
ABSDACC  suggest  that  competition  and  audit  quality  are  positively 
associated. This provides preliminary evidence in support of the hypothesis.  
 
4.4.2 Multivariate results 
Ordinary least squares regressions with robust standard errors are estimated 
to test the hypothesis. Robust standard errors, clustered per audit firm, are 
reported because the sample includes multiple observations per audit firm 
per year, which violates the assumption that observations are independent. 
This section provides an overview of the multivariate results for each of 
the experimental variables. 
4.4.2.1 Multivariate results: Herfindahl index 
The  first  regression  analysis  (model  (4.5))  estimates  the  effect  of 
concentration,  measured  using  the  Herfindahl  index,  on  absolute 
discretionary accruals. Results are shown in Table 4.5. The model has an 
adjusted R
2 of 14.94 percent and an F-value of 659.31, which indicate that 
the  model  fits  the  data  well  and  explains  a  reasonable  amount  of  the 
variation in the dependent variable. The reported adjusted R
2 is in line with 
values reported in prior research (e.g. Reynolds and Francis 2001; Kallapur 
et al. 2008). The coefficient for HERFINDAHL is negative and significant (β= 
-.846, p<.01). This suggests that absolute discretionary accruals are lower in 
local markets which are more concentrated. This suggests that audit quality 
is higher in more concentrated local audit markets. This finding is consistent 
with the results reported by Kallapur et al. (2008). Following the commonly 
argued negative association between market concentration and competition, 
the  results  may  suggest  that  there  is  a  negative  association  between 
competition  and  audit  quality.  However,  it  is  important  to  note  that  prior 
studies  have  questioned  whether  concentration  measures  capture 
competition (Yardley et al. 1992; Pearson and Trompeter 1994; Buijink et al. 
1998). 
The coefficient of control variable PBANK (β=.019, p<.01) indicates that 
client  earnings  management  is  higher  when  clients  have  an  increased 
bankruptcy  risk,  consistent  with  the  argument  that  poorly  performing 
companies  have  increased  incentives  to  manage  earnings.  This  is  in  line 
with prior research (e.g. DeAngelo et al. 1994). The coefficient of the second 
control variable, LISTED, (β=.022, p < 0.01) indicates that listed companies 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table  4.5:  Cross-sectional  regression  model  for  the  absolute  discretionary  accruals.  The 
experimental variable is HERFINDAHL. Results are based on sample C, i.e. the sample for 
regression analyses (n=90,529). 
  Expected Sign  Coefficient (t-value) 
Intercept    .300(38.38)*** 
HERFINDAHL  ?  -.846(-2.76)*** 
PBANK  ?  .020(8.10)*** 
LISTED  ?  .023(4.36)*** 
LN_AGE  -  -.010(-16.65)*** 
CFO  -  .008(1.50) 
LEV  ?  .025(11.11)*** 
GROWTH  +  .089(52.43)*** 
BIGN  -  .032(8.19)*** 
SIZE  -  -.022(-47.99)*** 
LOSS  -  -.028(-8.95)*** 
Adj. R- Squared    .1494 
Highest VIF-Value    2.15 
F-Value    659.31*** 
-  *,  **,  ***  Significant  at  the  10  percent,  5  percent  levels  and  1  percent  levels,  respectively. 
-  The  t-statistics  and  significance  levels  are  based  on  the  White  (1980)  heteroskedasticity  consistent  covariance  matrix, 
clustered at the audit firm level. 
- Coefficients for the dummy variables for the years 1999-2006 are not reported for the sake of brevity. 
-Variable  definitions:  Dependent  variable  (ABSDACC)  =  absolute  amount  of  discretionary  accruals  scaled  by  lagged  total 
assets. HERFINDAHL= Herfindahl score for the local market defined as the potential clients within a 50 kilometer distance from 
the local audit office. PBANK = 1 if the client has a high risk of going bankrupt, based on the bankruptcy prediction model by 
Ooghe and Verbaere (1982), and 0 otherwise. LISTED = 1 if the client is listed on the Belgian stock exchange, and 0 otherwise. 
LN_AGE = the natural logarithm of the company age measured in number of years. CFO = cash flow from operations, scaled by 
beginning of the year total assets. LEV = total liabilities divided by total assets. GROWTH = growth in total assets from the 
previous to the current fiscal year. BIGN = 1 if the client is audited by one of the Big N audit firms, and 0 otherwise. SIZE = 
natural logarithm of total assets of the client company (€000) at fiscal year-end. LOSS = 1 if the operating income of the client 
was negative in the prior fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. 
 
engage more in earnings management behavior than non-listed companies. 
The coefficient of control variable LN_AGE (β=-.010, p < 0.01) indicates that 
older firms show less earnings management behavior than younger firms. 
The fourth control variable, CFO, has a positive, but insignificant coefficient 
(β=.008, p>.10), which indicates that there is no relationship between the 
size of operating  cash flows and earnings management. Higher leverage, 
LEV  (β=.026,  p<.01),  is  significantly  associated  with  increased  earnings 
management,  which  is  consistent  with  the  findings  by  DeFond  and 
Jiambalvo 1994. GROWTH has a positive and significant coefficient (β=.090, 
p<.01), which indicates that client growth has a positive association absolute 
discretionary accruals. Hence, growing companies appear to engage more in 
earning management than more stable companies. Contrary to expectations, 
BIGN  has  a  positive  and  significant  coefficient  (β=.025,  p<.01),  which 
indicates  that  Big  N  audit  firms  allow  clients  more  discretion  to  manage 
earnings  than  non-Big  N  audit  firms.  This  effect  is  in  contrast  with  the 
commonly reported finding that Big N auditors provide higher audit quality 
than non-Big N auditors (e.g. Becker et al. 1998). This finding, however, is in 
line  with  other  studies  that  reported  mixed  evidence  on  an  audit  quality 
difference between Big N and non-Big N audit firms in the European private 
client  segment  (e.g.  Gaeremynck  and Willekens  2003;  Vander  Bauwhede 
and Willekens 2004). The coefficient of the control variable SIZE is negative 
and  significant  (β=-.022,  p<.01),  which  shows  that  the  absolute  level  of 
discretionary accruals is negatively associated with the size of the audited 
company. Finally, the coefficient of LOSS (β=-.027, p<.01) is negative and  




Table 4.6: Cross-sectional regression model for the change in absolute discretionary accruals. 
The experimental variables are absolute values of the changes in market share measured at the 
audit firm level, the local audit office level and the audit partner level. Results are based on 
sample D, i.e. the sample for change regressions (n=59,353). 
 
  (1) Audit Firm 
Level 
 
(2) Local Office 
Level 











Intercept    .006(2.50)**  .006(2.33)**  .006(2.41)** 
|∆MS_FIRM|  ?  -.130(-2.84)***     
|∆MS_OFFICE|  ?    -.112(-1.00)   
|∆MS_PARTNER|  ?      -.478(-.58) 
∆PBANK  ?  -.006(-2.11)**  -.006(-2.11)**  -.006(-2.11)** 
∆CFO  -  -.017(-3.71)***  -.017(-3.72)***  -.017(-3.72)*** 
∆LEV  ?  .045(5.13)***  .045(5.13)***  .045(5.13)*** 
∆GROWTH  +  .108(47.19)***  .108(47.24)***  .108(47.24)*** 
∆BIGN  -  .004(1.23)  .004(1.16)  .004(1.14) 
∆SIZE  -  -.040(-16.21)***  -.040(-16.22)***  -.040(-16.23)*** 
∆LOSS  -  .000(.07)  .000(.07)  .000(.07) 
Adj. R- Squared    .0750  .0750  .0750 
Highest VIF-Value    1.97  1.97  1.97 
F-Value    291.71***  289.19***  288.51*** 
- *, **, *** Significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent levels and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
-  The  t-statistics  and  significance  levels  are  based  on  the  White  (1980)  heteroskedasticity  consistent 
covariance matrix, clustered at the audit firm level. 
- Coefficients for the dummy variables for the years 2000-2006 are not reported for the sake of brevity. 
- Variable definitions: Dependent variable (∆ABSDACC) = the change in the absolute amount of discretionary 
accruals scaled by lagged total assets from year t-1 to year t. |∆MS_FIRM| = the absolute change in market 
share of the audit firm from year t-1 to year t, based on the natural logarithm of client assets. |∆MS_OFFICE| 
= the absolute change in market share of the local audit office from year t-1 to year t, based on the natural 
logarithm of client assets. |∆MS_PARTNER| = the absolute change in market share of the audit partner from 
year  t-1  to  year  t,  based  on  the  natural  logarithm  of  client  assets.  ∆PBANK  =  change  in  likelihood  of 
bankruptcy from year t-1 to year t. ∆LISTED = change in stock exchange listing from year t-1 to year t. ∆CFO 
= change in cash flow from operations, scaled by beginning of the year total assets from year t-1 to year t. 
∆LEV = change in total liabilities divided by total assets from year t-1 to year t. ∆GROWTH = change in the 
growth in total assets from year t-1 to year t. ∆BIGN = change in auditor size (Big N versus Non Big N) from 
year t-1 to year t. ∆SIZE = change in the natural logarithm of total assets of the client company (€000) from 
year t-1 to year t. ∆LOSS = change in the profitability status of the client from year t-2 to year t-1. 
 
significant, which indicates that firms that have had an operating loss in the 
prior year have lower absolute discretionary accruals in the current year. 
4.4.2.2 Multivariate results: market share mobility 
Table 4.6 reports the results of the estimation of regression model (4.6), in 
which changes in absolute discretionary accruals are regressed on absolute 
changes in market shares. The table includes three columns, one for each 
level  of  analysis,  i.e.  the  audit  firm,  the  local  office  and  the  audit  partner 
level. The adjusted R-squares for each of the three regressions equal 7.50 
percent.  The  F-values  are  all  above  288.51.  Although  the  reported  R-
squares are lower than the R-square reported for the Herfindahl index, the 
models still seem to fit the data well. The coefficient for the |∆MS_FIRM| is 
negative  and  significant  (β=-.130,  p<.01).  This  suggests  that  audit  firms 
which  face  increased  competition  provide  higher  audit  quality.  The 
coefficients for |∆MS_OFFICE| (β=-.112, p>.10) and |∆MS_PARTNER| (β=  
-.478,  p>.10)  are  however  not  significant,  possibly  because  changes  in 
market  shares  at  these  levels  are  small.  This  finding  that  increased 




with  results  reported  by  Copley  and  Doucet  (1993)  and  Johnstone  and 
Bedard (2003). Hence, the results provide limited support for the hypothesis 
that  there  is  an  association  between  competition  and  audit  quality.  The 
results also suggests that an analysis based on a concentration ratio does 
not necessarily provide the same results as an analysis based on a measure 
of  competition.  While  the  findings  reported  in  Table  4.5  show  a  positive 
association  between  the  Herfindahl  index  and  audit  quality,  the  results  of 
market share mobility reported in Table 4.6 suggest that competition is  
positively associated with audit quality. Hence, the use of a concentration 
ratio as a proxy for competition can lead to wrong conclusions. 
With  respect  to  the  control  variables,  the  results  shown  in  Table  4.6 
suggest that companies facing an increased bankruptcy risk experience a 
decrease in absolute discretionary accruals. This is opposite to the effect 
reported in the previous regression analysis. 
Whereas the effect of operating cash flows on earnings management was 
insignificant in  the  prior regression, the results of the change regressions 
indicate  that  increases  in  operating  cash  flows  are  associated  with 
decreases in earnings management. Firms changing from a non-Big N to a 
Big  N  auditor,  and  vice  versa,  do  not  seem  to  experience  a  change  in 
reported absolute discretionary accruals. The effects of the remaining control 
variables are consistent with those reported in Table 4.5. 
 
4.4.2.3 Multivariate results: competitor density 
Table  4.7  shows  the  results  for  regression  model  (4.7),  with 
COMPETITOR_DENSITY as the experimental variable. The model has an 
adjusted  R
2  of  14.97  percent.  The  model  F-value  equals  654.51.  The 
coefficient of COMPETITOR_DENSITY is negative and significant (β=-.218, 
p<.01).  This  suggests  that  increased  local  competition  is  associated  with 
lower  levels  of  absolute  discretionary  accruals  (ABSDACC),  hence  higher 
audit quality. This result is in line  with the findings reported in Table 4.6, 
which show a negative association between market share mobility at the firm 
level and a change in client earnings management. Hence, the results based 
on competitor density suggest that audit quality is higher in more competitive 
audit  markets.  These  findings  provide  further  support  for  the  hypothesis. 
Additionally, this provides further evidence that the locally defined Herfindahl 
index does not reflect local competition.
17 
The effects of the control variables are consistent with those reported in 




Table  4.7:  Cross-sectional  regression  model  for  absolute  discretionary  accruals.  The 
experimental variable is COMPETITOR_DENSITY. Results are based on sample C, i.e. the 
sample for regression analyses (n=90,529) 
  Expected Sign 
 
Coefficient (t-value) 
Intercept    .300(57.79)*** 
COMPETITOR_DENSITY  ?  -.218(-4.35)*** 
PBANK  ?  .020(7.97)*** 
LISTED  ?  .022(4.18)*** 
LN_AGE  -  -.010(-16.30)*** 
CFO  -  .008(1.48) 
LEV  ?  .025(11.03)*** 
GROWTH  +  .089(53.12)*** 
BIGN  -  .029(6.65)*** 
SIZE  -  -.022(-49.87)*** 
LOSS  -  -.027(-8.83)*** 
Adj. R- Squared    .1497 
Highest VIF-Value    1.97 
Model F-Value    654.51*** 
- *, **, *** Significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent levels and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
- The t-statistics and significance levels are based on the White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix, 
clustered at the audit firm level. 
- Coefficients for the dummy variables for the years 1999-2006 are not reported for the sake of brevity. 
-  Variable  definitions:  Dependent  variable  (ABSDACC)  =  absolute  amount  of  discretionary  accruals  scaled  by lagged  total 
assets. COMPETITOR_DENSITY= the ratio of the weighted number of competing audit partners divided by the number of 
potential clients in the local audit market, defined as the potential clients within a 50 kilometer distance from the local audit 
office. PBANK = 1 if the client has a high risk of going bankrupt, based on the bankruptcy prediction model by Ooghe and 
Verbaere (1982), and 0 otherwise. LISTED = 1 if the client is listed on the Belgian stock exchange, and 0 otherwise. LN_AGE = 
the natural logarithm of the company age measured in number of years. CFO = cash flow from operations, scaled by beginning 
of the year total assets. LEV = total liabilities divided by total assets. GROWTH = growth in total assets from the previous to the 
current fiscal year. BIGN = 1 if the client is audited by one of the Big N audit firms, and 0 otherwise. SIZE = natural logarithm of 
total assets of the client company (€000) at fiscal year-end. LOSS = 1 if the operating income of the client was negative in the 
prior fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. 
 
  
4.4.2.4 Multivariate results: summary 
In this section, the effect of competition in the market for audit services on 
audit quality was examined using three different measures of competition. 
The regression results based on the locally defined Herfindahl index suggest 
that  audit  quality  is  positively  related  to  local  market  concentration.  The 
regression  based  on  the  measure  of  absolute  values  of  changes  in  firm 
market shares suggests a positive association between competition at the 
audit firm level and audit quality. However, no effect of market share mobility 
on audit quality is found at the local office level and the audit partner level. 
The insignificant effects of competition on audit quality at these levels can 
probably be explained by to the very small changes in market shares that 
occur at the local office and audit partner levels. 
The  results  of  the  regression  that  examines  the  effect  of  competitor 
density  on  audit  quality  show  a  negative  association  between  competitor 
density and absolute discretionary accruals. Hence, these results suggest 
that there is a positive association between audit quality and competition. 
Overall, the results suggest that there is a positive association between 
competition and audit quality. Hence, there appears to be support for the 
hypothesis  that  there  is  an  association  between  competition  and  audit 
quality. The results, furthermore, indicate that the locally defined Herfindahl 
index may not capture competition. This is in line with the findings by Buijink 
et al. (1998), who suggest that audit markets can be competitive despite high 




Table 4.8: Cross-sectional regression model for negative and positive discretionary accruals 
(dependent  variable  is  absolute  discretionary  accruals  scaled  by  lagged  total  assets).  The 
experimental variable is HERFINDAHL. Results are based on sample C, i.e. the sample for 
regression analyses (n=90,529). 
 






  Expected Sign 
 
Coefficient (t-value)  Coefficient (t-value) 
Intercept    .142(16.69)***  .292(39.61)*** 
HERFINDAHL  ?  -.527(-2.50)**  -.536(-1.72)* 
PBANK  ?  .060(14.87)***  -.019(-16.20)*** 
LISTED  ?  .013(1.57)  .030(2.75)*** 
LN_AGE  -  -.006(-7.83)***  -.008(-10.97)*** 
CFO  -  .421(57.13)***  -.396(-56.73)*** 
LEV  ?  .065(22.75)***  -.011(-4.88)*** 
GROWTH  +  .033(11.94)***  .067(35.03)*** 
BIGN  -  .021(8.49)***  .024(7.45)*** 
SIZE  -  -.018(-23.03)***  -.018(-36.33)*** 
LOSS  -  -.038(-9.76)***  -.007(-2.79)*** 
Adj. R- Squared    .4723  .4546 
Highest VIF-Value    2.19  2.11 
F-Value    1,325.51***  1,597.41*** 
-  *,  **,  ***  Significant  at  the  10  percent,  5  percent  levels  and  1  percent  levels,  respectively. 
-  The  t-statistics  and  significance  levels  are  based  on  the  White  (1980)  heteroskedasticity  consistent 
covariance matrix, clustered at the audit firm level. 
- Coefficients for the dummy variables for the years 1999-2006 are not reported for the sake of brevity. 
- Variable definitions: Dependent variable (ABSDACC) = absolute amount of discretionary accruals scaled by 
lagged total  assets. HERFINDAHL=  Herfindahl score  for the local market  defined as the  potential clients 
within a 50 kilometer distance from the local audit office. PBANK = 1 if the client has a high risk of going 
bankrupt,  based  on  the  bankruptcy  prediction  model  by  Ooghe  and  Verbaere  (1982),  and  0  otherwise. 
LISTED = 1 if the client is listed on the Belgian stock exchange, and 0 otherwise. LN_AGE = the natural 
logarithm of the company age measured in number of years. CFO = cash flow from operations, scaled by 
beginning of the year total assets. LEV = total liabilities divided by total assets. GROWTH = growth in total 
assets from the previous to the current fiscal year. BIGN = 1 if the client is audited by one of the Big N audit 
firms, and 0 otherwise. SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets of the client company (€000) at fiscal year-
end. LOSS = 1 if the operating income of the client was negative in the prior fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. 
 
4.4.3 Robustness checks 
This section analyzes  the extent to  which the results reported before are 
robust  to  the  use  of  different  proxies  for  audit  quality  and  differences  in 
sample selection. 
4.4.3.1 Income increasing versus income decreasing earnings management 
So  far,  audit  quality  has  been  proxied  by  the  absolute  amount  of 
discretionary accruals. Using absolute discretionary accruals as a measure 
of audit quality makes sense, since clients can be expected to engage in 
either upward or downward earnings management based on their specific 
circumstances  and  auditors  are  expected  to  reduce  both  upward  and 
downward earnings management (Warfield et al. 1995).  
However, both clients and auditors face different incentives with respect 
to upward versus downward earnings management. Clients face incentives 
to manage earnings upwards in order to attract investors (Beatty et al. 2002; 
Fischer and Stocken 2004), while downward earnings management may be 
driven by tax reduction incentives (Vander Bauwhede and Willekens 2004; 
Ball  and  Shivakumar  2005).  Tax  authorities  are  mainly  focused  on 
preventing downward earnings management which is aimed at tax reduction 




Table 4.9: Cross-sectional regression model for negative and positive discretionary accruals 
(dependent variable is absolute discretionary accruals scaled by lagged total assets). The 
experimental variable is COMPETITOR_DENSITY. Results are based on sample C, i.e. the 
sample for regression analyses (n=90,529). 
 






  Expected Sign 
 
Coefficient (t-value)  Coefficient (t-value) 
Intercept    .146(19.23)***  .288(46.71)*** 
COMPETITOR_DENSITY  ?  -.185(-3.54)***  -.068(-1.52) 
PBANK  ?  .059(14.68)***  -.020(-16.17)*** 
LISTED  ?  .012(1.49)  .030(2.75)*** 
LN_AGE  -  -.006(-7.97)***  -.008(-11.02)*** 
CFO  -  .420(57.77)***  -.396(-56.94)*** 
LEV  ?  .065(23.24)***  -.011(-4.62)*** 
GROWTH  +  .033(11.94)***  .067(35.00)*** 
BIGN  -  .018(6.80)***  .022(6.28)*** 
SIZE  -  -.018(-23.58)***  -.018(-36.42)*** 
LOSS  -  -.038(-9.52)***  -.007(-2.69)*** 
Adj. R- Squared    .4727  .4535 
Highest VIF-Value    2.02  1.95 
F-Value    1,293.01***  1,539.35*** 
-  *,  **,  ***  Significant  at  the  10  percent,  5  percent  levels  and  1  percent  levels,  respectively. 
-  The  t-statistics  and  significance  levels  are  based  on  the  White  (1980)  heteroskedasticity  consistent 
covariance matrix, clustered at the audit firm level. 
- Coefficients for the dummy variables for the years 1999-2006 are not reported for the sake of brevity. 
- Variable definitions: Dependent variable (ABSDACC) = absolute amount of discretionary accruals scaled by 
lagged total assets. COMPETITOR_DENSITY= the ratio of the weighted number of competing audit partners 
divided by the number of potential clients in the local audit market, defined as the potential clients within a 50 
kilometer distance from the local audit office. PBANK = 1 if the client has a high risk of going bankrupt, based 
on the bankruptcy prediction model by Ooghe and Verbaere (1982), and 0 otherwise. LISTED = 1 if the client 
is listed on the Belgian stock exchange, and 0 otherwise. LN_AGE = the natural logarithm of the company 
age measured in number of years. CFO = cash flow from operations, scaled by beginning of the year total 
assets. LEV = total liabilities divided by total assets. GROWTH = growth in total assets from the previous to 
the current fiscal year. BIGN = 1 if the client is audited by one of the Big N audit firms, and 0 otherwise. SIZE 
= natural logarithm of total assets of the client company (€000) at fiscal year-end. LOSS = 1 if the operating 
income of the client was negative in the prior fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. 
 
(Vander Bauwhede et al. 2003). The increased risk that downward earnings 
management is detected  by the tax authorities may cause auditors to be 
stricter in preventing downward earnings management than upward earnings 
management. 
To  analyze  whether  audit  quality  differs  with  respect  to  upward  and 
downward earnings management, the regressions for model (4.5) and (4.7) 
are examined using two separate samples: a sample of clients that engage 
in downward earnings management (n=42,886), and a sample of clients that 
engage in upward earnings management (n=47,643). 
Table 4.8 reports the outcomes for the regression with HERFINDAHL as 
the experimental variable. Table 4.9 reports the regression outcomes for the 
experimental variable COMPETITOR_DENSITY. ABSDACC is used as the 
dependent variable, even though the sample is divided based on the sign of 
the discretionary accruals. This is done for ease of interpretation, because 
larger positive discretionary accruals, as well as larger negative discretionary 
accruals,  can  be  associated  with  greater  earnings  management  and  thus 
lower audit quality (Warfield et al. 1995).  
Table 4.8 presents the results for the regressions that use the Herfindahl 
index as the experimental variable. The results show that the adjusted R-




income increasing earning management samples, are high: 47.23 and 45.46 
percent respectively.
18 The model fits are good as indicated by the model F-
values  (1,325.51  and  1,597.41).  The  coefficients  for  HERFINDAHL  are 
negative and significant for the negative discretionary accruals sample (β=-
.527, p<.05) and the positive discretionary accruals sample (β=-.536, p<.10). 
Hence, the results are consistent with those reported in Table 4.5. The effect 
of market concentration on audit quality is not influenced by the direction of 
client  earning  management.  The  results  suggest  that  audit  market 
concentration  is  positively  associated  with  audit  quality,  regardless  of 
whether  clients  engage  in  upward  or  downward  earning  management. 
Furthermore, it can be concluded that a high bankruptcy risk (PBANK) is 
positively associated with absolute discretionary accruals (β=.060, p<.01) for 
clients  that  manage  earnings  downwards  and  negatively  associated  with 
absolute discretionary accruals (β=-.019, p < 0.01) for clients that engage in 
upward  earnings  management.  This  suggests  that  signed  discretionary 
accruals are lower for companies that have an increased bankruptcy risk. 
The  coefficient  for  LISTED  is  insignificant  for  the  income  decreasing 
earnings management sample (β=.013, p>.10) and positive and significant 
(β=.030, p<.01) for the income increasing earning management sample. This 
suggests  that  publicly  traded  companies  are  more  likely  to  manage  their 
earnings  upwards  in  order  to  attract  potential  investors,  as  opposed  to 
managing their income downwards to reduce their taxable income. CFO and 
LEV also have different coefficients for each of the two subsamples. Cash 
flows  from  operating  activities  are  associated  with  larger  negative 
discretionary  accruals  (β=.421,  p<.01)  and  smaller  positive  discretionary 
accruals (-.396, p<.01) which is consistent with findings from prior literature 
(e.g.  Frankel  et  al.  2002).  Higher  leverage  is  also  associated  with  more 
negative  discretionary  accruals  (β=.065,  p<.01)  and  smaller  income 
increasing  discretionary  accruals  (β=-.011,  p<.01).  The  effects  of  the 
remaining control variables are consistent with those reported in Table 4.5. 
Table 4.9 shows the results of estimating model (4.7) separately for the 
income  increasing  and  income  decreasing  earning  management 
subsamples.  The  adjusted  R-squares  are  high,  47.27  and  45.35  percent 
respectively. The fit of both models is good as indicated by the model F-
values (1,293.01 and 1,597.35). COMPETITOR_DENSITY has a negative 
and  significant  coefficient  (β=-.185,  p<.01)  for  the  negative  discretionary 
accruals subsample, suggesting that increased competition improves audit 
quality  for  clients  that  manage  their  earnings  downwards.  The  level  of 
competition  as  measured  by  COMPETITOR_DENSITY  is,  however,  not 
associated with the degree of client upward earnings management (β=-.068, 
p>.10). A possible explanation relates to the fact that downward earnings 
management is scrutinized by the tax authorities (Vander Bauwhede et al. 
2003),  which  may  create  incentives  for  auditors  to  constrain  downward 
earnings  management  by  clients  (Van  Tendeloo  and  Vanstraelen  2008). 
Auditors  therefore  have  greater  incentives  to  reduce  downward  earnings 
management  than  upward  earnings  management.  The  finding  that 
competition only seems to have a positive impact on audit quality when there 




effects of the control variables are consistent with those reported in Table 
4.8.
19 
4.4.3.2 Abnormal working capital accruals as a proxy for audit quality 
Even though the modified Jones model is commonly used to estimate client 
earnings management, it is not without criticism. Becker et al. (1998) argue 
that  managers  have  greater  discretion  with  respect  to  working  capital 
accruals  than  total  accruals.  Furthermore,  Young  (1999)  shows  that 
discretionary  accruals  derived  from  the  modified  Jones  may  contain 
systematic  errors  when  normal  accruals  are  estimated  including 
depreciation.  Therefore,  as  a  robustness  check,  abnormal  working  capital 
accruals are used to proxy for audit quality, instead of discretionary accruals. 
This  robustness  check  uses  the  proxy  for  abnormal  working  capital 
accruals  (AWCA)  as  developed  by  Defond  and  Park  (2001).  Abnormal 
working  capital  accruals  are  estimated  as  the  difference  between  current 
year non-cash working capital and the non-cash working capital that could 
be expected based on last year‟s non-cash working capital and the increase 
in sales revenues from last year to the current year, as reflected in model 
(4.8). Consistent with Myers et al. (2003), all variables are scaled by average 




AWCAt  =  abnormal work capital accruals in year t; 
t  =  year, t-1 refers to the prior year; 
WCt   = 
 
non-cash  working  capital  in  the  current  year  computed  as 
(current assets – cash and short term investments) – (current 
liabilities – short-term debt); 
WCt-1  =  non-cash working capital in the prior year; 
St  =  revenues in current year; and 
St-1  =  revenues in prior year. 
   
The  effects  of  the  experimental  variables  on  audit  quality  are  tested 
again, now using absolute abnormal working capital accruals as a proxy for 
audit quality. The following three models are used to examine the effects of 
audit market concentration and competition on audit quality: 
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ABSAWCA  =  the  absolute  amount  of  abnormal  working  capital  accruals, 





the  change  in  the  absolute  amount  of  abnormal  working 
capital  accruals,  scaled  by  average  total  assets,  from  the 
previous to the current fiscal year audit office. 
 
The remaining variables are defined as earlier. 
 
The results of estimating models (4.9), (4.10), and (4.11), which rely on 
absolute abnormal working capital accruals as a proxy for audit quality, are 
shown in Table 4.10. Panel A of Table 4.10 shows results largely consistent 
with those reported in Table 4.5. The coefficient of HERFINDAHL remains 
negative and significant (β=-.941, p<.01). The coefficient for CFO, however, 
is negative and significant for (β=-.034, p<.01). This suggests that absolute 
abnormal working capital accruals are lower for companies that have higher  
operating  cash  flows.  The  directions  and  significance  levels  of  the  other 
control variables are consistent with those reported in Table 4.5. Hence, the 
results are generally robust to using abnormal working capital accruals as a 
proxy for audit quality. 
The results of regressing the change in abnormal working capital accruals 
on absolute changes in market shares are shown in Panel B of Table 4.10. 
The coefficient of |∆MS_FIRM| is negative and insignificant (β=-.077, p>.10), 
as  are  the  coefficients  for  |∆MS_OFFICE|  (β=-.062,  p>.10)  and 
|∆MS_PARTNER|  (β=-1.315,  p>.10).  Hence,  the  results  do  not  show  a 
significant  association  between  market  share  changes  and  the  provided 
audit quality. The adjusted R-squares of the model are also lower than those 
reported in Table 4.6 for the regressions where audit quality is proxied by 
absolute discretionary accruals. The relationship between changes in audit 
firm market share and audit quality is not robust to the use of this alternative 
proxy of audit quality. 
The  results  of  model  (4.11),  which  examines  the  effect  of 
COMPETITOR_DENSITY  on  ABSAWCA,  are  shown  in  Panel  C  of  Table 
4.10.  This  panel  shows  a  negative  and  significant  coefficient  for 
COMPETITOR_DENSITY  (β=-.308,  p<.01),  which  is  consistent  with  the 
results reported in Table 4.7. Consistent with the results reported in Panel A 
of Table 4.10 for the regression model based on HERFINDAHL, Panel C of 
Table 4.10 shows that the coefficient for CFO is negative and significant for 
(β=-.034, p<.01). The results of the other control variables are consistent 
with those reported in Table 4.7. 
4.4.3.3 Discretionary accruals weighted by the standard deviation of cash 
flows from operating activities 
Hribar  and  Collins  (2002)  argue  that  the  balance  sheet  approach  to 
estimating  accruals  can  result  in  misstated  accruals.  To  overcome  this 
problem, Hribar and Nichols (2007) suggest using a weighted least squares 




Table 4.10 – Panel A: Cross-sectional regression model for absolute working capital accruals. 
The experimental variable is HERFINDAHL. Results are based on sample C, i.e. the sample for 
regression analyses (n= 90,539). 
  Expected Sign 
 
Coefficient (t-value) 
Intercept    .350(36.17)*** 
HERFINDAHL  ?  -.941(-3.02)*** 
PBANK  ?  .031(11.30)*** 
LISTED  ?  .020(3.18)*** 
LN_AGE  -  -.015(-12.40)*** 
CFO  -  -.034(-7.27)*** 
LEV  ?  .019(5.83)*** 
GROWTH  +  .051(27.32)*** 
BIGN  -  .037(8.61)*** 
SIZE  -  -.025(-46.43)*** 
LOSS  -  -.037(-9.67)*** 
Adj. R- Squared    .1048 
Highest VIF-Value    2.15 
F-Value    374.99*** 
-  *,  **,  ***  Significant  at  the  10  percent,  5  percent  levels  and  1  percent  levels,  respectively. 
-  The  t-statistics  and  significance  levels  are  based  on  the  White  (1980)  heteroskedasticity  consistent  covariance  matrix, 
clustered at the audit firm level. 
- Coefficients for the dummy variables for the years 1999-2006 are not reported for the sake of brevity. 
-  Variable  definitions:  Dependent  variable (ABSAWCA)  =  absolute  amount  of  abnormal  working  capital accruals  scaled  by 
average total assets. HERFINDAHL= Herfindahl score for the local market defined as the potential clients within a 50 kilometer 
distance from the local audit office. PBANK = 1 if the client has a high risk of going bankrupt, based on the bankruptcy prediction 
model by Ooghe and Verbaere (1982), and 0 otherwise. LISTED = 1 if the client is listed on the Belgian stock exchange, and 0 
otherwise.  LN_AGE  =  the  natural  logarithm  of  the  company  age  measured  in  number  of  years.  CFO  =  cash  flow  from 
operations, scaled by beginning of the year total assets. LEV = total liabilities divided by total assets. GROWTH = growth in total 
assets from the previous to the current fiscal year. BIGN = 1 if the client is audited by one of the Big N audit firms, and 0 
otherwise. SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets of the client company (€000) at fiscal year-end. LOSS = 1 if the operating 
income of the client was negative in the prior fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. 
 
regression  model  to  estimate  discretionary  accruals.  For  this  study,  it 
involves scaling the variables of model (4.1) again by cash flow  volatility. 
Cash flow volatility is computed based on operating cash flows scaled by 
total assets over the prior 5 years.  
Estimating model (4.1) using weighted least squares gives an estimation 
of discretionary accruals (DACC_WLS). The interpretation of this estimate of 
discretionary accruals is different from the usual interpretation, because it 
should be interpreted as the discretionary accruals scaled by the volatility of 
operating cash flows, as opposed to discretionary accruals scaled by total 
assets. To examine the effect of audit market concentration and competition 
on  audit  quality,  proxied  by  the  absolute  value  of  absolute  discretionary 
accruals  estimated  using  the  method  suggested  by  Hribar  and  Nichols 
(2007), the following three models are tested: 
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Table 4.10 – Panel B: Cross-sectional regression model for the change in absolute abnormal 
working capital accruals. Experimental variables are the absolute values of the changes in 
market share measured at the audit firm level, the local audit office level and the audit partner 
level. Results are based on sample D, i.e. the sample for change regressions (n=59,353). 










Intercept    .003(1.30)  .003(1.22)  .003(1.66)* 
|∆MS_FIRM|  ?  -.077(-1.34)     
|∆MS_OFFICE|  ?    -.062(-.38)   
|∆MS_PARTNER|  ?      -1.315(-.75) 
∆PBANK  ?  -.009(-3.32)***  -.009(-3.31)***  -.009(-3.32)*** 
∆CFO  -  -.047(-10.34)***  -.047(-10.34)***  -.047(-10.34)*** 
∆LEV  ?  .055(4.87)***  .055(4.88)***  .055(4.88)*** 
∆GROWTH  +  .063(20.46)***  .063(20.48)***  .063(20.48)*** 
∆BIGN  -  .004(1.25)  .004(1.18)  .004(1.24) 
∆SIZE  -  -.054(-15.54)***  -.054(-15.56)***  -.054(-15.55)*** 
∆LOSS  -  .000(.05)  .000(.05)  .000(.04) 
Adj. R- Squared    .0210  .0210  .0210 
Highest VIF-Value    1.97  1.97  1.97 
F-Value    66.38***  70.74***  71.12*** 
- *, **, *** Significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent levels and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
- Coefficients for the dummy variables for the years 2000-2006 are not reported for the sake of brevity. 
-  The  t-statistics  and  significance  levels  are  based  on  the  White  (1980)  heteroskedasticity  consistent  covariance  matrix, 
clustered at the audit firm level. 
- Variable definitions: Dependent variable (∆AWCA) = the change in the absolute amount of abnormal working capital accruals 
scaled by average total assets from year t-1 to year t. |∆MS_FIRM| = the absolute change in market share of the audit firm from 
year t-1 to year t, based on the natural logarithm of client assets. |∆MS_OFFICE| = the absolute change in market share of the 
local audit office from year t-1 to year t, based on the natural logarithm of client assets. |∆MS_PARTNER| = the absolute change 
in market share of the audit partner from year t-1 to year t, based on the natural logarithm of client assets. ∆PBANK = change in 
likelihood of bankruptcy from year t-1 to year t. ∆LISTED = change in stock exchange listing from year t-1 to year t. ∆CFO = 
change in cash flow from operations, scaled by beginning of the year total assets from year t-1 to year t. ∆LEV = change in total 
liabilities divided by total assets from year t-1 to year t. ∆GROWTH = change in the growth in total assets from year t-1 to year t. 
∆BIGN = change in auditor size (Big N versus Non Big N) from year t-1 to year t. ∆SIZE = change in the natural logarithm of 
total assets of the client company (€000) from year t-1 to year t. ∆LOSS = change in the profitability status of the client from year 
t-2 to year t-1. 
 
Table 4.10 – Panel C: Cross-sectional regression model for absolute working capital accruals. 
The experimental variable is COMPETITOR_DENSITY. Results are based on sample C, i.e. the 
sample for regression analyses (n= 90,539). 
  Expected Sign 
 
Coefficient (t-value) 
Intercept    .355(51.86)*** 
COMPETITOR_DENSITY  ?  -.308(-5.07)*** 
PBANK  ?  .031(11.15)*** 
LISTED  ?  .019(3.02)*** 
LN_AGE  -  -.015(-12.14)*** 
CFO  -  -.034(-7.19)*** 
LEV  ?  .019(5.97)*** 
GROWTH  +  .051(27.67)*** 
BIGN  -  .033(6.99)*** 
SIZE  -  -.025(-47.95)*** 
LOSS  -  -.036(-9.42)*** 
Adj. R- Squared    .1055 
Highest VIF-Value    1.97 
F-Value    383.40*** 
-  *,  **,  ***  Significant  at  the  10  percent,  5  percent  levels  and  1  percent  levels,  respectively. 
-  The  t-statistics  and  significance  levels  are  based  on  the  White  (1980)  heteroskedasticity  consistent  covariance  matrix, 
clustered at the audit firm level. 
- Coefficients for the dummy variables for the years 1999-2006 are not reported for the sake of brevity. 
-  Variable  definitions:  Dependent  variable (ABSAWCA)  =  absolute  amount  of  abnormal  working  capital accruals  scaled  by 
average total assets. COMPETITOR_DENSITY= the ratio of the weighted number of competing audit partners divided by the 
number of potential clients in the local audit market, defined as the potential clients within a 50 kilometer distance from the local 
audit office. PBANK = 1 if the client has a high risk of going bankrupt, based on the bankruptcy prediction model by Ooghe and 
Verbaere (1982), and 0 otherwise. LISTED = 1 if the client is listed on the Belgian stock exchange, and 0 otherwise. LN_AGE = 
the natural logarithm of the company age measured in number of years. CFO = cash flow from operations, scaled by beginning 
of the year total assets. LEV = total liabilities divided by total assets. GROWTH = growth in total assets from the previous to the 
current fiscal year. BIGN = 1 if the client is audited by one of the Big N audit firms, and 0 otherwise. SIZE = natural logarithm of 
total assets of the client company (€000) at fiscal year-end. LOSS = 1 if the operating income of the client was negative in the 
prior fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. 
 




Table 4.11 – Panel A: Cross-sectional regression model for the absolute discretionary accruals 
estimated according to the weighted least squares method suggested by Hribar and Nichols 
(2007). The experimental variable is HERFINDAHL, n=24,436. 
  Expected Sign 
 
Coefficient (t-value) 
Intercept    .283(28.60)*** 
HERFINDAHL  ?  -.791(-2.19)** 
PBANK  ?  .013(5.03)*** 
LISTED  ?  .021(1.09) 
LN_AGE  -  -.008(-7.83)*** 
CFO  -  .015(2.46)** 
LEV  ?  .018(5.10)*** 
GROWTH  +  .070(26.33)*** 
BIGN  -  .025(6.80)*** 
SIZE  -  -.018(-31.65)*** 
LOSS  -  -.014(-2.65)*** 
Adj. R- Squared    .0986 
Highest VIF-Value    1.22 
F-Value    266.19*** 
-  *,  **,  ***  Significant  at  the  10  percent,  5  percent  levels  and  1  percent  levels,  respectively. 
-  The  t-statistics  and  significance  levels  are  based  on  the  White  (1980)  heteroskedasticity  consistent  covariance  matrix, 
clustered at the audit firm level. 
- Coefficients for the dummy variables for the years 2004-2006 are not reported for the sake of brevity. 
- Variable definitions: Dependent variable (ABSDACC_WLS) = absolute amount of discretionary accruals scaled by lagged total 
assets weighted by the standard deviation of cash flows from operations. HERFINDAHL= Herfindahl score for the local market 
defined as the potential clients within a 50 kilometer distance from the local audit office. PBANK = 1 if the client has a high risk 
of going bankrupt, based on the bankruptcy prediction model by Ooghe and Verbaere (1982), and 0 otherwise. LISTED = 1 if 
the client is listed on the Belgian stock exchange, and 0 otherwise. LN_AGE = the natural logarithm of the company age 
measured in number of years. CFO = cash flow from operations, scaled by beginning of the year total assets. LEV = total 
liabilities divided by total assets. GROWTH = growth in total assets from the previous to the current fiscal year. BIGN = 1 if the 
client is audited by one of the Big N audit firms, and 0 otherwise. SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets of the client company 
(€000) at fiscal year-end. LOSS = 1 if the operating income of the client was negative in the prior fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. 
 
where: 
ABSDACC_WLS  =  the  absolute  amount  of  discretionary  accruals  scaled  by 
lagged total assets weighted by the standard deviation of 
cash flows from operations; and 
∆ABSDACC_WLS  =  the  change  in  absolute  amount  of  discretionary  accruals 
scaled  by  lagged  total  assets  weighted  by  the  standard 
deviation of cash flows from operations from year t-1 to year 
t. 
 
The remaining variables are defined as earlier. 
 
These regressions are tested using smaller sample sizes, because of the 
required  availability  of  financial  data  for  the  prior  five  years  in  order  to 
compute  the  standard  deviations.  Models  (4.12)  and  (4.14)  are  therefore 
tested using a sample of 24,436 observations. Model (4.13) is tested using a 
sample of 15,013 observations. 
The results of estimating these models are shown in Table 4.11. Panel A 
of Table 4.11 reports the results for model (4.12). The adjusted R-square for  
this  model  is  9.86  percent.  The  coefficient  of  HERFINDAHL  remains 
negative  and  significant  (β=-.791,  p<.05),  suggesting  that  audit  quality  is 
higher  in  more  concentrated  audit  markets.  The  effects  of  the  control 
variables  remain  consistent  with  those  reported  in  Table  4.5,  with  the 
exception of the effect of LISTED and CFO. The coefficient of LISTED is no 
longer  significant  (β=.021,  p>.10),  indicating  that  there  is  no  difference  in 
audit  quality  between  publicly  traded  and  privately  held  companies.  The 
coefficient  for  CFO  is  positive  and  significant  (β=.015,  p<.05).  These  




Table 4.11 – Panel B: Cross-sectional regression model for the absolute discretionary accruals 
estimated according to the weighted least squares method suggested by Hribar and Nichols 
(2007). The experimental variables are the change in market share measured at the audit firm 
level, the local audit office level and the audit partner level, n=15,011. 
   
(1) Audit Firm 
 
(2) Local Office 
 











Intercept    -.002(-.850)  -.005(-2.46)**  -.003(-1.41) 
|∆MS_FIRM|  ?  -1.082(-4.99)***     
|∆MS_OFFICE|  ?    .027(.04)   
|∆MS_PARTNER|  ?      -4.289(-3.09)*** 
∆PBANK  ?  -.009(-2.57)**  -.009(-2.55)**  -.009(-2.55)** 
∆CFO  -  -.011(-1.16)  -.011(-1.17)  -.011(-1.16) 
∆LEV  ?  .056(2.88)***  .056(2.88)***  .056(2.87)*** 
∆GROWTH  +  .096(15.92)***  .096(15.89)***  .096(15.80)*** 
∆BIGN  -  .014(2.30)**  .012(1.85)*  .012(1.94)* 
∆SIZE  -  -.036(-4.11)***  -.036(-4.12)***  -.036(-4.09)*** 
∆LOSS  -  .020(.90)  .020(.91)  .020(.90) 
Adj. R- Squared    .0571  .0566  .0568 
Highest VIF-Value    1.90  1.90  1.90 
F-Value    91.70***  75.01***  70.96*** 
-  *,  **,  ***  Significant  at  the  10  percent,  5  percent  levels  and  1  percent  levels,  respectively. 
-  The  t-statistics  and  significance  levels  are  based  on  the  White  (1980)  heteroskedasticity  consistent  covariance  matrix, 
clustered at the audit firm level. 
- Coefficients for the dummy variables for the years 2005-2006 are not reported for the sake of brevity. 
- Variable definitions: Dependent variable (∆ABSDACC_WLS) = the change in absolute amount of discretionary accruals scaled 
by lagged total assets weighted by the standard deviation of cash flows from operations from year t-1 to year t. |∆MS_FIRM| = 
the absolute change in market share of the audit firm from year t-1 to year t, based on the natural logarithm of client assets. 
|∆MS_OFFICE| = the absolute change in market share of the local audit office from year t-1 to year t, based on the natural 
logarithm of client assets. |∆MS_PARTNER| = the absolute change in market share of the audit partner from year t-1 to year t, 
based on the natural logarithm of client assets. ∆PBANK = change in likelihood of bankruptcy from year t-1 to year t. ∆LISTED = 
change in stock exchange listing from year t-1 to year t. ∆CFO = change in cash flow from operations, scaled by beginning of 
the year total assets from year t-1 to year t. ∆LEV = change in total liabilities divided by total assets from year t-1 to year t. 
∆GROWTH = change in the growth in total assets from year t-1 to year t. ∆BIGN = change in auditor size (Big N versus Non Big 
N) from year t-1 to year t. ∆SIZE = change in the natural logarithm of total assets of the client company (€000) from year t-1 to 
year t. ∆LOSS = change in the profitability status of the client from year t-2 to year t-1. 
 
analyses show that the results are largely robust to using the discretionary 
accruals estimation method suggested by Hribar and Nichols (2007) to proxy 
for audit quality. 
Panel B of Table 4.11 provides the results of estimating model (4.13), in 
which  the  change  in  discretionary  accruals  scaled  by  the  volatility  of 
operating cash flows is regressed on the absolute changes in auditor market 
shares. The coefficient of |∆MS_FIRM| remains negative and significant (β=-
1.082, p<.01), while the coefficient of |∆MS_OFFICE| remains insignificant 
(β=.027, p>.10). The coefficient of |∆MS_PARTNER| becomes negative and 
significant (β=-4.289, p<.01). Hence, the results suggest that competition at 
the  audit  firm  and  audit  partner  level  is  positively  associated  with  audit 
quality.  The  effect  of  ∆CFO  is  no  longer  significant.  A  significant  positive 
coefficient is found for ∆BIGN, suggesting that switches to Big N (non-Big N) 
audit  firms  are  associated  with  increases  (decreases)  in  client  earnings 
management.  
Panel  C  of  Table  4.11  shows  the  results  for  the  estimation  of  model 
(4.14).  The  adjusted  R-square  for  the  model  equals  9.89  percent.  The 
coefficient  of  COMPETITOR_DENSITY  remains  negative  and  significant 
(β=-.176,  p<.05),  suggesting  that  competition  is  positively  associated  with 
audit quality. The effects of the control variables are consistent with those 






In conclusion, the above results appear largely robust to using different 
estimation methods of client earnings management. Hence, based on the 
results presented in this study it can be concluded that competition in the  
market  for  audit  services  is  positively  associated  with  audit  quality. 
Therefore, there appears to be sufficient evidence to support the hypothesis 
that there is an association between competition and audit quality. 
 
 
4.5. Conclusion & limitations 
 
4.5.1 Conclusions 
High concentration ratios on the market for audit services have been central 
to  criticism  on  the  auditing  industry.  More  concentrated  markets  are 
commonly argued to be less competitive, because supplier collusion is more 
likely to occur when there are only a few dominant firms. From a theoretical 
perspective the effect of competition on audit quality is not clear. Standard 
economic theory on product markets generally argues that competition will 
result  in  improved  quality  (e.g.  Spence  1975;  Leland  1977;  Mussa  and 
Rosen 1978). Increased competition, however, may negatively affect both 
components of audit quality. Auditor competence may be harmed if competi-
tion eliminates the price premium that is needed to induce auditors to pro-
Table 4.11 – Panel C: Cross-sectional regression model for the absolute discretionary accruals 
estimated according to the weighted least squares method suggested by Hribar and Nichols 
(2007). The experimental variables is COMPETITOR_DENSITY, n=24,436. 
  Expected Sign 
 
Coefficient (t-value) 
Intercept    .280(30.26)*** 
COMPETITOR_DENSITY  ?  -.176(-2.50)** 
PBANK  ?  .013(4.95)*** 
LISTED  ?  .022(1.09) 
LN_AGE  -  -.008(-7.75)*** 
CFO  -  .015(2.48)** 
LEV  ?  .019(5.17)*** 
GROWTH  +  .070(26.45)*** 
BIGN  -  .022(5.42)*** 
SIZE  -  -.018(-32.38)*** 
LOSS  -  -.014(-2.55)** 
Adj. R- Squared    .0989 
Highest VIF-Value    1.22 
F-Value    283.36*** 
-  *,  **,  ***  Significant  at  the  10  percent,  5  percent  levels  and  1  percent  levels,  respectively. 
-  The  t-statistics  and  significance  levels  are  based  on  the  White  (1980)  heteroskedasticity  consistent  covariance  matrix, 
clustered at the audit firm level. 
- Coefficients for the dummy variables for the years 2004-2006 are not reported for the sake of brevity. 
- Variable definitions: Dependent variable (ABSDACC_WLS) = absolute amount of discretionary accruals scaled by lagged total 
assets weighted by the standard deviation of cash flows from operations. COMPETITOR_DENSITY= the ratio of the weighted 
number of competing audit partners divided by the number of potential clients in the local audit market, defined as the potential 
clients within a 50 kilometer distance from the local audit office. PBANK = 1 if the client has a high risk of going bankrupt, based 
on the bankruptcy prediction model by Ooghe and Verbaere (1982), and 0 otherwise. LISTED = 1 if the client is listed on the 
Belgian stock exchange, and 0 otherwise. LN_AGE = the natural logarithm of the company age measured in number of years. 
CFO = cash flow from operations, scaled by beginning of the year total assets. LEV = total liabilities divided by total assets. 
GROWTH = growth in total assets from the previous to the current fiscal year. BIGN = 1 if the client is audited by one of the Big 
N audit firms, and 0 otherwise. SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets of the client company (€000) at fiscal year-end. LOSS = 
1 if the operating income of the client was negative in the prior fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. 




vide high quality audits (e.g. Hermanson et al. 1987; Kranton 2003). Auditor 
independence may be harmed if reduced audit fees force auditors to  
offset low initial revenues or early losses with quasi rents to be charged for 
future audits (DeAngelo 1981a). 
This study uses data on the Belgian audit market to examine the relation-
ship between competition and audit quality at three levels of analysis: the 
audit firm level, the local audit office level, and the audit partner level. Data 
availability  in  this  setting  facilitates  the  construction  of  client  portfolios  re-
quired  to  measure  competition  at  these  three  levels  of  analysis.  Spatial 
analysis, based on geographical coordinates of all local audit offices and all 
audited companies in Belgium, is used to measure local competition. 
Regression analyses are used to examine the effect of competition on 
audit quality. The proxy for audit quality, absolute discretionary accruals, is 
regressed on three different experimental variables. The first experimental 
variable is the Herfindahl index, which is a measure of market concentration. 
The second experimental  variable is market share  mobility. To more pre-
cisely measure local competition, this study introduces a new measure of 
local competition: competitor density. This measure takes the geographical 
dispersion of auditors and clients within local markets into account, recogniz-
ing that different clients within a local market face different competing audi-
tors, due to their geographical locations. Competitor density thus is the third 
experimental variable used in this study. 
The results show a negative  association  between  the Herfindahl index 
and absolute discretionary accruals, suggesting that audit quality is higher in 
more concentrated audit markets. A positive association between competi-
tion and audit quality is found when competition is measured by audit firm 
market share mobility. However, no association is found when market share 
mobility is measured at the local office level and the audit partner level. The 
lack of evidence at these lower levels of analysis is most likely due to the 
relative small changes in market share at the levels. The results furthermore 
show that competitor density is negatively associated with absolute discre-
tionary  accruals, again suggesting that there  is a positive  association  be-
tween competition and audit quality. 
In conclusion, the results based on competitor density and firm market 
share mobility show that there is a positive association between competition 
and audit quality. Furthermore, the results provide evidence that high market 
concentration does not equal low competition. In fact, audit quality appears 
to be higher in more concentrated audit markets. Concerns that high market 
concentration results in reduced audit quality are therefore not warranted. 
Hence, it is important for regulators to not focus on lowering market concen-
tration. Instead, they should focus on ensuring that the market for audit ser-
vices remains competitive, since both competition and market concentration 
are positively associated with audit quality. 
 
4.5.2 Limitations and recommendations for future research 
This study is not without limitations. First of all, measures of competition are 




not publicly available in the setting of this study. Although prior research has 
shown a strong correlation between client assets and audit fees, it might be 
worth replicating this study in a setting where audit fee data are available. 
Second, local markets in this study are defined based on the geographi-
cal locations of client and audit partners and the use of an arguably arbitrary 
cut-off. Although further analysis showed that the results are robust to varia-
tion in the distance used to define local markets, it is worthwhile for future 
studies to examine the effect of local competition on audit quality in differ-
ently defined local audit markets. 
The  final  limitation  relates  to  the  measure  of  local  competition,  COM-
PETITOR_DENSITY,  introduced  in  this  paper.  This  measure  is computed 
based on the number of audit partners that can potentially compete in a local 
audit market. Because the measure is constructed at the audit partner level, 
it implicitly assumes that audit partners working for the same firm compete 
against each other for clients. In reality, the extent of competition between 
audit partners that work for the same firm is limited. Although further analysis 
based  on  a  measure  of competitor  density  constructed  at  the  local  office 
shows that the level of analysis did not affect the results, future research 
could  benefit  from  developing  a  measure  of  local  competitor  density  that 
controls for local office capacity, while recognizing the constraints on compe-
tition between audit partners that work for the same audit firm and within the 
same local office. 
 






1 Barriers to entry and economies of scale in auditing, as opposed to a lack of competition, 
provide alternative explanations for the high concentration levels commonly observed on audit 
markets (Dopuch and Simunic 1980; Danos and Eichenseher 1982). 
 
2 The difference between market concentration and competition is discussed in section 3.3.1. 
 
3 The audit market is characterized by information asymmetry regarding the quality of the pro-
vided audit. More specifically, the auditor has a better insight in the audit quality than the buy-
er(s) of audit services (i.e. the shareholder / audit committee), even though the audit can be 
affected by the client‟s management decisions. The quality of audit services is not easily ob-
servable and can be argued to be either sufficient or not sufficient. Even if an audit was not of 
sufficient quality, it may take a long time before errors are observed, if observed at all. As Aker-
lof (1970) points out, information asymmetry can lead to market failure in which good quality is 
driven out of the market. Leland (1979) indicates the need for minimum quality standards in this 
case. Minimum quality standards can be useful in reducing the negative social effects of asym-
metric information. Hence, minimum quality standards do not only have an effect on the level of 
competition on the audit market, but are also used to prevent audit quality from being reduced to 
an unacceptable level. 
 
4 The top and bottom 1 percent of the observations are defined as observations with extreme 
sales volatility. Removing these observations is consistent with Carey and Simnett (2006) who 
argue  that  the  estimation  of  discretionary  accruals  is  unreliable  for  companies  with  volatile 
sales, because the estimation of discretionary accruals relies on the change in sales. 
 
5 Kothari et al. (2005) demonstrate that controlling for firm performance using current year return 
on assets (ROA) instead of lagged ROA results in a better performing accruals measure. 
 
6 If the Herfindahl index is computed at the audit firm level, there would only be variation in the 
measure  across  years,  not  within  years.  The  Herfindahl  index  would  be  the  same  for  all 
observations within the same year of analysis. 
 
7 Sensitivity analyses show that the results are robust to increasing the range used to compute 
local competition to 60 kilometers, as well as decreasing the range to 40 kilometers. 
 
8 Buijink et al. (1998) use the market share mobility measure to analyze the relative competi-
tiveness of two different audit markets, i.e. the Dutch and German markets for audit services. 
The current study uses market share mobility to analyze competition faced by auditors within a 
single audit market. 
 
9 As a result, the measure at the audit partner level implicitly assumes that partners working for 
the same local audit office compete against each other. While audit partners that work for the 
same local office may compete against each other for new clients, it is unlikely that they com-
pete against each other for clients that are already part of the local office‟s client portfolio. 
COMPETITOR_DENSITY computed at the audit partner level provides an upper bound for the 
level of competition, whereas COMPETITOR_DENSITY computed at the local office level there-
fore provides a lower bound for the level of competition. To validate the findings, the same 
regressions have been tested using the number of competing audit offices as opposed to audit 
partners. Results indicate that the findings are robust to analyzing competitor density at the local 
office level. 
 
10 This range is similar to the range used to define local audit markets for the Herfindahl index, 
as discussed in section 3.3.1. The results of the regressions based on competitor density are 
robust to changing the local competition range to either 40 or 60 kilometers. 
 
11 To incorporate that not every audit partner has the required experience and resources to audit 
every potential client, the number of competing audit partners is constrained based on the size 





of the client (measured as total assets) and the size of the currently largest client of the local 
audit office at which the audit partner is employed. To reflect the growth potential of local audit 
offices, an audit partner is regarded as a potential competitor if the client size does not exceed 
that of the audit office‟s largest client plus 10 percent. Sensitivity analyses show that the results 
are robust to variations in the growth restriction between 0 and 25 percent of the asset base of 
the local office‟s largest client. 
 
12  Division  by the  number  of clients in  a  local market  is  required because competition  is  a 
function of both the number of audit partners and the number of audit clients. 
 
13 The Big N is defined as Arthur Andersen. Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG and PwC. Arthur 
Andersen ceased to exist after the Enron scandal, and is therefore only included in the first four 
years of the sample. 
 
14 Simunic (1980) argues the audit market is competitive only for small audit firms. Hence, the 
variable BIGN may pick up differences in competition. The variance inflation factors do not 
suggest that multicollinearity is an issue. Furthermore, the regression analyses are analyzed 
while excluding the variable BIGN to examine whether the results are affected by a possible 
correlation between the competition measures and the control variable BIGN. The exclusion of 
the control variable BIGN does not influence the direction or significance levels of the remaining 
explanatory variables. Hence, the results are not affected by a possible correlation between the 
experimental variable and the control variable BIGN. The control variable BIGN is therefore 
retained in the regression analyses. 
 
15 The bankruptcy prediction model by Ooghe and Verbaere (1982) is specifically developed for 
Belgian  companies.  It  consists  of  the  following  ratios:  accumulated  profit  (loss)  and  re-
serves/total  liabilities;  taxes  and  social  security  charges/short-term  external  liabilities; 
cash/restricted current assets; work in progress and finished goods/restricted current assets; 
short-term financial  debts/short-term  external  liabilities.  The  optimal  cut-off  point  of  .1304  is 
used to distinguish companies with a high bankruptcy risk from clients with a low bankruptcy risk 
(Ooghe et al. 1995). 
 
16 Consistent with Leuz et al. (2003), cash flows from operations is computed as operating 
income minus total accruals. 
 
17 The reported results are robust to inclusion of two dummy variables that distinguish between 
three  regional areas in Belgium: Flanders, Wallonia, and the country‟s capital city Brussels. 
Flanders is the Flemish-speaking part of Belgium. Wallonia is the French-speaking part of the 
country. 
 
18 The higher adjusted R-squares compared to the results reported in Table 5 can be explained 
by the significance of the control variable CFO. This control variable captures a large extent of 
the variation in the dependent variable (ABSDACC) when the sample is split based on the 
direction of client earnings management. 
 
19  The  analysis  of the  effect  of market share mobility  on changes  in  audit  quality  uses  the 
change in the absolute value of discretionary accruals as a proxy for audit quality, because 
companies  can manage  earnings  either  upwards  or  downwards.  An  analysis  of changes  in 
signed discretionary accruals would therefore not lead to meaningful results. For this reason, no 
robustness check is conducted for the effect of market share mobility on the change in signed 
discretionary accruals. 131 
 
Chapter 5 





This chapter first provides a summary of the findings of the three empirical 
studies  included  in  this  dissertation.  Subsequently,  the  conclusions  and 
implications  are  presented.  This  is  followed  by  a  discussion  of  potential 
limitations and suggestions for future research. 
 
 
5.2 Summary of the empirical studies 
 
This dissertation consists of three empirical studies on audit quality. Each of 
the  three  studies  uses  data  from  the  Belgian  market  for  audit  services. 
Belgium is an appropriate setting for these studies  because  of its unique 
characteristics which enable the construction of complete client portfolios at 
the audit firm, the local office, and the audit partner level. 
The first study, discussed in chapter 2, investigates whether audit firms 
use audit partner expertise as a risk management strategy. Audit firms are 
expected  to  allocate  audit  partners  based  on  the  expertise  of  the  audit 
partners and the risk characteristics of the clients for two reasons. First of all, 
audit standards require the engagement partner to be assured that the audit 
engagement team has a sufficient amount of experience with clients of a 
similar nature (ISA 220.A11). The engagement partner is the leader of the 
audit team, and his experience can be expected to be an important aspect of 
the overall required experience level of the engagement team. Second, from 
a  risk  management  perspective,  audit  firms  are  required  to  sufficiently 
manage client risks, since a single audit failure can have a significant impact 
on the profitability and reputation of an entire audit firm.  
However, despite the benefits of using audit partner expertise as a risk 
management  strategy,  audit  firms  may  fail  to  use  it  effectively  for  three 
reasons. First of all, the large variation in client characteristics and partner 
expertise levels makes the allocation of audit partners to clients a complex 
task (Dopuch et al. 2003). Second, more experienced audit partners may 
use their power within the audit firm to avoid being allocated to more risky 
clients because they may be held personally accountable in case of audit 
failure  or  litigation.  Third,  less  experienced  audit  partners  may  be  under 
pressure to expand their client portfolios due to career concerns. Hence, less 
experienced auditors may be willing to audit those clients that experienced 
audit partners are not interested in.  
The study  examines  whether audit partner  expertise is used as  a risk 
management  strategy  for  three  commonly  distinguished  risk  categories 
(Huss  and  Jacobs  1991):  audit  risk,  client  business  risk,  and  auditor 




examined: general partner experience and industry experience. The results, 
based on an analysis of clients to which a new audit partner was allocated, 
show that general audit partner experience is used as a risk management 
strategy for auditor business risk. Furthermore, evidence shows that partner 
industry experience is used to manage audit risk. No evidence is found that 
audit  firms  allocate  partners  with  greater  expertise  to  clients  with  higher 
client business risk. Overall, the results discussed in chapter 2 suggest that 
audit  firms  use  audit  partner  expertise  to  manage  audit  risk  and  auditor 
business risk, but not client business risk. 
The second study, discussed in chapter 3, examines the effect of auditor-
client economic bonding on audit quality. Audit fees may contribute to an 
economic bond between the auditor and the client. A strong auditor-client 
economic  bond  may  impair  the  independence  of  the  auditor,  resulting  in 
lower  audit  quality.  However,  auditors  also  face  litigation  and  reputation 
costs in case of an audit failure. These costs are positively associated with 
client size. Reputation and litigation costs may therefore induce auditors to 
remain independent from clients that provide high audit fees (Reynolds and 
Francis 2001). 
The off-setting  effect of reputation and  litigation costs on auditor-client 
economic bonding may however be limited to the audit firm level, since the 
benefits of audit fees mainly accrue to the local audit office or audit partner, 
whereas litigation and reputation costs are shared by the audit firm. Hence, 
there  may  be  a  moral  hazard  problem  in  which  audit  partners  make 
decisions  to  maximize  their  own  utility  as  opposed  to  firm  value. 
Furthermore, clients are more likely to contribute to a significant source of 
revenue for a local office or audit partner, than for an audit firm. Hence, it is 
more  likely  that  auditor-client  economic  bonding  impairs  auditor 
independence at the local office level or audit partner level rather than at the 
audit  firm  level  office  (Reynolds  and  Francis  2001).  The  study  therefore 
measures  auditor-client  economic  bonding  at  three  levels  of  analysis:  the 
audit firm level, the local office level, and the audit partner level.  
Furthermore,  the  study  distinguishes  between  clients  that  engage  in 
upward  earnings  management  and  clients  that  engage  in  downward 
earnings  management.  Tax  authorities  are  more  likely  to  scrutinize  the 
financial statements of companies that manage earnings downwards than of 
companies  that  manage  earnings  upwards,  since  downward  earnings 
management results in a reduction of taxable income. Fear that downward 
earnings  management  will  be  detected  by  the  tax  authorities  may  create 
incentives  for  auditors  to  be  stricter  in  constraining  downward  earnings 
management than upward earnings management (Vander Bauwhede et al. 
2003).  Given  the  relatively  low  litigious  environment  in  Belgium,  these 
differences  in  regard  to  the  extent  of  public  oversight  create  a  setting  in 
which  can  be  examined  whether  reputation  concerns  are  sufficient 
mechanism to ensure that audit quality is not compromised for clients on 
which auditors are economically dependent. Furthermore, it enables testing 
whether public oversight enhances audit quality. 
The results of the study show that high levels of auditor-client economic 




allow earnings management. This finding is however restricted to clients that 
manage their earnings upwards. Auditors do not give in to pressure from 
clients  on  which  they  are  economically  dependent  to  allow  downward 
earnings management. This could imply that auditors may fear  downward 
earnings  management  to  be  detected  by  the  tax  authorities  (Vander 
Bauwhede  et  al.  2003),  suggesting  that  public  oversight  is  an  important 
factor in maintaining audit quality. Furthermore, the results do not support 
the notion that problems related to auditor-client economic bonding are more 
likely to manifest at the local office level and audit partner level than at the 
audit firm level. A possible explanation lies in the fact that Belgian audit firms 
and  local  offices  are  relatively  smal.  Independence  issues  at  the  audit 
partner level are therefore likely to also result in independence issues at the 
local office level and audit firm level, implying that any differences in results 
between the three levels will be limited. 
The  third  empirical  study,  discussed  in  chapter  4,  analyzes  the 
association between competition on the market for audit services and audit 
quality.  The  market  for  audit  services  is  commonly  criticized  to  not  be 
competitive because of the typically high market concentration levels (e.g. 
Government Accountability Office 2003; Financial Stability Forum 2006). A 
lack of competition is commonly argued  to result  in  reduced  audit quality 
(Yardley  et  al.  1992).  However,  it  can  be  disputed  whether  high  (static) 
concentration  levels  reflect  a  lack  of  competition  (Buijink  et  al.  1998). 
Furthermore, while standard economic theory predicts a positive association 
between competition and quality on product markets, this prediction cannot 
be  directly  translated  to  the  market  for  audit  services  because  the  audit 
industry  is  highly  regulated  and  audit  quality  is  not  directly  observable. 
Competition may result in reduced audit fees, which could reduce incentives 
for  auditors  to  invest  in  quality,  harming  auditor  competence  and  thereby 
lowering audit quality (Leland 1979; Kranton 2003). In addition, there may be 
a negative effect of competition on auditor independence, since lower audit 
fees may cause auditors to be dependent upon future audits of the same 
client to offset initial losses (DeAngelo 1981a). Reduced auditor competence 
and  auditor  independence  will  negatively  affect  audit  quality  (DeAngelo 
1981a).  
To test whether high concentration levels reflect limited competition, and 
to  examine  the  association  between  competition  on  the  market  for  audit 
services  and  audit  quality,  this  study  uses  one  measure  of  market 
concentration  and  two  measures  of  competition.  The  Herfindahl  index  is 
used  as  a  measure  of  market  concentration.  The  first  measure  of 
competition is based on the market share mobility measure used by Buijink 
et  al.  (1998).  The  second  measure  of  competition  is  a  newly  developed 
measure of competitor density, based on the geographical coordinates of all 
local audit offices and audit clients in Belgium. 
The empirical results show that audit quality proxied by the magnitude of 
absolute discretionary accruals is higher in more concentrated audit markets. 
Overall,  the  results  based  on  the  competition  measures  show  that  audit 




high concentration levels do not necessarily reflect limited competition and 
that highly concentrated audit markets can still be competitive. 
 
 
5.3 Conclusions and implications 
 
The  first  study  deals  with  the  use  of  audit  partner  expertise  as  a  risk 
management  strategy.  While  audit  firms  are  expected  to  benefit  from 
allocating audit partners with the highest expertise to those clients that pose 
higher risks, the actual allocation might be too complex or may be hindered 
by audit partner incentives. The findings show that audit firms allocate audit 
partners  with  greater  general  experience  to  clients  which  pose  a  higher 
auditor business risk. Audit risk is managed by the allocation of partners with 
greater  industry  experience.  However,  no  evidence  is  found  that  client 
business risk is managed using partner expertise. Even though it is possible 
that audit firms use alternative risk management strategies to manage this 
type  of  risk,  auditors  should  examine  whether  client  business  risk  is 
sufficiently managed as required by auditing standards (e.g. ISA 220.14; AU. 
312.02).  Furthermore,  it  is  worthwhile  to  investigate  why  audit  partner 
expertise is not used as a risk management strategy for client business risk. 
Possible reasons relate to risk aversion of experienced audit partners and 
career  pressure  faced  by  less  experienced  audit  partners.  Pressure  to 
develop  their  client  portfolio  might  create  incentives  for  less  experienced 
partners  to  attract  clients  regardless  of  their  risk  characteristics. 
Furthermore,  it  is  important  to  note  that  the  use  of  general  partner 
experience as a risk management strategy is limited to auditor business risk. 
Although prior research has indicated that public listing status, a proxy for 
auditor business risk, is considered by auditors to reflect increased auditor 
business  risk,  auditors  and  regulators  need  to  consider  whether  the 
allocation of experienced personnel to clients with a high auditor business 
risk is in fact the result of a risk management strategy. Alternatively, it could 
be explained by prestige and career perspectives associated with the audit 
of a listed client. This alternative explanation is a concern especially since 
the use of general audit partner experience as a risk management strategy is 
limited  to  auditor  business  risk.  Hence,  it  is  important  for  audit  firms  and 
regulators  to  consider  whether  audit  partner  experience  is  used  by  audit 
firms as a risk management strategy, and whether audit quality could benefit 
from  ensuring  that  audit  partners  with  more  years  of  experience  are 
allocated to clients with high audit risk and high client business risk. With 
respect to the current debate on fair value accounting and the need for audit 
partner expertise (e.g. IAASB 2008), the findings of this study suggest that 
auditors should consider what aspect of expertise (i.e. the number of years 
of  experience  or  industry  experience)  is  required  for  auditing  judgments 
associated with fair value accounting. Furthermore, auditors and regulators 
need to ensure that guidelines and regulation are in place to ensure that the 
allocation of experts to engagements occurs in a manner in which audits can 




The  results  of  the  second  study,  which  analyzes  the  effect  of  auditor-
client  economic  bonding  on  audit  quality,  suggest  that  high  auditor-client 
economic bonding only induces auditors to acquiesce to client pressure to 
allow upward earnings management, not downward earnings management. 
This result can be explained by an increased fear by auditors that material 
misstatements  will  be  detected  by  the  tax  authorities  if  clients  engage  in 
income  decreasing,  hence  taxable  income  decreasing,  earnings 
management.  This  result  shows  the  importance  of  public  oversight  in 
maintaining audit quality, and adds to the current debate on the need for 
increased  public  oversight  (e.g.  Financial  Stability  Forum  2008;  Basel 
Committee 2008). The results reported in the study are consistent across the 
three levels of analysis (i.e. the audit firm level, the local office level, and the 
audit partner  level). This  suggests that there is no  moral hazard problem 
arising from the fact that reputation and litigation costs are carried by the 
entire firm, while the benefits related to the audits of single clients pertain 
mostly to individual audit partners and local audit offices. This may be due to 
the fact that audit firms in Belgium are relatively small. Conflicts of interests 
between individual audit partners and audit firms will be less prominent in 
smaller audit firms than in larger audit firms, because audit partners in small 
audit firms typically have a relatively larger interest in the audit firm. 
The third and final study examines the relationship between competition 
on the market for audit services and audit quality. The results of this study 
show that competition is positively associated with audit quality. This finding 
is  in  line  with  the  positive  effect  of  competition  on  quality  suggested  by 
standard economic theory. It is therefore important for regulators to ensure 
that the market for audit services remains competitive. The results also show 
a positive relationship between audit market concentration and audit quality. 
This  finding  therefore  shows  that  high  market  concentration  does  not,  by 
definition, reflect limited competition. It is important for regulators to take this 
into account to make certain that regulation is not merely aimed at lowering 
concentration levels. Although this study shows mixed findings regarding the 
effect of audit firm size on audit quality, the positive association between 
concentration  levels  and  audit  quality  suggests  that  audit  quality  may  be 
higher in more concentrated audit markets. Robustness checks conducted 
for the study show that the positive association between competition on the 
audit market and audit quality is limited to clients that engage in downward 
earnings management. No effect between competition and audit quality is 
found for clients that engage in upward earnings management. This finding 
is likely related to fear by auditors that downward earnings management will 
be detected by the tax authorities. This may induce auditors to be stricter in 
reducing  downward  earnings  management  than  upward  earnings 
management.  This  underlines  the  importance  of  public  oversight  in 
maintaining audit quality. 
Overall,  the  findings  of  this  dissertation  suggest  that  there  are 
opportunities for the audit profession and audit regulators to enhance audit 
quality. With respect to the use of partner expertise as a risk management 
strategy,  the  results  of  the  first study  show  that  audit  firms  allocate  audit 




clients that have a higher auditor business risk. However, no association is 
found between client business risk and audit partner expertise. While one 
explanation could be that alternative risk management strategies are more 
efficient at managing this type of risk, it is also possible that auditor partner 
expertise is not used as a risk management strategy due to risk aversion by 
auditor  partners.  Therefore,  audit  firms  and  regulators  should  focus  on 
ensuring that the partner allocation process is effective since it reduces the 
risk that client risks are not sufficiently managed. Furthermore, the allocation 
of  partners  with  greater  expertise  to  risky  clients  results  in  a  higher 
probability that material misstatements are detected by the auditor. Hence, it 
is important that auditors with high levels of expertise are allocated to clients 
with greater risk because this will have a positive impact on audit quality. 
With  respect  to  auditor  independence,  the  findings  of  the  second  study 
suggest  that  auditors  may  acquiesce  to  pressure  by  influential  clients  to 
allow earnings management. Hence, regulators and audit firms should focus 
on  ensuring  that  auditors  remain  independent  from  their  clients. 
Furthermore, the findings suggest that public oversight is an important factor 
in  maintaining  auditor  independence.  This  adds  to  the  current  debate  on 
whether public oversight is needed to enhance audit quality. With respect to 
competition,  the  third  study  shows  that  competition  has  a  positive 
association  with  audit  quality,  but  only  for  clients  that  engage  in  income 
reducing  earnings  management.  This  suggests  that  regulators  need  to 
ensure  that  the  market  for  audit  services  remains  competitive,  because 
competition  is  positively  associated  with  audit  quality.  Furthermore,  the 
findings  of  the  third  study  underline  the  importance  of  public  oversight  in 
maintaining audit quality. 
 
 
5.4 Limitations and suggestions for future research 
 
There are a number of limitations to this dissertation. Some are general 
limitations that relate to all three studies, while some specifically relate to an 
individual study. The first general limitation relates to the fact that audit fee 
data were not publicly available in Belgium at the time of the study. This 
limitation affects each of the three studies. As a result of this limitation, the 
first study is required to measure industry experience based on the sales 
revenues  and  total  assets  of  the  audit  clients  instead  of  audit  fees.  The 
second  study  measures  auditor-client  economic  bonding  based  on  client 
revenues instead of audit fees. Similarly, the measures of competition used 
in the third study are computed based on client asset data instead of audit 
fee  data.  However,  the  natural  logarithms  of  client  revenues  and  client 
assets are found to be highly correlated with audit fees (e.g. Francis 1984, 
Moizer and Turley 1987, Craswell et al. 1995, Reynolds and Francis 2001). 
In  addition,  the  Belgian  Institute  of  Auditors  requires  a  direct  relationship 
between the level of the audit fees and client characteristics. Every auditor 
has to report an overview of its clients, the audit fees and the amount of 




the audit fees. Therefore, the use of client revenues or client assets instead 
of audit fees does not seem to be a major concern.  Although the proxies 
provide a reliable estimation of auditor-client economic bonding and relative 
market share distributions, they do not control for possible changes in the 
level of audit fees. Hence, it would be valuable to replicate these studies in a 
setting  where  regulators  require  both  public  and  private  companies  to 
disclose audit fees.  
The second general limitation relates to the external validity of the stu-
dies. Belgium has a relatively low litigious environment compared to com-
monly used settings in audit research, such as the U.K. and the U.S. Even 
though  prior  research  has  shown  that  there  are  mechanisms  other  than 
litigation in place to ensure that audit quality is maintained at a sufficiently 
high  level  regardless  of  a  relative  lack  of  litigation  (Gaeremynck  and 
Willekens 2003), external validity of the results may be considered an issue. 
The implication of this lack of litigation for the findings of the first study is that 
it is even more likely for audit partner expertise to be used as a risk man-
agement strategy in more litigious environments where the possible impact 
of unmanaged risks is greater. Regarding the second study, it is possible 
that auditors would constrain downward earnings management even further 
in a high litigious environment than in a low litigious environment. In contrast 
to the reported findings related to upward earnings management, however, it 
is possible that auditors will not acquiesce to pressure from their most in-
fluential clients to allow upward earnings management in a setting with a 
higher  risk  of  litigation.  Future  research  could  benefit  from  separately  ex-
amining the effect of litigation and public oversight on the likelihood that au-
ditors acquiesce to client pressure to allow upward earnings management in 
more litigious environments. It is unclear whether the association between 
competition and audit quality would be different in a setting with relatively 
higher litigation risk (e.g. Chaney et al. 2003). 
In addition to these general limitations, there are a number of limitations 
specific to individual studies. A specific limitation to the first study is the use 
of public data. Because the study is based on public data, it is not possible to 
control for all alternative risk management strategies that audit firms may 
use. To overcome this problem, the study uses a sample in which most of 
the other risk management strategies are unlikely to be used, and in which 
the use of partner expertise as a risk management strategy is most likely to 
occur. However, it would be worthwhile for future research to simultaneously 
examine the different risk management strategies that audit firms can use to 
manage client risk, as well as the extent to which audit firms use different 
risk management strategies based on different client risk characteristics. 
The use of public data results in an additional limitation for the first study. 
The measures of risk used in this study are based on public data as opposed 
to private data, which may potentially provide more accurate estimations of 
client risk. Private data, however, might be biased by auditor judgments. The 
use of public data to measure client risk does therefore not necessarily result 
in a less reliable measure of risk than a measure of risk based on private 




A limitation related to the third study is that the local markets in this study 
are defined based on the geographical locations of client and audit partners 
and an arguably arbitrary cut-off. Although robustness checks show that the 
results variations in the cut-off distance do not affect the results in any sig-
nificant way, it is still worthwhile for future research to study the association 
between competition and  audit quality using differently defined local audit 
markets. 
The  final  limitation,  which  also  affects  the  third  study,  relates  to  the 
measure  of  local  competition  developed  in  this  study.  This  measure  is 
developed at the audit partner level. It therefore implicitly assumes that audit 
partners  working  for  the  same  audit  firm  also  compete  for  clients. 
Competition amongst partners that are employed at the same audit firm is 
however likely to be very limited. Although sensitivity tests suggest that this 
issue does not have a significant impact on the results, it would be valuable 
if future research could develop a measure of local competition which takes 
local office capacity in account, as well as the limited competition amongst 
audit partners that work for the same audit firm. 
Finally,  there  is  one  additional  suggestion  for  future  research.  Belgian 
audits  are  based  on  three  year  renewable  contracts,  referred  to  as man-
dates. Auditors might be more likely to acquiesce to client pressure to allow 
earnings management in the last year of the mandate than in the prior two 
years  in  the  hope  of  renewing  the  contract  for  an  additional  three  year. 
Hence, audit quality is possibly lower during the last year of the mandate 
than during the first two years of the mandate. However, no relationship be-
tween the year of the mandate and earnings quality was observed. Future 
research  could  analyze  data  on  the  subsequent  fiscal  year  to  examine 
whether  more  earnings  management  discretion  was  given  to  clients  that 
subsequently switched to another audit firm, because the auditor might have 
been  under  pressure  to  allow  client  earnings  management  in  order  to 
increase  the  likelihood  of  mandate  renewal.  Because  of  data  restrictions 
caused by the need to measure auditor tenure, the study did not analyze 
whether  clients  switching  to  another  audit  firm  in  the  subsequent  year 
showed increased earnings management behavior during the year prior to 
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Dit proefschrift onderzoekt drie verschillende onderwerpen. Het eerste empi-
rische stuk bestudeert of accountantskantoren gebruik maken van expertise 
van partners om risico‟s te beheersen die verbonden zijn aan accountants-
controles.  Het  tweede  empirische  stuk  onderzoekt  of  economische 
afhankelijkheid van klanten de kwaliteit van accountantscontroles beïnvloedt. 
Het derde en laatste empirische stuk analyseert of de mate van concurrentie 
tussen accountants van invloed is op de kwaliteit van accountantscontroles. 
Aangezien accountants, zoals aangetoond door Simunic en Stein (1990), 
hun  complete  klantenbestand  in  beschouwing  nemen  bij  het  nemen  van 
beslissingen met betrekking tot individuele klanten is het van belang voor de 
empirische  onderzoeken  in  dit  proefschrift  om  gebruik  te  maken  van  een 
dataset waarin volledige portfolio‟s van klanten beschikbaar zijn. Bovendien 
is een vereiste voor het samenstellen van klantenbestanden dat het mogelijk 
is om te identificeren welk accountantskantoor, vestiging en partner verant-
woordelijk zijn voor een accountantscontrole. Verder zijn gegevens over de 
expertise van accountants alsmede financiële gegevens vereist. Ten slotte 
zijn gegevens nodig over de geografische locaties van accountants en klan-
ten, om de mate van concurrentie binnen lokale markten te bepalen. Aange-
zien de Belgische markt voor accountantscontroles aan al deze eisen vol-
doet, is dit een geschikte markt voor de studies in dit proefschrift. Voor de 
onderzoeken is daarom een dataset verzameld bestaande uit gegevens over 
alle accountantscontroles die uitgevoerd zijn in België tussen 1998 en 2006. 
De benodigde gegevens zijn verkregen via drie verschillende bronnen. Fi-
nanciële gegevens zijn beschikbaar in de Bel-First databank. Gegevens over 
accountants zijn verkregen middels ledenlijsten van het Belgische instituut 
van  de  bedrijfsrevisoren  (IBR).  Tenslotte  is  gebruik  gemaakt  van  Google 
Earth om geografische locaties van accountantskantoren en klanten te bepa-
len. 
Zoals  aangegeven  onderzoekt  het  eerste  empirische  stuk  of  accoun-
tantskantoren  gebruik  maken  van  de  verschillen  in  ervaringsniveaus  van 
partners als een strategie voor risicobeheersing. Accountantskantoren kun-
nen de risico‟s verbonden aan accountantscontroles beheersen door mid-
dels van het toewijzen van partners met hogere mates van expertise aan 
meer  risicovolle  klanten.  Bovendien  vereisen  controlestandaarden  dat 
controleteams over voldoende ervaring beschikken. Ondanks dat het voor 
accountantskantoren  van  belang is dat  partners met de meeste expertise 
worden toegewezen aan de meest risicovolle klanten, is het nog maar de 
vraag of dit in de praktijk gebeurt. Ten eerste is het toewijzingsproces van 
partners  aan  klanten  erg  complex  vanwege  de  verschillen  in 
ervaringsniveaus van partners en de variatie in risico karakteristieken van 
klanten. Tevens is risico aversie van partners mogelijk van negatieve invloed 




kunnen leiden dat relatief onervaren partners worden toegewezen aan de 
meeste risicovolle klanten. 
Gebaseerd op voorgaand onderzoek onderscheidt deze studie twee ver-
schillende maatstaven van expertise: algemene ervaring en branche speci-
fieke  ervaring.  Drie  verschillende  typen  risico‟s  worden  geanalyseerd:  ac-
countantscontrolerisico,  ondernemingsrisico  van  klanten,  en  onder-
nemingsrisico van accountants. Accountantscontrolerisico en ondernemings-
risico van klanten worden gemeten aan de hand van financiële gegevens. 
Ondernemingsrisico van de accountant is afhankelijk van de vraag of een 
klant al dan niet beursgenoteerd is. 
De resultaten laten zien dat accountants gebruik maken van algemene 
ervaring van partners, om het ondernemingsrisico van de accountant te be-
perken.  De  toewijzing  van  partners  met  meer  branchespecifieke  ervaring 
wordt gebruikt als strategie voor beheersing van accountantscontrolerisico. 
Er is geen bewijs gevonden voor de verwachting dat expertise van partners 
wordt gebruikt om het ondernemingsrisico van klanten te beperken. In zijn 
geheel genomen tonen de resultaten dat accountants gebruik maken exper-
tise van partners als strategie voor risicobeheersing. Hier moet wel de kant-
tekening bij geplaatst worden dat ervaren partners wellicht ervoor kiezen om 
klanten met een hoog ondernemingsrisico voor de accountant te controleren 
vanwege prestige en carrière ontwikkelingsmogelijkheden verbonden met de 
controle van beursgenoteerde ondernemingen. 
Het tweede empirische stuk bestudeert of economische afhankelijkheid 
van klanten de kwaliteit van accountantscontroles beïnvloedt. Accountants-
honoraria kunnen leiden tot een economische band tussen de accountant en 
de klant. Dit zorgt er mogelijk voor dat de accountant minder onafhankelijk is 
van de klant, wat een lagere kwaliteit van de accountantscontrole ten gevol-
ge zal hebben. Dit probleem speelt voornamelijk bij klanten die een relatief 
hoog honorarium betalen. In het geval dat de jaarrekening zoals goedge-
keurd door de accountant materiële afwijkingen bevat kan dit nadelige effec-
ten hebben op de reputatie van de accountant en bovendien kan de accoun-
tant  aangeklaagd  worden.  Deze  mogelijke  gevolgen  geven  een  stimulans 
voor de accountant om zich onafhankelijk op te blijven stellen, ongeacht de 
hoogte van het controlehonorarium (Reynolds en Francis 2001).  
Aangezien problemen met betrekking tot verminderde onafhankelijkheid 
zich eerder voordoen op partner of lokaal kantoor niveau dan op het niveau 
van de gehele accountantsorganisitie, bestudeert deze studie de gevolgen 
van economische afhankelijkheid op de kwaliteit van de accountantscontrole 
op deze drie niveaus. Verder onderscheidt de studie ondernemingen die hun 
winsten naar boven sturen van ondernemingen die hun winsten naar bene-
den  sturen.  Dit  verschil  is  van  belang,  aangezien  de  belastingdienst  een 
hogere prioriteit geeft aan het controleren van jaarverslagen van onderne-
mingen  controleert  die  hun  winsten  naar  beneden  sturen  dan  aan  het 
controleren  van  jaarverslagen  van  ondernemingen  die  hun  winsten  naar 
boven sturen. Gegeven dat de Belgische markt een beperkt aansprakelijk-
heidsrisico kent, creëert dit de mogelijkheid om te bestuderen of reputatie 
effecten voldoende zijn voor accountantskantoren om zich onafhankelijk op 
te stellen, of dat er een behoefte is aan een publieke toezichthouder. Summary in Dutch 
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Gebaseerd op eerder onderzoek maakt deze studie gebruik van een li-
neaire regressie om het effect van economische afhankelijkheid op de kwali-
teit  van  de  accountantscontrole  te  onderzoeken.  Economische  afhankelijk 
wordt  gemeten  op  basis  van  de  relatieve  grootte  van  klanten  binnen  het 
klantenbestand van een accountant. De kwaliteit van de accountantscontrole 
wordt gemeten aan de hand van korte termijn accruals.  
De  resultaten  van  deze  studie  tonen  aan  dat  economische  af-
hankelijkheid een lagere kwaliteit van de accountantscontrole ten gevolge 
heeft. Deze bevinding is echter alleen van toepassing voor ondernemingen 
die hun winsten naar boven sturen. Accountants laten niet meer ruimte toe 
voor ondernemingen die hun winsten naar beneden sturen. Deze bevinding 
suggereert dat er een rol is weggelegd voor een publieke toezichthouder om 
de  kwaliteit  van  accountantscontroles  te  garanderen.  De  resultaten  tonen 
geen bewijs dat problemen qua onafhankelijkheid zich eerder voordoen op 
het niveau van de partner dan op het niveau van de accountantsorganisatie. 
Dit  kan  mogelijk  verklaard  worden  door  de  geringe  groottes  van  accoun-
tantskantoren in België. 
Het laatste empirische stuk bestudeert het effect van concurrentie op de 
kwaliteit van de controle. Vanwege de hoge mate van concentratie wordt de 
markt voor accountantscontroles vaak bekritiseerd als zijnde een markt met 
beperkte  concurrentie  (e.g.  Government  Accountability  Office  2003; 
Financial  Stability  Forum  2006).  De  algemene  verwachting  is  dat  een 
beperkte mate van concurrentie op een markt leidt tot een lage kwaliteit. Het 
is echter onduidelijk of dit ook van toepassing is op de markt voor accoun-
tantscontroles.  Voorgaand  onderzoek  heeft  aangetoond  dat  een  hoge 
marktconcentratie  niet  per  definitie  gelijk  staat  aan  een  lage  mate  van 
concurrentie (Buijink et al. 1998). Bovendien is het niet duidelijk of standaard 
economische theoriën betreffende concurrentie en kwaliteit van toepassing 
zijn op accountantscontroles aangezien de kwaliteit van accountantscontro-
les niet direct waarneembaar is en bovendien is de markt voor accountants-
controles strikt gereguleerd. 
In lijn met voorgaand onderzoek maakt de studie gebruik van de Herfin-
dahl-index om de mate van marktconcentratie te meten. Tevens wordt een 
maatstaf van marktaandeel mobiliteit gebruikt om de mate van concurrentie 
te  meten.  Een  tweede  maatstaf  van  concurrentie,  concurrentiedichtheid, 
wordt in deze studie geintroduceerd. Net zoals in de tweede studie maakt 
deze studie gebruik van korte termijn accruals om de kwaliteit van accoun-
tantscontroles te meten. 
De resultaten van  deze studie laten  een negatief verband  zien tussen 
marktconcentratie en de kwaliteit van accountantscontroles. Teven toont de 
studie een positief verband tussen de mate van concurrentie op de markt 
voor accountantscontroles en de kwaliteit van accountantscontroles. Deze 
bevinding  suggereert  dat  concurrentie  op  de  markt  voor  accountants-
controles mogelijk is, ongeacht de hoge mate van marktconcentratie. 
Deze  en  verdere  conclusies  en  aanbevelingen  worden  in  hoofdstuk  5 
weergegeven. Dit hoofdstuk geeft tevens een overzicht van de beperkingen 
van het onderzoek en suggesties voor toekomstig onderzoek.  
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